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PHILOSOPHY

for foreign students

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PHILOSOPHY

(From Greek, by way of Latin, philosophia, "love of wisdom"), according to tradition ancient Greek mathematician and thinker Pythagoras was the first who began to use word “philosophy”. Most scientists regard philosophy in two aspects. First of all philosophy is world outlook. Secondly it is a science. World outlook considers the problem of world and man correlation. People become aware of the world by means of images and notions and besides by means of logically organized system of concepts and categories. Thus, there are two ways of spiritual mastering of the world, which form different types of world outlooks: emotionally-imaginative (myth, religion, art) and logically-rational (philosophy, science). So, philosophy is world outlook, firstly always looks like a system and, secondly, bases on arguments of intellect. This world outlook is connected with that a man realizes being as a whole, himself and his limits.

There are three criteria of science status: 1. Language, 2. Subject, 3. Methods. Philosophy has all these criteria, therefore it is a science.

The language of philosophy is the categories and concepts such as “being”, “matter”, “consciousness”, ”freedom”, “necessity”, “essence”, “existence” and a lot of others.

The subject of philosophy is the world as a whole, general principles and laws of its being and cognition.

Methods of philosophy are dialectics, sophistics, metaphysics, dogmatism, hermeneutics.

The process of philosophic cognition is always attended by value judgements. When one cognizes things even by means of senses, collation, comparison take place. Similar and unsimilar signs and qualities of things are selected. One selects what is important and interesting for him. Such value judgements are directed on man himself, his needs, his spiritual aspirations. They express attitude to a thing, its qualities (and are connected with the values.). Thus, philosophy is busy with not only truths, but values as well.

Philosophy consists of the number of parts:

1. Ontology (theory of being)- the part of philosophy, which studies the fundamental principles of the world.
2. Gnosiology(the second name “epistemology)- theory of knowledge concerned with the nature, scope and justification of knowledge.
3. Axiology- the theory of values.

According to the fields of reflection it is possible to distinguish within philosophy: logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophical anthropology, the history of philosophy, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of politics and law.

The interconnection of philosophy and medicine is very special theme. Modern medicine is the complex of scientific disciplines, which are theoretical basis for medical practice. Medical knowledge is vast and very heterogeneous. Hence it follows the goal of theoretical synthesis of medical notions and definition of the object of theoretization. Medicine deals with man. It is obvious that doctor activity is impossible without biological, humanistic and technological knowledge.

The vital activity of man has integrated character, which is not reduced to functions of organism. The concepts such as “holos”, that means “whole”, have been used more often in modern medicine. Quite new models of influence at integrated man are formed in methods of medicine.

Modern medicine has at its disposal huge reserves of knowledge, but it has not got integrated, fundamental knowledge about man. But there are no united connecting lines between different medical theories, conceptions and philosophic systems of world s interpretation. The search of such medicine s basis is the most important task of philosophy. In other words, medicine gives philosophy vast actual material, but philosophy gives medicine general method of scientific and theoretical cognition of life as a whole and vital activity of man especially. Two basic approaches to man arised in philosophy and they exist now and show themselves in medicine more distinctly. The talk is about eastern and western traditions in approach to man.

Control questions.

1. Can you give definition of philosophy?
2. What is the difference between philosophy and usual sciences?
3. Why philosophy is so necessary and important for medicine?

EASTERN PHILOSOPHY

Indian philosophy

General characteristics of Indian philosophy

Common concerns

The various Indian philosophies contain such a diversity of views, theories, and systems that it is almost impossible to single out characteristics that are common to all of them. Acceptance of the authority of the Vedas characterizes all the orthodox (astika) systems, but not the unorthodox (nastika) systems, such as Carvaka (radical materialism), Buddhism, and Jainism. Moreover, even when philosophers professed allegiance to the Vedas, their

allegiance did little to fetter the freedom of their speculative ventures. On the contrary, the acceptance of the authority of the Vedas was a convenient way for a philosopher's views to become acceptable to the orthodox, even if a thinker introduced a wholly new idea. Thus, the Vedas could be cited to corroborate a wide diversity of views; they were used by the Vaishesika thinkers (i.e., those who believe in ultimate particulars, both individual souls and atoms) as much as by the Advaita (monist) philosophers.

In most Indian philosophical systems, the acceptance of the ideal of moksa, like allegiance to the authority of the scriptures, was only remotely connected with the systematic doctrines that were being propounded. Many epistemological, logical, and even metaphysical doctrines were debated and decided on purely rational grounds that did not directly bear upon the ideal of moksa. Only the Vedanta ("end of the Vedas") philosophy and the Samkhya (a system that accepts a real matter and a plurality of the individual souls) philosophy may be said to have a close relationship to the ideal of moksa. The logical systems - Nyaya, Vaishesika, and Purva-mimamsa - are only very remotely related. Also, both the philosophies and other scientific treatises, including even the Kama-sutra ("Aphorisms on Love") and the Arthashastra ("Treatise on Material Gain"), recognized the same ideal and professed their efficacy for achieving it.

When Indian philosophers speak of intuitive knowledge, they are concerned with making room for it and demonstrating its possibility, with the help of logic-and there, as far as they are concerned, the task of philosophy ends. Indian philosophers do not seek to justify religious faith; philosophic wisdom itself is accorded the dignity of religious truth. Theory is not subordinated to practice, but theory itself, as theory, is regarded as being supremely worthy and efficacious.

Three basic concepts form the cornerstone of Indian philosophical thought: the self, or soul (atman), works (karma, or karman), and salvation (moksa). Leaving the Carvakas aside, all Indian philosophies concern themselves with these three concepts and their interrelations, though this is not to say that they accept the objective validity of these concepts in precisely the same manner. Of these, the concept of karma, signifying moral efficacy of human actions, seems to be the most typically Indian. The concept of atman, not altogether absent in Western thought, corresponds, in a certain sense, to the Western concept of a transcendental or absolute spirit self - important differences notwithstanding. The concept of moksa as the concept of the highest ideal has likewise been one of the concerns of Western thought, especially during the Christian Era, though it probably has never been as important as for the Hindu mind. Most Indian philosophies assume that moksa is possible, and the "impossibility of moksa" (anirmoksa) is regarded as a material fallacy likely to vitiate a philosophical theory.

In addition to karma, the lack of two other concerns further differentiates Indian philosophical thought from Western thought in general. Since the time of the Greeks, Western thought has been concerned with mathematics, and, in the Christian Era, with history. Neither mathematics nor history has ever raised philosophical problems for the Indian. In the lists of pramanas, or ways of knowing accepted by the different schools, there is none that includes mathematical knowledge or historical knowledge. Possibly connected with their indifference toward mathematics is the significant fact that Indian philosophers have not developed formal logic. The theory of the syllogism (a valid deductive argument having two premises and a conclusion) is, however, developed, and much sophistication has been achieved in logical theory. Indian logic offers an instructive example of a logic of cognitions (jnanani) rather than of abstract propositions - a logic not sundered and kept isolated from psychology and epistemology, because it is meant to be the logic of man's actual striving to know what is true of the world.

Buddhism

Religion and philosophy that developed from the teachings of the Buddha Gautama (or Gotama), who lived as early as the 6th century BC. Spreading from India to Central and Southeast Asia, China, Korea, and Japan, Buddhism has played a central role in the spiritual, cultural, and social life of the Eastern world and during the 20th century has spread to the West. This article surveys Buddhism from its origins to its elaboration in various schools, sects, and regional developments.

Ancient Buddhist scripture and doctrine developed primarily in two closely related literary languages of ancient India, Pali and Sanskrit. In this article, Pali and Sanskrit words that have gained some currency in English are treated as English words and are rendered in the form in which they appear in English-language dictionaries. Exceptions occur in special circumstances - as, for example, in the case of the Sanskrit term dharma (Pali: dhamma), which has meanings that are not usually associated with the English "dharma." Pali forms are given in the sections that deal with Buddhists whose primary sacred language was Pali (including discussions of the teaching of the Buddha, which are reconstructed on the basis of Pali texts). Sanskrit forms are given in the sections that deal with Buddhists whose primary focus was on Sanskritic traditions.

Founded by Siddharta Gautama, Buddhism developed into three major forms in the course of its more than 2,500-year history: Theravada ("Way of the Elders"), also called in derogation Hinayana ("Lesser Vehicle"); Mahayana ("Greater Vehicle"); and, stemming from it, Vajrayana ("Vehicle of the Thunderbolt"). A belief in saints prevails in all three groups.

Theravada Buddhism, claiming strict adherence to the teachings of the Buddha, recognizes as saints (arhats) those who have attained Nirvana (the state of bliss) and hence salvation from samsara (the compulsory circle of rebirth) by their own efforts. The word nirvana literally means “blowing out” or “cooling”. Blowing out suggests extinction. Cooling suggests not complete annihilation, but only the dying out of hot passion. The Buddha himself - having obtained Nirvana ("the destruction of greed, … hate,… and illusion") - is viewed as the first Buddhist, saint.

Disciples of the Buddha who reached Nirvana after him also are considered holy men. Furthermore, in early Buddhism, there were also women regarded as holy, including Prajapati, the Buddha's aunt and .stepmother - whose repeated requests finally caused the Buddha to permit women to enter his order-arid his wife Yashodhara.

Mahayana Buddhism, originating about the beginning of the Christian Era, rejected the Theravada belief that only monks may attain salvation. In Mahayana belief there is a path to redemption for all people, irrespective of their social standing. Salvation and the way to redemption are conceived in terms more liberal than those of Theravada. Mahayana Buddhists believe in an otherworldly paradise that allows for personal existence and in which dwell heavenly Buddhas (those who have attained Nirvana in previous worlds) and bodhisattvas ("Buddhas-to-be"). The heavenly Buddhas and bodhisattvas are believed to grant grace to sentient beings, so that salvation is no longer acquired by fleeing from the world and giving up worldly professions, but rather by faith (in the sense of trust) in the promise of a saviour deity. Thus, in Mahayana Buddhism, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas are viewed as the holy ones, the saints, who in compassion, attempt to aid others struggling for salvation. This concept is in striking contrast to the arhats of Theravada Buddhism, who follow the dying Buddha's last words, "Seek your own salvation with diligence." The basic altruistic concept of Mahayana then is that of the helping bodhisattva. Everyone should strive for this ideal in order to save as many fellowmen as possible as a bodhisattva and to bring them into the "Greater Vehicle" (Mahayana). Hence, the idea of faith in benevolent saints gains prominence in Mahayana Buddhism as a theistic religion of salvation. In Japanese Mahayana there are patron saints, such as Shotoku Taishi, the regent who supported the introduction and development of Buddhism in his country in about AD 600, after it had been introduced in AD 552.

Vajrayana Buddhism, embodying, among other views, Tantrism (a system of magical and esoteric practices), is mainly represented by Tibetan Buddhism. In addition to the innumerable saints of Mahayana Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism also accepts as living saints those who are regarded as incarnations (tulkus) of saints, scholars of the past, deities, or demons. The Dalai Lamas, heads of the Tibetan hierarchy, are viewed as reincarnations of Chen-re-zi (the bodhisattva of mercy. Avalokiteshvara).

Ethics China

The two greatest moral philosophers of ancient China, Lao-tzu (flourished c. 6th century BC) and Confucius (551-479 BC), thought in very different ways. Lao-tzu is best known for his ideas about the Tao (literally "Way," the Supreme Principle). The Tao is based on the traditional Chinese virtues of simplicity and sincerity. To follow the Tao is not a matter of keeping to any set list of duties or prohibitions, but rather of living in a simple and honest manner, being true to oneself, and avoiding the distractions of ordinary living. Lao-tzu's classic book on the Tao, Tao-te Ching, consists only of aphorisms and isolated paragraphs, making it difficult to draw an intelligible system of ethics from it. Perhaps this is because Lao-tzu was a type of moral skeptic: he rejected both righteousness and benevolence, apparently because he saw them as imposed on individuals from without rather than coming from their own inner nature. Like the Buddha, Lao-tzu found the things prized by the world-rank, luxury, and glamour-to be empty, worthless values when compared with the ultimate value of the peaceful inner life. He also emphasized gentleness, calm, and nonviolence. Nearly 600 years before Jesus, he said: "It is the way of the Tao ... to recompense injury with kindness." By returning good for good and also good for evil, Lao-tzu believed that all would become good; to return evil for evil would lead to chaos.

The lives of Lao-tzu and Confucius overlapped, and there is even an account of a meeting between them, which is said to have left the younger Confucius baffled. Confucius was the more down-to-earth thinker, absorbed in the practical task of social reform. When he was a provincial minister of justice, the province became renowned for the honesty of its people and their respect for the aged and their care for the poor. Probably because of its practical nature, the teachings of Confucius had a far greater influence on China than did those of the more withdrawn Lao-tzu.

Confucius did not organize his recommendations into any coherent system. His teachings are offered in the form of sayings, aphorisms, and anecdotes, usually in reply to questions by disciples. They aim at guiding the audience in what is necessary to become a better person, a concept translated as "gentleman" or "the superior man." In opposition to the prevailing feudal ideal of the aristocratic lord, Confucius presented the superior man as one who is humane and thoughtful, motivated by the desire to do what is good rather than by personal profit. Beyond this, however, the concept is not discussed in any detail; it is only shown by diverse examples, some of them trite: “A superior man's life leads upwards .... The superior man is broad and fair; the inferior man takes sides and is petty… A superior man shapes the good in man; he does not shape the bad in him.”

One of the recorded sayings of Confucius is an answer to a request from a disciple for a single word that could serve as a guide to conduct for one's entire life. He replied: "Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others." This rule is repeated several times in the Confucian literature and might be considered the supreme principle of Confucian ethics. Other duties are not, however, presented as derivative from this supreme principle, nor is the principle used to determine what is to be done when more specific duties - e.g., duties to parents and duties to friends, both of which were given prominence in Confucian ethics - should clash.

Confucius did not explain why the superior man chose righteousness rather than personal profit. This question was taken up more than 100 years after his death by his follower Mencius, who asserted that humans are naturally inclined to do what is humane and right. Evil is not in human nature but is the result of poor upbringing or lack of education. But Confucius also had another distinguished follower. Hsun-tzu, who said that man's nature is to

seek self-profit and to envy others. The Riles of morality are designed to avoid the strife that would otherwise follow from this nature. The Confucian school was united in its ideal of the superior man but divided over whether such an ideal was to be obtained by allowing people to fulfill their natural desires or by educating them to control those desires.

Taoism General characteristics

The great sages and their associated texts

Lao-tzu and the Tao-te Ching

Behind all forms of Taoism stands the figure of Lao-tzu, traditionally regarded as the author of the classic text known as the Lao-tzu, or the Tao-te Ching ("Classic of the Way of Power"). The first mention of Lao-tzu is found in another early classic of Taoist speculation, the Chuang-tzu (4th-3rd century BC), so called after the name of its author. In this work Lao-tzu is described as being one of Chuang-tzu's own teachers, and the same book contains many of the Master's (Lao-tzu's) discourses, generally introduced by the questions of a disciple. The Chuang-tzu also presents seven versions of a meeting of Lao-tzu and Confucius. Lao-tzu is portrayed as the cider and his Taoist teachings confound his celebrated interlocutor. The Chuang-tzu also gives the only account of Lao-tzu's death. Thus in this early source, Lao-tzu appears as a senior contemporary of Confucius (6th-5th century BC) and a renowned Taoist master, a curator of the archives at the court of the Chou dynasty (c. 1111-255 BC) and, finally, a mere mortal.

The first consistent biographical account, of Lao-tzu is found in the "Historical Records" (Shih-chi) - China's first universal history (2nd century BC) - of Ssu-ma Ch'ien. This concise resume has served as the classical source on the philosopher's life. Lao-tzu's family name was Li, his given name Erh, and he occupied the post of archivist at the Chou court. He is said to have instructed Confucius on points of ceremony. Observing the decline of the Chou dynasty. Lao-tzu left the court and headed west. At the request of Yin Hsi, the guardian of the frontier pass, he wrote his treatise on the Tao in two scrolls. lie then left China behind, and what became of him is not known. The historian quotes variant accounts, including one that attributed to Lao-tzu an exceptional longevity; the narrative terminates with the genealogy of eight generations of Lao-tzu's supposed descendants. With passing references in other early texts, this constitutes the body of information on the life of the sage as of the 2nd century BC; it is presumably legendary (see also Lao-tzu).

Modern scholarship has little to add to the Shih-chi account, and the Tao-te Ching, regarded by many scholars as a compilation that reached its final form only in the 3rd century BC, rather than the work of a single author, stands alone, with all its attractions and enigmas, as the 'fundamental text of both philosophical and religious Taoism.

The work's 81 brief sections contain only about 5,000 characters in all, from which fact derives still another of its titles, Lao Tzu's Five Thousand Words. The text itself appears in equal measure to express a profound quietism and determined views on government. It is consequently between the extremes of meditative introspection and political application that its many and widely divergent interpreters have veered.

.The Tao-te Ching was meant as a handbook for the ruler. He should be a sage whose actions pass so unnoticed that his very existence remains unknown. He imposes no restrictions or prohibitions on his subjects; "so long as I love quietude, the people will of themselves go straight. So long as I act only by inactivity, the people will of themselves become prosperous." His simplicity makes the Ten Thousand Beings passionless and still and peace follows naturally. He does not teach them discrimination, virtue, or ambition because "when intellect emerges, the great artifices begin. When discord is rife in families, dutiful sons' appear. When the State falls into anarchy, loyal subjects' appear." Thus, it is better to banish wisdom, righteousness, and ingenuity, and the people will benefit a hundredfold.

Therefore the Holy Man rules by emptying their hearts (minds) and filling their bellies, weakening their wills and strengthening their bones, ever striving to make the people knowledgeless and desireless.

The word people in this passage more likely refers not to the common people but to those nobles and intellectuals who incite the ruler's ambition and aggressiveness.

War is condemned but not entirely excluded: "Arms are ill-omened instruments," and the sage uses them only when he cannot do otherwise. He does not glory in victory; "he that has conquered in battle is received with rites of mourning."

The book shares certain constants of classical Chinese thought but clothes them in an imagery of its own. The sacred aura surrounding kingship is here rationalized and expressed as "inaction" (wu-wei), demanding of the sovereign no more than right cosmological orientation at the centre of an obedient universe. Survivals of archaic notions concerning the compelling effect of renunciation-which the Confucians sanctified as ritual "deference" (jang) - are echoed in the recommendation to "hold to the role of the female," with an eye to the ultimate mastery that comes of passivity.

It is more particularly in the function attributed to the Tao, or Way, that this little tract stands apart. The term Tao was employed by all schools of thought. The universe has its Tao; there is a Tao of the sovereign, his royal mode of being, while the Tao of man comprises continuity through procreation. Each of the schools, too, had its own Tao, its way or doctrine. But in the Tao-te Ching, the ultimate unity of the universal Tao itself is being proposed as a social ideal, It is this idealistic peculiarity that seems to justify later historians and bibliographers in their assignment of the term Taoist to the Tao-te Ching and its successors.

From a literary point of view, the Tao-te Ching is distinguished for its highly compressed style. Unlike the dialectic or anecdotal composition of other contemporary treatises, it articulates its cryptic subject matter in short, concise statements. More than half of these are in rhyme, and close parallelism recurs throughout the text. No proper name occurs anywhere. Although its historical enigmas are apparently insoluble, there is abundant testimony to the vast influence exercised by the book since the earliest times and in surprisingly varied social contexts. Among the classics of speculative Taoism, it alone holds the distinction of having become a scripture of the esoteric Taoist movements, which developed their own interpretations of its ambiguities and transmitted it as a sacred text.

Control questions.

1. Why did samsara give people a fright?
2. How does in India combine asceticism and healthcare?
3. What is the intercommunication between Ancient East philosophy and medicine?
4. How is relationship of the individual to social order and to the “way” understood by Confucians and Taoists?

ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

The pre-Socratic philosophers

Cosmology and the metaphysic of matter

Because the earliest Greek philosophers focused their attention upon the origin and nature of the physical world, they are often called cosmologists or naturalists. Though monistic views (which trace the origins of the world to a single substance); prevailed at first, they were soon followed by several pluralistic theories (which trace it to several ultimate substances).

Monistic cosmologies

There is a consensus, dating back at least to the 4th century BC and continuing to the present, that the first Greek philosopher was Thales of Miletus, who flourished in the first half of the 6th century DC. At that time the word philosopher ("lover of wisdom") had not yet been coined. Thales was counted, however, among the Seven Wise Men (Sophoi), whose name derives from a term that then designated inventiveness and practical wisdom rather than speculative insight. Thales showed these qualities by trying to give the mathematical knowledge that he derived from the Babylonians a more exact foundation and by using it for the solution of practical problems-such as the determination of the distance of a ship as seen from the shore or of the height of the Pyramids. Though he was also credited with predicting an eclipse of the Sun, it is likely that he merely gave a natural explanation of one on the basis of Babylonian astronomical knowledge.

Thales was considered the first Greek philosopher because he was the first to give a purely natural explanation of the origin of the world, free from all mythological ingredients. He upheld that everything had come out of water - an explanation based on the discovery of fossil sea animals far inland. His tendency (and that of his immediate successors) to give nonmythological explanations of the origin of the world was undoubtedly prompted by the fact that all of them lived on the coast of Asia Minor surrounded by a number of nations whose civilizations were much farther advanced than that of the Greeks and whose mythological explanations differed greatly both among themselves and from those of the Greeks. It appeared necessary, therefore, to make a fresh start on the basis of what a person could observe and figure out by looking at die world as it presented itself This procedure naturally resulted in a tendency to make sweeping generalizations on the basis of rather restricted but carefully checked observations.

Thales' disciple and successor, Anaximander of Miletus (mid-6th century), tried to give a more elaborate account of the origin and development of the ordered world (the cosmos). According to him, it developed out of the apeiron, something both infinite and indefinite (without distinguishable qualities). Within this apeiron something arose to produce the opposites of hot and cold. These at once began to struggle with each other and produced the cosmos. The cold (and wet) partly dried up (becoming solid earth), partly remained (as water), and - by means of the hot-partly evaporated (becoming air and mist), its evaporating part (by expansion) splitting up the hot into fiery rings, which surround the whole cosmos. Because these rings are enveloped by mist, however, there remain only certain breathing holes that are visible to men, appearing to them as Sun, Moon, and stars. Anaximander was the first to realize that upward and downward arc not absolute but, that downward means toward the middle of the Earth and upward away from it, so that the Earth had no need to be supported (as Thales had believed) by anything. Starting from Thales' observations, Anaximander tried to reconstruct the development of life in more detail. Life, being closely bound up with moisture, originated in the sea. All land animals, he held, are descendants of sea animals; because the first humans as newborn infants could not have survived without parents, Anaximander believed that they were born within an animal of another kind - specifically, a sea animal in which they were nurtured until they could fend for themselves. Gradually, however, the moisture will be partly evaporated, until in the end all things will have returned into the undifferentiated apeiron, "in order to pay the penalty for their injustice" - that of having struggled against one another.

Anaximander's successor, Anaximenes of Miletus (second half of the 6th century), taught that air was the origin of all things. His position was for a long time thought to have been a step backward because, like Thales, he placed a special kind of matter at the beginning of the development of the world. But this criticism missed the point. Neither Thales nor Anaximander appear to have specified the way in which the other things arose out of the water or apeiron. Anaximenes, however, declared that the other types of matter arose out of air by condensation and rarefaction. In this way, what to Thales had been merely a beginning became a fundamental principle that remained essentially the same through all of its transmutations. Thus, the term arche, which originally simply meant "beginning," acquired the new meaning of "principle," a term that henceforth played an enormous role in philosophy down to the present. This concept of a principle that remains the same through many transmutations is, furthermore, the presupposition of the idea that nothing can come out of nothing and that all of the comings to be and passings away that men observe are nothing but transmutations of something that essentially remains the same eternally. In this way it also lies at the bottom of all of the conservation laws - those of the conservation, of matter, of force, and of energy - that have been basic in the development of physics. Though Anaximenes of course did not realize all of the implications of his idea, its importance can hardly be exaggerated.

The first three Greek philosophers have often been called hylozoists because they seemed to believe in a kind of living matter. But this is hardly an adequate characterization. It is, rather, characteristic of them that they did not clearly distinguish between kinds of matter, forces, and qualities not between physical and emotional qualities. The same entity is sometimes called fire and sometimes the hot. Heat appears sometimes as a force and sometimes as a quality, and again there is no clear distinction between warm and cold as physical qualities and the warmth of love and the cold of hate. To realize these ambiguities is important to an understanding of certain later developments in Greek philosophy.

Xenophanes of Colophon (born c. 560 BC), a rhapsodist and philosophical thinker who emigrated from Asia Minor to Elea in southern Italy, was the first to bring out more clearly what was implied in Anaximenes' philosophy. He criticized the popular notions of the gods, saying that men made their gods in their own image. But, more importantly, he argued that there could be only one God, the ruler of the universe, who must be eternal. For, being the strongest of all beings, he could not have come out of something less strong, nor could he be overcome or superseded by something else, because, nothing could arise that is stronger than the strongest. The argument clearly rested on the axiom that nothing can come out of nothing and that nothing that is can really vanish.

This axiom was made more explicit and carried to its extreme consequences by Parmenides of Elea (first half of the 5th century BC), the founder of the so-called school of Eleaticism, of whom Xenophanes has been regarded as the teacher and forerunner. In a philosophical poem Parmenides insisted that "what is" cannot have come into being and cannot pass away because it would have to have come out of nothing or to become nothing, whereas nothing by its very nature does not exist. There can be no motion either; for it would have to be a motion into something that is-which is not possible since it would be blocked-or a motion into something that is not-which is equally impossible since what is not does not exist. Hence everything is solid immobile being. The familiar world, in which things move around, come into being, and pass away, is a world of mere belief (doxa). In a second part of the poem, however, Parmenides tried to give an analytical account of this world of belief, showing that it rested on constant distinctions between what is believed to be positive - i.e., to have real being, such as light and warmth-and what is negative - i.e., the absence of positive being, such as darkness and cold.

It is significant that Heraclitus of Ephesus, a contemporary of Parmenides, whose philosophy was later considered to be the very opposite of Parmenides' philosophy of immobile being, came, in some fragments of his work, near to what Parmenides tried to show: the positive and the negative, he said, arc merely different views of the same thing; death and life, day and night, or light and darkness are really one.

Pythagoras

b. c. 580 BC,, Samos, Ioniad. c. 500,, Mctapontum, Lucania

Greek philosopher, mathematician, and founder of the Pythagorean brotherhood that, although religious in nature, formulated principles that influenced the thought of Plato and Aristotle and contributed to the development of mathematics and Western rational philosophy (see Pythagoreanism). Pythagoras migrated to southern Italy about 532 BC, apparently to escape Samos' tyrannical rule, and established his ethico-political academy at Croton (now Crotona).

It is difficult to distinguish Pythagoras' teachings from those of his disciples. None of his writings has survived, and Pythagoreans invariably supported their doctrines by indiscriminately citing their master's authority. Pythagoras, however, is generally credited with the theory of the functional significance of numbers in the objective world and in music. Other discoveries often attributed to him (e.g., the incommensurability of the side and diagonal of a square, and the Pythagorean Theorem for right triangles) were probably developed only later by the Pythagorean school. More probably the bulk of the intellectual tradition originating with Pythagoras himself belongs to mystical wisdom rather than to scientific scholarship. The early evidence shows that he was famous for introducing the doctrine of metempsychosis, according to which the soul is immortal and is reborn in both human and animal incarnations. General reflections on the natural world such as "number is the wisest thing" and "the most beautiful, harmony" were preserved orally.

Democritus

b. 460 BCd. c. c. 370 Greek philosopher, a central figure in the development of the atomic theory of the universe.

Knowledge of Democritus' life is largely limited to untrustworthy tradition: it seems that he was a wealthy citizen of Abdera, in Thrace; that he traveled widely in the East; and that he lived to a great age. According to Diogenes Laertius, his works numbered 73; only a few hundred fragments have survived, mostly from his treatises on ethics.

Democritus' physical and cosmological doctrines were an elaborated and systematized version of those of his teacher, Leucippus. To account for the world's changing physical phenomena, Democritus asserted that space, or the Void, had an equal right with reality, or Being, to be considered existent. He conceived of the Void as a vacuum, an infinite space in which moved an infinite number of atoms that made up being (i.e., the physical world). These atoms are eternal and invisible; absolutely small, so small that their size cannot be diminished (hence the name atomon or "indivisible"); absolutely full and incompressible, as they are without pores and entirely fill the space they occupy; and homogeneous, differing only in shape, arrangement, position, and magnitude. But, while atoms thus differ in quantity, differences of quality are only apparent, owing to the impressions caused on our senses by different configurations and combinations of atoms. A thing is hot or cold, sweet or bitter, or hard or soft only by convention; the only things that exist in reality arc atoms and the Void. Thus, the atoms of water and iron are the same, but those of water, being smooth and round and therefore unable to hook onto one another, roll over and over like small globes, whereas those of iron, being rough, jagged, and uneven, cling together and form a solid body. Because all phenomena arc composed of the same eternal atoms, it may be said that nothing comes into being or perishes in the absolute sense of the words, although the compounds made out of the atoms arc liable to increase and decrease, explaining a thing's appearance and disappearance, or "birth" and "death".

"Just as the atoms are uncaused and eternal, so too, according to Democritus, is motion. Democritus posited the fixed and "necessary" laws of a purely mechanical system, in which there was no room for an intelligent cause working with a view to an end. He explained the origin of the universe as follows. The original motion of the atoms was in all directions - it was a sort of "vibration"; hence there resulted collisions and, in particular, a whirling movement, whereby similar atoms were brought together and united to form larger bodies and worlds. This happened not as the result of any purpose or design but rather merely as the result of "necessity"; i.e., it is the normal manifestation of the nature of the atoms themselves. Atoms and void being infinite in number and extent, and motion having always existed, there must always have been an infinite number of worlds, ail consisting of similar atoms in various stages of growth and decay.

Democritus devoted considerable attention to perception and knowledge. He asserted, for example, that sensations are changes produced in the soul by atoms emitted from other objects that impinge on it; the atoms of the soul can be affected only by the contact of other atoms. But sensations such as sweet and bitter are not as such inherent in the emitted atoms, for they result from effects caused merely by the size and shape of the atoms; e.g., sweet taste is due to round and not excessively small atoms. Democritus also was the first to attempt to explain color, which he thought was due to the "position" (which he differentiated from shape) of the constituent atoms of compounds. The sensation of white, for instance, is caused by atoms that are smooth and flat so as to cast no shadow; the sensation of black is caused by rough, uneven atoms.

Sophists

In the middle of the 5th century BC, Greek thinking took a somewhat different turn through the advent of the Sophists. The name is derived from the verb sophizesthai, "making a profession of being inventive and clever," and aptly described the Sophists, who, in contrast to the philosophers mentioned so far, asked money for their instruction. Philosophically they were, in a way, the leaders of a rebellion against the preceding development, which more and more had resulted in the belief that the real world is quite different from the phenomenal world. "What is the sense of such speculations?" they asked, since men do not live in these so-called real worlds. This is the meaning of the pronouncement of Protagoras of Abdera (mid-5th century) that "Man is the measure of all things, of those which are that they arc and of those which are not that they are not." For man the world is what it appears to him to be, not something else; and, though he meant man in general, he illustrated it by pointing out that even in regard to an individual man it makes no sense to tell him that it is really warm when he is shivering with cold, because for him it is cold - for him, the cold exists, is there.

His younger contemporary Gorgias of Leontini, famous for his treatise on the art of oratory, made fun of the philosophers in a book “Peri tou me ontos e peri physeos” ("On that which is not, or on Nature"), in which - referring to the "truly existing world," also called "the nature of things" - he tried to prove (1) that nothing exists, (2) that if something existed, man could have no knowledge of it, and (3) that if nevertheless somebody knew it, he could not communicate his knowledge to others. We can not express any knowledge we may have, because no two people can think of the same thing, since the same thing can not be in two places, and because we use words in speech, not colors or shapes or objects.

The Sophists were not only skeptical of what had by then become a philosophical tradition but also of other traditions. On the basis of the observation that different nations have different rules of conduct even in regard to things considered most sacred - such as the relations between the sexes, marriage, and burial - they concluded that

most rules of conduct are conventions. What is really important is to be successful in life and to gain influence on others. This they promised to teach. Gorgias was proud of the fact that, having no knowledge of medicine, he was more successful in persuading a patient to undergo a necessary operation than his brother, a physician, who knew when an operation was necessary. The older Sophists, however, were far from openly preaching immoralism. They, nevertheless, gradually came under suspicion because of their sly ways of arguing. One of the later Sophists, however, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (late 5th century), was bold enough to declare openly that "right is what is beneficial for the stronger or better one"; that is, for the one able to win the power to bend others to his will.

Socrates Ethics and politics

With Socrates the central problem of philosophy shifted from cosmology to the formulation of a rule of life, to the "practical use of reason." As the Apology relates, the specific message from God that Socrates brought to his fellowmen was that of the "care" or "tending" of one's "soul," to "make one's soul as good as possible" - "making it like God," in fact - and not to ruin one's life, as most men do, by putting care for the body or for "possessions" before care for the "soul", for the "soul" or psyche is that which is most truly a man's self. Socrates' view of the soul stands in sharp contrast with the Homeric and Ionian view of the psyche as "the breath of life," which is given up when the man "himself,"

his body, has perished, and also with the view prevalent in circles influenced by Orphic-type religions, according to which the soul is a sort of stranger loosely inhabiting the body, which "sleeps while the body is active, but wakes when the body sleeps"; instead, the soul came in the 4th century to be viewed as the normal walking personality, the seat of character and intelligence, "that," as Socrates says in Plato, "in virtue of which we are called wise or foolish, good or bad." And as this usage of the word first appears in writers who are known to have been influenced by Socrates (Isocrates, Plato, and Xenophon), it may fairly be ascribed to his influence. Thus the soul is the man. Socrates says that the only knowledge he has is that he knows nothing, but it would be a mistake to infer that he has no convictions about moral matters- convictions arrived at through a difficult process of reasoning. He holds that the unexamined life is not worth living, that it is better to be treated unjustly than to do injustice, that understanding of matters is the only unconditional good, that the virtues are all forms of knowledge and cannot be separated from each other, that death is not an evil, that good person cannot be harmed.

A man's happiness or well-being, in Socrates' view, depends directly on the goodness or badness of his soul. No one ever wishes for anything but true good - i.e., true happiness. But men miss their happiness because they do not know what it is. For real good they mistake things that are not really good (e.g., unlimited wealth or power). In this sense, "all wrong-doing is involuntary." Men need to know true good and not confuse it with anything else, so as to keep from using strength, health, wealth, or opportunity wrongly. If a man has this knowledge, he will always act on it, since to do otherwise would be to prefer known misery to known happiness. If a man really knew, for instance, that to commit a crime is worse than to suffer loss or pain or death, no fear of these things would lead him to commit the crime. To the professional Sophist, "goodness" is a neutral "accomplishment" that can always be put to either of two uses, a good one or a bad one. To Socrates, in contrast, knowledge of good is the one knowledge of which it is impossible to make an ill use; the possession of it is a guarantee that it will always be used properly. Thus, Socrates becomes-as against the relativism of Protagoras-the founder of the doctrine of an absolute morality based on the conception of a felicity that is the good not of Athenians or Spartans or even of Greeks but of man as man, as part of universal humanity.

Politics, from this point of view, is the statesman's task of "tending" the souls of all his fellow citizens and making them "as good as possible." The knowledge of good is also the foundation of all statesmanship. The radical vice of ancient democracy, according to Socrates, is that of putting society in the hands of men without true insight and with no adequate expert knowledge. His main criticism, however, is that, though in some departments democracy takes the advice only of a qualified expert, on questions of morality and justice it treats any one citizen's opinion as of equal value with another's.

Even a Themistocles or a Pericles plainly had no knowledge of true statesmanship: they gave the populace the things that tickled its taste, such as a navy and a commerce; but they were no "physicians of the body politic," for they did not promote "righteousness and temperance," the spiritual health of the community. Socrates maintained that he alone deserved the name of statesman, because he understood, as the men of action did not, that knowledge of the absolutely good is the necessary and sufficient condition of national well-being and felicity. Indeed, Plato's Republic may fairly be viewed as a picture of life in a society governed by this Socratic conviction. How far any of the special regulations of the Republic embody actual convictions of Socrates is mere than can be said, though it is significant that the Aspasia of Aeschines represents Socrates as maintaining one of Plato's "paradoxes," the capacity of women for war and for politics.

Plato

Plato (c. 427-347 BC) accepted the Parmenidean constraint on any theory of knowledge that both knowledge and its objects must be unchanging. One consequence of this, as Plato pointed out in Theaetetus, is that knowledge cannot have physical reality as its object. In particular, since sensation and perception have various kinds of motions as their objects, knowledge cannot be the same as sensation or perception. The negative thesis of Plato's

epistemology consists, then, in the denial that sense experience can be a source of knowledge on the ground that the objects apprehended through the senses arc subject to change. To the extent that humans have knowledge, they attain it by transcending the information provided by the senses in order to discover unchanging objects. But this can be done only by the exercise of reason, and in particular by the application of the dialectical method of inquiry inherited from Socrates.

The Platonic theory of knowledge is thus divided into two parts: a quest first to discover whether there are any unchanging objects and to identify and describe them and second to illustrate how they could be known by the use of reason, that is, via the dialectical method. Plato used various literary devices for illustrating his theory; the most famous of these is the allegory of the cave in Book VII of The Republic. The allegory depicts ordinary people as living locked in a cave, which represents the world of sense-experience; in the cave people see only unreal objects, shadows, or images. But through a painful process, which involves the rejection and overcoming of the familiar sensible world, they begin an ascent out of the cave into reality; this process is the analogue of the application of the dialectical method, which allows one to apprehend unchanging objects and thus acquire knowledge. In the allegory, this upward process, which not everyone is competent to engage in. culminates in the direct vision of the sun, which represents the source of knowledge.

In searching for unchanging objects, Plato begins his quest by pointing out that every faculty in the human mind apprehends a set of unique objects: hearing apprehends sounds but not odours; the sense of smell apprehends odours but not visual images; and so forth. Knowing is also a mental faculty, and therefore there must be objects that it apprehends. These have to be unchanging, whatever they arc. Plato's discovery is that there are such entities. Roughly, they are the items denoted by predicate terms in language: such words as "good," "white," or "triangle." To say "This is a triangle" is to attribute a certain property, that of being a triangle, to a certain spatiotemporal object, such as a particular figure drawn on a blackboard. Plato is here distinguishing between specific triangles that can be drawn, sketched, or painted and the common property they share, that of being triangular. Objects of the former kind he calls particulars. They are always located somewhere in the space-time order, that is, in the world of appearance. But such particular things are different from the common property they share. That is, if x is a triangle, and y is a triangle, and z is a triangle, x, y, and z are particulars that share a common property, triangularity. That common property is what Plato calls a "form" or "idea" (not using this latter term in any psychological sense). Unlike particulars, forms do not exist in the space-time order. Moreover, they do not change. They are thus the objects that one must apprehend in order to acquire knowledge.

Similar remarks apply, for example, to goodness, whiteness, or being to the right of. Particular things change; they come into and go out of existence. But whiteness never changes, and neither does triangularity; and, if they do not change, they are not subject to the ravages of lime. In that sense, they are eternal.

The use of reason for discovering unchanging forms is exercised in the dialectical method. The method is one of question and answer, designed to elicit a real definition. By a "real definition" is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that exactly delimit a concept. One may, for example, consider the concept of being the brother of Y. This can be explained in terms of the concepts of being male and of being a sibling of Y. These concepts together lay down necessary and sufficient conditions for anything's being a brother. One who grasps these conditions understands precisely what it is to be a brother.

The Republic begins with the use of the dialectical method to discover what justice is Cephalus proposes the thesis that "justice" means the same as "honesty in word and deed." Socrates searches for and finds a counterexample to this proposal. It is just, he points out, under some conditions, not to tell the truth or to repay debts. If one had borrowed a weapon from an insane person, who then demanded it back in order to kill an innocent person, it would be just to lie to him, stating that one no longer had the weapon. Therefore, "justice" cannot mean the same as "honesty in word" (i.e., telling the truth). By this technique of proposing one definition after another and subjecting each to possible counterexamples, Socrates attempts to find a definition that would be immune to counterexamples. To find such a definition would be to define the concept of justice, and in this way to discover the true nature of justice. In such a case one would be apprehending a form, the common feature that all just things share.

Plato's search for definitions and thereby the nature of forms is a search for knowledge. But how should knowledge in general be defined? In Theaetetus Plato argues that it involves true belief. No one can know what is false. A person may mistakenly believe that he knows something, which is in fact false, but this is only thinking that one knows, not knowing. Thus, a person may confidently assert, "I know that Columbus was the first European to land in North America" and be unaware that other Europeans, including Erik the Red, preceded Columbus. So knowledge is at least true belief, but it must also be something more. Suppose that someone believes there will be an earthquake in September because of a dream he had in April and that there in fact is an earthquake in September, although there is no connection between the dream and the earthquake. That person has a true belief about the earthquake but not knowledge. What the person lacks is a good reason supporting his true belief. In a word, the person lacks justification for it. Thus, in Theaetetus, Plato concludes that knowledge is justified true belief.

Although it is difficult to explain what justification is, most philosophers accepted the Platonic analysis of knowledge as fundamentally correct until 1963, when the American philosopher Edmund L. Gettier produced a counterexample that shook the foundations of epistemology: suppose that Kathy knows Oscar very well and that Oscar is behind her, out of sight, walking across the mall. Further, suppose that in front of her she sees walking toward her someone who looks exactly like Oscar; unbeknownst to her, it is Oscar's twin brother. Kathy forms the

belief that Oscar is walking across the mall. Her belief is true, because he is walking across the mall (though she does not see him doing it). And her true belief seems to be justified, because she formed it on the same basis she would have if she had actually seen Oscar walking across the mall. Nonetheless, Kathy does not know that Oscar is walking across the mall, because the justification for her true belief is not the right kind. What her true belief lacks is an appropriate causal connection to its object.

The first elaborate work of European political philosophy is the Republic of Plato (c. 378 BC), a masterpiece of insight and feeling, superbly expressed in dialogue form and probably meant for recitation. Further development of Plato's ideas is undertaken in his Statesman and Laws, the latter prescribing the ruthless methods whereby they might be imposed. Plato grew up during the Great War between Athens and Sparta in which Athens suffered defeat and, like many political philosophers, tried to find remedies for prevalent political injustice and decline. Indeed, the Republic is the first of the utopias, though not one of the more attractive; and it is the first classic attempt of a European philosopher to moralize political life.

Cast as a lively discussion between Socrates, whose wisdom Plato is recounting, and various leisured Athenians, Books V, VII-V1II, and IX of the Republic state the major themes of political philosophy with poetic power. Plato's work has been criticized as static and class bound, reflecting the moral and aesthetic assumptions of an elite in a slave-owning civilization and bound by the narrow limits of the city-state. The work is indeed a classic example of a philosopher's vivisection of society, imposing by relatively humane means the rule of a high-minded minority.

The Republic is a criticism of current Hellenic politics-often an indictment. It is based upon a metaphysical act of faith, for Plato believes that a world of permanent Forms exists beyond the limitations of human experience and mat morality and the good life, which the state should promote, are reflections of these ideal Forms (see Platonism). The point is best made in the famous simile of the cave, in which men are chained with their faces to the wall and their backs to the light, so that they see only (he shadows of reality. So constrained, they shrink from what is truly "real" and permanent and need to be forced to face it. This idealistic doctrine, known misleadingly as Realism (in nontechnical language it is hardly realistic), pervades all Plato's philosophy: its opposite doctrine, Nominalism, declares that only particular and observed "named" data are accessible to the mind. On his Realist assumption, Plato, who was perhaps influenced by Indian thought, regards most ordinary life as illusion and the current evils of politics as the result of men pursuing brute instinct. It follows that:

Unless philosophers bear kingly rule in cities or those who are now called kings and princes become genuine and adequate philosophers, and political power and philosophy are brought together. … there will be no respite from evil for cities.

Only philosopher-statesmen can apprehend permanent and transcendent Forms and turn to "face the brightest blaze of being" outside the cave, and only philosophically minded men of action can be the saviours and helpers of the people.

Plato is thus indirectly the pioneer of modern beliefs that only a party organization, inspired by correct and "scientific" doctrines, formulated by the written word and interpreted by authority, can rightly guide the state. His rulers would form an elite, not responsible to the mass of the people. Thus, in spite of his high moral purpose, he has been called an enemy of the open society and the father of totalitarian lies. But he is also an anatomist of the evils of unbridled appetite and political corruption and insists on the need to use public power to moral ends.

Having described his Utopia, Plato turns to analyze the existing types of government in human terms with great insight. Kingly government is the best but impracticable; in oligarchies the rule of the few and the pursuit of wealth divide societies - the rich become demoralized and the poor envious, and there is no harmony in the state. In democracy, in which the poor get the upper hand, demagogues distribute "a peculiar kind of equality to equals and unequals impartially," and the old flatter the young, fawning on their juniors to avoid the appearance of being sour or despotic. The leaders plunder the propertied classes and divide the spoils among themselves and the people until confusion and corruption lead to tyranny, a worse form of government. For the tyrant becomes a wolf instead of a man and "lops off potential rivals and starts wars to distract the people from their discontent". "Then, by Zeus," Plato concludes, "the public learns what a monster they have begotten."

In the Statesman Plato admits that, although there is a correct science of government, like geometry, it cannot be realized, and he stresses the need for the rule of law, since no man can be trusted with unbridled power. He then examines which of the current forms of government is the least difficult to live with, for the ruler, after all, is an artist who has to work within the limits of his medium. In the Laws, purporting to be a discussion of how best to found a polis in Crete, he presents a detailed program in which a state with some 5,000 citizens is ruled by 37 curators of laws and a council of 360. But the keystone of the arch is a sinister and secret Nocturnal Council to be "the sheet anchor of the state," established in its "central fortress as guardian." Poets and musicians will be discouraged and the young subjected to a rigid, austere, and exacting education. The stark consequence of Plato's political philosophy here becomes apparent. He had, nonetheless, stated, in the dawn of European political thought, the normative principle that the state should aim at promoting the good life and social harmony and that the rule of law, in the absence of the rule of philosopher-kings, is essential to this purpose.

Aristotelianism

For many people, Plato is the type of an other-worldly, Aristotle of a this-worldly philosopher. Plato found reality to lie in things wholly remote from sense; Aristotle took form to be typically embodied in matter and thought

it his job as a philosopher to make sense of the here and now. The contrast is to some extent overdrawn for Aristotle, too, believed in pure form (God and the astral intelligences - the intelligent movers of the planets-were supposed to satisfy this description), and Plato was sufficiently concerned with the here and now to want to change human society radically. It remains true, nevertheless, that Aristotelianism is in essentials a form of immanent metaphysics, a theory that instructs men on how to take the world they know rather than one that gives them news of an altogether different world.

The key concepts in Aristotelianism are substance, form and matter, potentiality and actuality, and cause. Whatever happens involves some substance or substances; unless there were substances, in the sense of concrete existents, nothing could be real whatsoever. Substances, however, are not, as the name might suggest, mere parcels of matter; they are intelligible structures, or forms, embodied in matter. That a thing is of a certain kind means that it has a certain form or structure. But the structure as conceived in Aristotelianism is not merely static. Every substance, in this view, not only has a form but is, as it were, striving to attain its natural form; it is seeking to be in actuality what it is potentially, which is in effect to be a proper specimen of its kind. Because this is so, explanation in this system must be given in teleological rather than mechanical terms. For Aristotle, form is the determining element in the universe, but it operates by drawing things on, so that they become what they have it in themselves to be rather man by acting as a constant efficient cause (i.e., tire agent that initiates the process of change). The notion of an efficient cause has a role in Aristotelianism-as Aristotle put it, it takes a man, a developed specimen of his kind, to beget a man; it is, however, a subordinate role and yields pride of place to a different idea, namely, form considered as purpose.

For reasons connected with his astronomy, Aristotle postulated a God. His God, however, had nothing to do with the universe; it was not his creation, and he was, of necessity, indifferent to its vicissitudes (he could not otherwise have been an unmoved mover). It is a mistake to imagine that everything in the Aristotelian universe is trying to fulfill a purpose that God has ordained for it. On the contrary, the teleology of which use is here made is unconscious; although things all tend to an end, they do not in general consciously seek that end. They are like organs in a living body that fulfill a function and yet seemingly have not been put there for that purpose.

As this last remark will suggest, an important source of Aristotelian thought is reflection on natural growth and decay. Aristotle, who was the son of a doctor, was himself a pioneer in natural history, and it is not surprising that he thought in biological terms. What is surprising, and gives his system a continuing interest, is the extent to which he succeeded in applying ideas in fields that are remote from their origin. He was without doubt more successful in some fields than in others: in dealing with the phenomena of social life, for instance, as opposed to those of physical reality. His results overall, however, were impressive enough for his system not only to dominate men's minds for many centuries but to constitute a challenge even today. Men still, on occasions, think like Aristotle, and, as long us that is so, Aristotelianism will remain a live metaphysical option.

Hippocrates

Medical thought had reached this stage and had partially discarded the conceptions based upon magic and religion by 460 BC, the year that Hippocrates is said to have been born. Although he has been called the father of medicine, little is known of his life, and there may, in fact, have been several men of this name; or Hippocrates may have been the author of only some, or none, of the books that make up the Hippocratic Collection (Corpus Hippocraticum). Ancient writers held that Hippocrates taught and practiced medicine in Cos, the island of his birth, and in other parts of Greece, including Athens, and that he died at an advanced age.

Whether Hippocrates was one man or several, the works attributed to him mark the stage in Western medicine where disease was coming to be regarded as a natural rather than a supernatural phenomenon and doctors were encouraged to look for physical causes of illness. Some of the works, notably the Aphorismi (Aphorisms), were used as textbooks until the 19th century. The first and best-known aphorism is, "Life is Short, Art long, Occasion sudden and dangerous, Experience deceitful, and Judgment difficult" (often shortened to the Latin tag, "Ars longa, vita brevis"). This is followed by brief comments on diseases and symptoms, many of which remain valid.

The thermometer and the stethoscope were not then known; nor, indeed, did Hippocrates employ any aid to diagnosis beyond his own powers of observation and logical reasoning. He had an extraordinary ability to foretell the course of a malady, and he laid more stress upon the expected outcome, or prognosis, of a disease than upon its identification, or diagnosis. He had no patience with the idea that disease was a punishment sent by the gods. Writing of epilepsy, then called "the sacred disease," he said. "It is not any more sacred than other diseases, but has a natural cause, and it’s supposed divine origin is due to man's inexperience. Every disease." he continued, "has its own nature, and arises from external causes.

Hippocrates noted the effect of food, of occupation, and especially of climate in causing disease, and one of his most interesting books, entitled De acre, aquis et locis (Air, Waters and Places), would today be classed as a treatise on human ecology. Pursuing this line of thought, Hippocrates stated that "our natures arc the physicians of our diseases" and advocated that this tendency to natural cure should be fostered. He laid much stress on diet and the use of few drugs. He knew well how to describe illness clearly and concisely and recorded failures as well as successes; he viewed disease with the eye of the naturalist and studied the entire patient in his environment.

Perhaps the greatest legacy of Hippocrates is the charter of medical conduct embodied in the so-called Hippocratic Oath, which has been adopted as a pattern by physicians throughout the ages:

I swear by Apollo the physician, and Asclepius, and Health, and All-heal, and all the gods and goddesses ... to reckon him who taught me this Art equally dear to me as my parents, to share my substance with him, and relieve his necessities if required; to look upon his offspring in the same footing as my own brothers, and to teach them this art, if they shall wish to learn it., without fee or stipulation; and that by precept, lecture, and every other mode of instruction, I will impart a knowledge of the Art to my own sons, and those of my teachers, and to disciples bound by a stipulation and oath according to the law of medicine, but to none others. I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. 1 will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I. will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion. . . . Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption; and, further from the seduction of females or males, of freemen and slaves. Whatever, in connection with my professional practice or not, in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret.

Not strictly an oath, it was, rather, an ethical code or ideal, an appeal for right conduct. In one or other of its many versions, it has guided the practice of medicine throughout the world for more than 2,000 years.

Control questions.

1. Compare the features of Greek philosophy with Eastern philosophy.
2. Comment on phrase of Protagoras: “Man is the measure of all things”.
3. Explain the thought of Socrates: “I know, that I know nothing”.
4. What is thought of atoms today?

THEOLOGIC PHILOSOPHY

Tertullian

In antiquity most Christians never forgave him for his apostasy (rejection of his earlier faith) to Montanism. Later Christian writers mention him only infrequently, and then mostly unfavourably. Somewhat grudgingly, however, they acknowledged his literary gifts and acute intelligence. Modern scholars, however, do not share this earlier view. In the 19th and 20th centuries Tertullian has been widely read and studied and is considered one of the formative figures in the development of Christian life and thought in the West.

Tertullian is usually considered the outstanding exponent of the outlook that Christianity must stand uncompromisingly against its surrounding culture. Recent scholarship has tended to qualify this interpretation, however. Because he was a moralist rather than a philosopher by temperament-which probably precipitated his famous question, "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?"-Tertullian's practical and legal bent of mind expressed what would later be taken as the unique genius of Latin Christianity. Like most educated Christians of his day, he recognized and appreciated the values of the Greco-Roman culture, discriminating between those he could accept and those he had to reject. Tertullian was hostile to rationality. There is his celebrated phrase about God: It is certain because it is impossible.

Augustine

Augustine is generally recognized as having been the greatest thinker of Christian antiquity. His mind was the crucible in which the religion of the New Testament was most completely fused with the Platonic tradition of Greek philosophy; and it was also the means by which the product of this fusion was transmitted to the Christendom’s of medieval Roman Catholicism and Renaissance Protestantism.

This unique significance would have belonged to Augustine had he never written the famous Confessions, in which at the age of about 45 be told the story of his own restless youth and of the stormy voyage that had ended, as he believed, 12 years before he put it in writing, in the haven of the Catholic Church. It is easy to forget that the real work of Augustine's life did not begin until the last scene of the Confessions was already receding for him into a remembered past. Moreover, the Confessions themselves are not so much autobiography as they are devotional outpourings of penitence and thanksgiving. Augustine's conscientious memory generally can be trusted for the facts: his reflections upon them are those of the bishop on his knees. This is not to say that, in any attempt to understand or appreciate the mind of the bishop, the Confessions can be neglected. The picture must, however, be drawn in proper proportion; it is essential to avoid giving undue prominence to what should be no more than its background.

Thomas Aquinas Albertus

From philosophy, history of Thomas Aquinas Albertus Magnus' Dominican confrere and pupil Thomas Aquinas (1224/25-1274) shared his master's great esteem for the ancient philosophers, especially Aristotle, and also for the more recent Arabic and Jewish thinkers. He welcomed truth wherever he found it and used it for the enrichment of Christian thought. For him reason and faith cannot contradict each other because they come from the

same divine source. In his day conservative theologians and philosophers regarded Aristotle with suspicion and leaned toward the more traditional Christian Neo-Platonism. Thomas realized that their suspicion was due, in part, to the fact that Aristotle's philosophy had been distorted by his Arabic commentators; so he wrote his own commentaries on Aristotle to show the essential soundness of his system and to convince contemporaries of its value for Christian theology.

Thomas's own philosophical views are best expressed in his theological works, especially his Summa theologiae (1265/66-1273; Eng. trans., Summa theologiae) and Summa contra gentiles (1258-64; Summa Against the Gentiles). In these works he clearly distinguishes between the domains and methods of philosophy and theology. The philosopher seeks the first causes of things, beginning with data furnished by the senses; the subject of the theologian's inquiry is God as revealed in sacred Scripture. In theology, appeal to authority carries most weight; in philosophy, it carries least.

Thomas found Aristotelianism and, to a lesser extent, Platonism useful instruments for Christian thought and communication; but he transformed and deepened everything he borrowed from them. For example, he took over Aristotle's proof of the existence of a primary unmoved mover, but the primary mover at which Thomas arrives is very different from that of Aristotle; it is in fact the God of Judaism and Christianity. He also adopted Aristotle's teaching that the soul is man's form and the body is his matter, but for Aquinas this does not entail, as it does for the Aristotelians, the denial of the immortality of the soul or the ultimate value of the individual. Thomas never compromised Christian doctrine by bringing it into line with the current Aristotelianism; rather, he modified and corrected the latter whenever it clashed with Christian belief. The harmony he established between Aristotelianism and Christianity was not forced but achieved by a new understanding of philosophical principles, especially the notion of being, which he conceived as the act of existing (esse). For him, God is pure being, or the act of existing. Creatures participate in being according to their essence; for example, man participates in being, or the act of existing, to the extent that his humanity, or essence, permits. The fundamental distinction between God and creatures is that creatures have a real composition of essence and existence, whereas God's essence is his existence

Avicenna

Avicenna's influence in the Western world, Avicenna's influence was felt, though no distinct school of "Latin Avicennism" can be discerned as can with Averroes, the great Spanish-Arabic philosopher. Avicenna's "Book of Healing" was translated partially into Latin in the 12ш century, and the complete Canon appeared in the same century. These translations and others spread the thought of Avicenna far and wide in the West. His thought, blended with that of St. Augustine, the Christian philosopher and theologian, was a basic ingredient in the thought of many of the medieval Scholastics, especially in the Franciscan schools. In medicine the Canon became the medical authority for several centuries, and Avicenna enjoyed an undisputed place of honour equalled only by the early Greek physicians Hippocrates and Galen. In the East his dominating influence in medicine, philosophy, and theology has lasted over the ages and is still alive within the circles of Islamic thought. It was in metaphysics that Avicenna made his greatest contributions to philosophy, brilliantly synthesizing the rival approaches of the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic tradition with the creationist monotheism of Islamic dialectical theology. According to Avicenna, any being must be either necessary or contingent, but if contingent, it requires a cause; since no infinite causal regress is possible, there must be a Necessary Being, which is therefore simple, the ultimate cause of all other things.

Averroes

To arrive at a balanced appraisal of Averroes' thought it is essential to view his literary work as ₐ whole. In particular, a comparison of his religious-philosophical treatises with his Commentary on Plato's Republic shows the basic unity of his attitude to the Shari'ah dictated by Islam and therefore determining his attitude to philosophy, more precisely to the nomos, the law of Plato's philosopher-king, it will then become apparent that there is only one truth for Averroes, that of the religious law, which is the same truth that the metaphysician is seeking. The theory of the double truth was definitely not formulated by Averroes, but rather by the Latin Averroists. Nor is it justifiable to say that philosophy is for the metaphysician what religion is for the masses. Averroes stated explicitly and unequivocally that religion is for all three classes; that the contents of the Shari'ah are the whole and only truth for all believers; and that religion's teachings about reward and punishment and the hereafter must be accepted in their plain meaning by the elite no less than by the masses. The philosopher must choose the best religion, which, for a Muslim, is Islam as preached by Muhammad, the last of the prophets, just as Christianity was the best religion at the time of Jesus, and Judaism at the time of Moses.

It is significant that Averroes could say in his Commentary on Plato's Republic that religious law and philosophy have the same aim and in the Fasl that "philosophy is the companion and foster-sister of the Shari'ah." Accepting Aristotle's division of philosophy into theoretical (physics and metaphysics) and practical (ethics and politics), he finds that the Shari'ah teaches both to perfection: abstract knowledge commanded as the perception of God, and practice - the ethical virtues the law enjoins (Commentary on Plato's Republic). In the T3hafut he maintains that "the religious laws conform to the truth and impart knowledge of those actions by which the happiness of the whole creation is guaranteed." There is no reason to question the sincerity of Averroes. These statements reflect the same attitude to law and the same emphasis on happiness. Happiness as the highest good is the aim of political

science. As a Muslim, Averroes insists on the attainment of happiness in this and the next life by all believers. This is, however, qualified by Averroes as the disciple of Plato; the highest intellectual perfection is reserved for the metaphysician, as in Plato's ideal state. But the Muslim's ideal state provides for the happiness of the masses as well because of its prophetically revealed law, which is superior to the Greek nomos (law) for this reason. The philosopher Averroes distinguishes between degrees of happiness and assigns every believer the happiness that corresponds to his intellectual capacity. He takes Plato to task for his neglect of the third estate because Averroes believes that everyone is entitled to his share of happiness. Only the Shari'ah of Islam cares for ail believers. It legitimates speculation because it demands that the believer should know God. This knowledge is accessible to the naive believer in metaphors, the inner meaning of which is intelligible only to the metaphysician with the help of demonstration. On this point all falasifah are agreed, and all recognize the excellence of the Shari'ah stemming from its divinely revealed character. But only Averroes insists on its superiority over the nomos.

Insisting on the prerogative of the metaphysician-understood as a duty laid upon him by God-to interpret the doctrines of religion in the form of right beliefs and convictions (like Plato's philosopher-king), he admits that the Shari'ah contains teachings that surpass human understanding but that must be accepted by all believers because they contain divinely revealed truths. The philosopher is definitely bound by the religious law just as much as the masses and the theologians, who occupy a position somewhere in between. In his search for truth the metaphysician is bound by Arabic usage, as is the jurist in his legal interpretations, though the jurist uses subjective reasoning only, in contrast to the metaphysician's certain proof. This means that the philosopher is not bound to accept what is contradicted by demonstration. He can, thus, abandon belief in the creation out of nothing since Aristotle demonstrated the eternity of matter. Hence creation is a continuing process. Averroes sought justification for such an attitude in the fact that a Muslim is bound only by consensus (ijma') of the learned in a strictly legal context where actual laws and regulations are concerned. Yet, since there is no consensus on certain theoretical statements, such as creation, he is not bound to conform. Similarly, anthropomorphism is unacceptable, and metaphorical interpretation of those passages in Scripture that describe God in bodily terms is necessary. And the question whether God knows only the universals, but not the particulars, is neatly parried by Averroes in his statement that God has knowledge of particulars but that his knowledge is different from human knowledge. These few examples suffice to indicate that ambiguities and inconsistencies are net absent in Averroes' statements.

The Commentary on Plato's Republic reveals a side of Averroes that is not to be found in his other commentaries. While he carried on a long tradition of attempted synthesis between religious law and Greek philosophy, he went beyond his predecessors in spite of large-scale dependence upon them. He made Plato's political philosophy, modified by Aristotle, his own and considered it valid for the Islamic state as well. Consequently, he applied Platonic ideas to the contemporary Almoravid and Almohad states in a sustained critique in Platonic terms, convinced that if the philosopher cannot rule, he must try to influence policy in the direction of the ideal state. For Plato's ideal state is the best after the ideal state of Islam based on and centered in the Shari'ah as the ideal constitution. Thus, he regrets the position of women in Islam compared with their civic equality in Plato's Republic. That women are used only for childbearing and the rearing of offspring is detrimental to the economy and responsible for the poverty of the state. This is most unorthodox.

Of greater importance is his acceptance of Plato's idea of the transformation and deterioration of the ideal, perfect state into the four imperfect states. Mu'awiyah I, who in Muslim tradition perverted the ideal state of the first four caliphs into a dynastic power state, is viewed by Averroes in the Platonic sense as having turned the ideal state into a timocracy - a government based on love of honour. Similarly, the Almoravid and Almohad states are shown to have deteriorated from a state that resembled the original perfect Shari'ah state into timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny, Averroes here combines Islamic notions with Platonic concepts. In the same vein he likens the false philosophers of his time, and especially the mutakallimun, to Plato's sophists. In declaring them a real danger to the purity of Islam and to the security of the state, he appeals to the ruling power to forbid dialectical theologians to explain their beliefs and convictions to the masses, thus confusing them and causing heresy, schism, and unbelief. The study of The Republic and the Nicomachean Ethics enabled the falasifah to see more clearly the political character and content of the Shari'ah in the context of the classical Muslim theory of the religious and political unity of Islam. Leaning heavily on the treatment of Plato's political philosophy by al-Farabi, a 10th-century philosopher, Averroes looks at The Republic with the eyes of Aristotle, whose Nicomachean Ethics constitutes for Averroes the first, theoretical part of political science. He is, therefore, only interested in Plato's theoretical statements. Thus fie concentrates on a detailed commentary on Books II-IX of The Republic and ignores Plato's dialectical statements and especially his tales and myths, principally the myth of Er. He explains Plato, whose Laws and Politicos he also knows and uses, with the help, and in the light, of Aristotle's Analytic posteriora, De anima, Physical, and Nicomachean Ethics. Naturally, Greek pagan ideas and institutions are replaced by Islamic ones. Thus Plato's criticism of poetry (Homer) is applied to Arab pre-Islamic poetry, which he condemns. Averroes sees much common ground between the Shari'ah and Plato's general laws (interpreted with the help of Aristotle), notwithstanding his conviction that the Shari'ah is superior to the nomos. He accepts al-Farabi's equation of Plato's philosopher-king with the Islamic imam, or leader and lawgiver, but leaves it open whether the ideal ruler must also be a prophet. The reason for this may well be that, as a sincere Muslim, Averroes holds that Muhammad was "the seal of the prophets" who promulgated the divinely revealed Shari'ah once and for all. Moreover, Averroes exempts Muhammad from the general run of prophets, thus clearly rejecting the psychological explanation of prophecy through the theory of emanation adopted by the other falasifah. No trace of this theory can be discovered in

Averroes' writings, just as his theory of the intellect is strictly and purely Aristotelian and free from the theory of emanation. In conclusion, it may be reiterated that the unity of outlook in Averroes' religious-philosophical writings and his commentary on The Republic gives his political philosophy a distinctly Islamic character and tone, thereby adding to his significance as a religious philosopher.

Averroes rejects Avicenna's idea that the world itself is contingent if it is necessitated by its causes, arguing that removing the necessity that is hallmark of God's wisdom would leave us no way of inferring a wise Author of nature. Ultimately Averroes rejects emanation and seeks to return natural theology to the physics of matter and motion, discrediting Avicenna's metaphysical approach and locating God's act in the ordering of eternal matter. On bodily resurrection, individual providence, and miracles, he takes refuge in authority, fudge, and bluff; and even his defense of causal necessity smacks of a dogmatism expressive of the awkwardness of his position and the stiffening of Peripatetic thought. Yet he retains the idea that the intellect is immortal, indeed impersonal: since only matter differentiates individuals, all minds are ultimately one; they reach fulfillment and beatitude by making contact with the Active Intellect.

Control questions.

1. Give the definition of theology.
2. Explain the saying of Tertullian: "I believe, for it is absurdly".
3. In what cases is the word "miracle" frequently used?
4. What are "miracles" in a strict philosophical and theological sense?

PHILOSOPHY OF NEW TIME

Descartes and Bacon

Rene Descartes (1596-1650), French philosopher and mathematican who signed himself "Lord of Perron" and who lived the 20 most productive years of his life in the tolerant and hospitable Dutch republic. Descartes, a crucial figure in the history of philosophy, combined (however unconsciously or even unwillingly) the influences of the past into a synthesis that was striking in its originality and yet congenial to the scientific temper of the age. In the minds of all later historians he counts as the progenitor of the modern spirit in philosophy.

From the past there seeped into the Cartesian synthesis doctrines about God from Anselm and Aquinas, a theory of the will from Augustine, a deep sympathy with the Stoicism of the Romans, and a skeptical method taken indirectly from the ancient Skeptics Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus. But Descartes was also a great mathematician, who invented analytic geometry, who made many physical and anatomical experiments, who knew and profoundly respected the work of Galileo, and who withdrew from publication his own cosmological treatise Le Monde ("The World") after Galileo's condemnation by the Inquisition in 1633.

Each of the maxims of Leonardo, which constitute the Renaissance worldview, found its place in Descartes: the Empiricism of his physiological researches described in his Discours de la methode (1637; Discourse on Method), the mechanistic interpretations of the physical world and human action detailed in the Principia Philosophiae (1644; Principles of Philosophy) and Les Passions de l'ame (1649; The Passions of the Soul), and the mathematical bias that dominates his theory of method in the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii (published 1701; Rules for the Direction of the Mind) and his metaphysics in the Meditationcs de Prima Philosophia (2nd ed. 1642; Meditations on the First Philosophy). But of these three, it is the mathematical strain that clearly predominates.

Bacon and Descartes, the founders of modern Empiricism and Rationalism, respectively, shared two pervasive Renaissance tenets: an enormous enthusiasm for physical science; and the belief that knowledge means power - that the ultimate purpose of theoretical science is to serve the practical needs of men.

In his Principia Descartes defined philosophy as "the study of wisdom" or "the perfect knowledge of all one can know.'* Its chief utility is "for the conduct of life" (morals), "the conservation of health" (medicine), and "the invention of all the arts" (mechanics). He expressed the relation of philosophy as theoretical inquiry to practical consequences in the famous metaphor of the tree of philosophy whose root is metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches are, respectively, morals, medicine, and mechanics. The metaphor is revealing for it indicates that, for Descartes (as for Bacon and Galileo), the major concern was for the trunk (physics) and that he busied himself with the roots only in order to provide a firm foundation for the trunk. Thus the Discours de la methode, which provides a synoptic view of the Cartesian philosophy, shows it to be not (as with Aristotle or Whitehead) a metaphysics founded upon physics but rather - that more characteristic product of the 17th century - a physics founded upon metaphysics.

Descartes's mathematical bias was expressed in his determination to ground natural science not in sensation and probability (as did Bacon) but in a principle of absolute certainty. Thus his metaphysics in essence consisted of three principles:

To employ the procedure of complete and systematic doubt to eliminate every belief that does not pass the test of indomitability (skepticism); to accept no idea as certain that is not clear, distinct, and free of contradiction (mathematicism). To found all knowledge upon the bedrock certainty of self-consciousness, so that "I think, therefore I am" becomes the only innate idea unshakable by doubt (subjectivism).

From the indomitability of the self, Descartes deduced the existence of a perfect God; and, from the fact that a perfect being is incapable of falsification or deception, he made the inference that those ideas about the corporeal world that he has implanted within man must be true. The achievement of certainly about the natural world was thus guaranteed by the perfection of God and by the clear and' distinct ideas that are his gift.

The Cartesian metaphysics is the fountainhead of Rationalism in modern philosophy, for it suggests that the mathematical criteria of clarity, distinctness, and absence of contradiction among ideas are the ultimate test of meaningfulness and truth. This stance is profoundly antiempirical. Bacon, who had said that "reasoners resemble spiders who make cobwebs out of their own substance," might well have said so of Descartes, for the Cartesian self is just such a substance from which the idea of God originates and with which all deductive reasoning begins. Bacon himself championed the new empiricism resulting from the achievements of early modern science. The goal of acquiring knowledge is the good of mankind: knowledge is power. Bacon thought that scientific induction proceeds as follows. First, we look for those cases where, given certain changes, certain others invariably follow. In his example, if certain changes in the form (motion of particles) take place, heat always follows. We seek to find all of the "positive instances" of the that give rise to the effect of that form. Next, we investigate the "negative instances", cases where in the absence of the form, the qualitative change does not take place. In the operation of these methods it is important to try to produce experimentally "prerogative instances", particularly striking or typical examples of the phenomenon under investigation. Finally, in cases where the object under study is present to some greater or lesser degree, we must be able to take into account why these changes occur. In the example, quantitative changes in degrees of heat will be correlated to quantitative changes in the speed of the motion of the particles. Yet for Descartes the understanding is vastly superior to the senses, and, in the question of what constitutes truth in science, only man's reason can ultimately decide

Cartesianism was to dominate the intellectual life of the Continent until the end of the 17th century. It was a fashionable philosophy, appealing alike to learned gentlemen and highborn ladies; and it was one of the few philosophical alternatives to the decadent Scholasticism still being taught in the universities. Precisely for this reason it constituted a serious threat to established religious authority. In 1663 the Roman Catholic Church placed Descartes's works on the Index of Forbidden Books, and the University of Oxford forbade the teaching of his doctrines. Only in the liberal Dutch universities, such as Groningen and Utrecht, did Cartesianism make serious headway.

Certain features of the Cartesian philosophy made it an important starting point for subsequent philosophical speculation. Being the meeting ground of the medieval and the modern worldviews, it accepted the doctrines of Renaissance science while attempting to ground them metaphysically in the medieval notions of God and the human mind. Thus a certain dualism between God the Creator and the mechanistic world of his creation and between mind as a spiritual principle and matter as mere spatial extension was inherent in the Cartesian position; and a whole generation of French Cartesians (among them Arnold Geulinex, Nicolas Malebranche, and Pierre Bayle) wrestled with the resulting problems of the interaction and reconciliation between the counterpoised entities.

Spinoza and Leibniz

Two philosophers of genius carried on the tradition of continental Rationalism: the Dutch Jew Benedict de Spinoza (1632-77) and his younger contemporary Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), a Leipzig scholar and polymath. Bacon's philosophy had been a search for method in science, and Descartes's basic aim had been the achievement of scientific certainty; but Hobbes and Spinoza provided the most comprehensively worked out speculative systems of the early modern period. In certain respects they had much in common: a mechanistic picture of the world, with its events guided by a strict determinism, and even a political philosophy in each case looking for political stability based upon centralized power. Yet Spinoza introduced a conception of philosophizing that was new to the Renaissance: Philosophy became a personal and moral quest for the wisdom of life and for the achievement of human perfection.

In conducting this search, Spinoza borrowed much of the basic apparatus of Descartes: the aim at a rational understanding of principles, the terminology of "substance" and of "clear and distinct ideas," and a mathematical method that seeks to convert philosophical knowledge into a complete deductive system using the geometric model of Euclid's Elements. Spinoza viewed the universe pantheistically as a single infinite substance, which he called "God," with the dual attributes (or aspects) of thought and extension, and which he differentiated into plural "modes" (or particular things); and he attributed to this world as a whole the properties of a timeless logical system-of a complex of completely determined causes and effects. In so doing Spinoza was simply seeking for man the series of "adequate" ideas that furnish the intellect and constitute human freedom. For ultimately, for Spinoza, the wisdom that philosophy seeks is achieved when one perceives the universe in its wholeness, through the "intellectual love of God," which merges the finite individual with the eternal unity and provides the mind with the pure joy that is the final achievement of its search. Spinoza consistently maintains that there is only one substance. His metaphysics is thus a form of substantial monism. Spinoza regards a human being as a finite mode of God, existing simultaneously in God as a mode of thought and as a mode of extension. He holds that every mode of extension is literally identical with the mode of thought that is the "idea of" that mode of extension. Since the human mind is the idea of the human body, it follows that the human mind and the human body are literally the same thing, conceived under two different attributes. Because they are actually identical, there is no causal interaction between the mind and the body; but there is a complete parallelism between what occurs in the mind and what occurs in the

body. Since every mode of extension has a corresponding and identical mode of thought (however rudimentary that might be), Spinoza allows that every mode of extension is “animated to some degree”.

Whereas the basic elements of the Spinozistic worldview are given in his one great work, the Ethics, Leibniz' philosophy has to be pieced together from numerous brief expositions or fragments, which seem to be mere intermissions, or philosophical interludes, in an otherwise busy life. But the philosophical form is deceptive. Leibniz was a mathematician and jurist (inventor of the infinitesimal calculus and codifier of the laws of Mainz), diplomat, historian to royalty, and court librarian in a princely house; yet he was also one of the most original philosophers of the early modern period. His chief contributions were in the fields of logic, in which he was a truly brilliant innovator, and metaphysics, in which he provided a third alternative to the Rationalist constructions of Spinoza and Descartes. Leibniz saw logic as a mathematical calculus. He was the first to distinguish "truths of reason" from "truths of fact" and to contrast the "necessary'" propositions of logic and mathematics (which express identities), which hold for all possible worlds, with the "contingent" (or empirical) propositions of science, which hold only for certain existential conditions; and he saw clearly that, as "the principle of contradiction" controls the first, so "the principle of sufficient reason" governs the second.

In metaphysics Leibniz espoused pluralism (as opposed to the dualism of Descartes's thought and extension and the monism of Spinoza's single substance, which is God). There were for him an infinite number of spiritual substances (which he called "monads"), each different, each a percipient of the universe around it, and each mirroring that universe from its own point of view with varying degrees of clarity, except for God, who perceives all monads with utter clarity. Leibniz’s main theses concerning causality among the created monads are these: God creates, conserves and concurs in the actions of each created monad. Each state of a created monad is a causal consequence of a preceding state, except for its state at creation and any of its states due to miraculous divine causality. Intrasubstantial causality is the rule with respect to created monads, which are precluded from intersubstantial causality, a mode of operation of which God alone is capable. The chief significance of Leibniz, however, lies not in his differences from Descartes and Spinoza but in the extreme Rationalism that all three shared. In the Principes de la nature et de la grace fondes en raison (1714; "Principles of Nature and of Grace Founded in Reason"), he stated the maxim that can stand for the entire school:

True reasoning depends upon necessary or eternal truths, such as those of logic, numbers, geometry, which establish an indubitable connection of ideas and unfailing consequences.

Hobbes and Locke

In epistemology and psychology, a form of Empiricism that limits experience as a source of knowledge to sensation or sense perceptions. Sensationalism is a consequence of the notion of the mind as a tabula rasa, or "clean slate." In ancient Greek philosophy, the Cyrenaics, proponents of a pleasure ethic, subscribed unreservedly to a sensationalist doctrine. The medieval Scholastics' maxim that "there is nothing in the mind but what was previously in the senses" must be understood with Aristotelian reservations that sense data are converted into concepts. The Empiricism of the 17th century, however - exemplified by Pierre Gassendi, a French neo-Epicurean, and by the Englishmen Thomas Hobbes and John Locke-put a greater emphasis on the role of the senses, in reaction against the followers of Rene Descartes who stressed the mind's faculty of reasoning. Hobbes was the first important sensationalist in modern times. “There is no conception in man’s mind”, he wrote, “which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from the original”. But the belief gained prominence in the eighteenth century, due largely to the influence of Locke. He argues that all our ideas and knowledge can be accounted for by tracing the way in which the mind uses its innate capacities to work on material presented to it by sensation and reflection. He than undertakes to account for all our ideas, on the assumption that the only “input” is ideas of sensation and reflection, and that the mind, which at birth is a tabula rasa, works on these by such operations as combination, division, generalization and abstraction. Locke's influence on 18th-century French philosophy produced the extreme sensatiormisme (or, less often, scnsualisme) of Etienne Bonnot dc Gondillac, who contended that "all our faculties come from the senses or . . . more precisely, from sensations"; that "our sensations are not the very qualities of objects [but] only modifications of our soul", and that attention is only the sensation's occupancy of the mind, memory the retention of sensation, and comparison a twofold attention.

Control questions.

1. What errors are indicated by Bacon?
2. What was the central notion in Descartes’ philosophy?
3. How does Locke explain the appearance of knowledge?

GERMAN CLASSIC PHILOSOPHY

Kant

Kant made a sharper distinction between metaphysics and critical philosophy. Much of Kant's philosophical effort was devoted to arguing that metaphysics, understood as knowledge of things supersensible, is impossibility.

Yet metaphysics, as r study of the presuppositions of experience, could be put on "the sure path of science"; it was also possible, and indeed necessary, to hold certain beliefs about God, freedom, and immortality. But however well founded these beliefs might be, they in no sense amounted to knowledge: to know about the intelligible world was entirely beyond human capacity. Kant employed substantially the same arguments as had Hume in seeking to demonstrate this conclusion but introduced interesting variations of his own. One point in his case that is especially important is his distinction between sensibility as a faculty of intuitions and understanding as a faculty of concepts. According to Kant, knowledge demanded both that there be acquaintance with particulars and that these be brought under general descriptions. Acquaintance with particulars was always a matter of the exercise of the senses; only the senses could supply intuitions. Intuitions without concepts, nevertheless, were blind; one could make nothing of particulars unless one could say what they were, and this involved the exercise of a very different faculty, the understanding. Equally, however, the concepts of the understanding were empty when considered in themselves; they were mere forms waiting to be brought to bear on particulars. Kant emphasized that this result held even for what he called "pure" concepts such as cause and substance; the fact that these had a different role in the search for knowledge from the concepts discovered in experience did not give them any intuitive content. In their case, as in that of all other concepts, there could be no valid inference from universal to particulars: to know what particulars there were in the world, it was necessary to do something other than think. Thus is revealed the futility of trying to say what there is on the basis of pure reason alone.

Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions has peculiarities of its own, but for present purposes it may be treated as substantially identical with Hume's distinction set out above. Similarly, the important differences between Kant and Hume about causality may be ignored, seeing that they agreed on the central point that the concept can be properly applied only within possible experience. If it is asked whether there are substantial differences between the two as critics of metaphysics, the answer must be that there are but that these turn more on temperament and attitude than on explicit doctrine. Hume was more of a genuine iconoclast; he was ready to set aside old beliefs without regret. For Kant, however, the siren song of metaphysics had not lost its charm, despite the harsh words he sometimes permitted himself on the subject. Kant approached philosophy as a strong believer in the powers of reason; he never abandoned his conviction that some of man's concepts are a priori, and he argued at length that the idea of the unconditioned, though lacking constitutive force, had an all-important part to play in regulating the operations of the understanding. His distinction between phenomena and noumena, objects of the senses and objects of the intelligence, is in theory a matter of conceptual possibilities only; he said that, just as one comes to think of things sensible as phenomena, so one can form the idea of a world that is not the object of any kind of sense experience. It seems clear, however, that he went beyond this in his private thinking; the noumenal realm, so far from being a bare possibility invoked as a contrast with the realm that is actually known, was there thought of as a genuine reality that had its effects in the sense world, in the shape of moral scruples and feelings. A comparison of what was said in Kant's early essay Traume cines Geistersehers erlautert durch Traume der Metaphysik (1766; Dreams of a Spirit-Seer), with the arguments developed in the last part of his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785; Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals), would seem to put this judgment beyond serious doubt.

Though Kant remained convinced of the existence of things supersensible, he, nonetheless, maintained throughout his critical writings that there can be no knowledge of them. There can be no science of metaphysics because, to be true to fact, thinking must be grounded in acquaintance with particulars, and the only particulars with which human beings are acquainted are those given in sense. Not was this all. Attempts to construct metaphysical systems were constantly being made; philosophers repeatedly offered arguments to show that there must be a first cause, that the world must consist of simple parts, that it must have a limit in space, and so on. Kant thought that all such attempts could be ruled out of court once and for all by the simple expedient of showing that for every such proof there was an equally plausible counterproof; each metaphysical thesis, at least in the sphere of cosmology-i.e., the branch of metaphysics that deals with the universe as an orderly system-could be matched with a precise antithesis whose grounds seemed just as secure, thus giving rise to a condition that he called "the antinomy of pure reason." Kant said of this antinomy that "nature itself seems to have arranged it to make reason stop short in its bold pretensions and to compel it to self-examination." Admittedly, the self-examination led to more than one result: it showed on the one hand that there could be no knowledge of the unconditioned and demonstrated on the other that the familiar world of things in space and time is a mere phenomenon, thus - to Kant-clearing the way to a doctrine of moral belief. Though this doctrine could not be expunged from Kant's philosophy without destroying it altogether, it is quite wrong to present it, as some modern German writers do, as amounting to the advocacy of an alternative metaphysics. What Kant was concerned with here is what must be thought, not what can be known.

Interestingly, Kant (1724-1804) acknowledged that he had despised the ignorant masses until he read Rousseau and came to appreciate the worth that exists in every human being. For other reasons too. Kant is part of the tradition deriving from both Spinoza and Rousseau. Like his predecessors, Kant insisted that actions resulting from desires cannot he free. Freedom is to be found only in rational action. Moreover, whatever is demanded by reason must be demanded of all rational beings: hence, rational action cannot be based on a single individual's personal desires, but must be action in accordance with something that he can will to be a universal law. This view roughly parallels Rousseau's idea of the general will as that which, as opposed to the individual will, a person shares with the whole community. Kant extended this community to all rational beings.

Kant's most distinctive contribution to ethics was his insistence that our actions possess moral worth only when we do our duty for its own sake. He first introduced this idea as something accepted by our common moral consciousness and only then tried to show that it is an essential element of any rational morality. In claiming that this idea is central to the common moral consciousness, Kant was expressing in heightened form a tendency of Judeo-Christian ethics and revealing how much the Western ethical consciousness had changed since the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Does our common moral consciousness really insist that there is no moral worth in any action done for any motive other than duty? Certainly we would be less inclined to praise the young man who plunges into the surf to rescue a drowning child if we learned that he did it because he expected a handsome reward from the child's millionaire father. This feeling lies behind Kant's disagreement with all those moral philosophers who have argued that we should do what is right because that is the path to happiness, either on earth or in heaven. But Kant went further than this. He was equally opposed to those who see benevolent or sympathetic feelings as the basis of morality. Here he may be reflecting the moral consciousness of 18th-century Protestant Germany, but it appears that even then the moral consciousness of Britain, as reflected in the writings of Shaftesbury. Hutcheson. Butler, and Hume, was very different. The moral consciousness of Western civilization in the last quarter of the 20th century also appears to be different from the one Kant was describing.

Kant's ethics is based on his distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. He called any action based on desires a hypothetical imperative, meaning by this that it is a command of reason that applies only if we desire the goal. For example, "Be honest, so that people will think well of you!" is an imperative that applies only if you want people to think well of you. A similarly hypothetical analysis can be given of the imperatives suggested by, say, Shaftesbury's ethics: "Help those in distress, if you sympathize with their sufferings!" In contrast to such approaches to ethics, Kant said that the commands of morality must be categorical imperatives: they must apply to all rational beings, regardless of their wants and feelings. To most philosophers this poses an insuperable problem: a moral law that applied to all rational beings, irrespective of their personal wants and desires, could have no specific goals or aims because all such aims would have to be based on someone's wants or desires. It took Kant's peculiar genius to seize upon precisely this implication, which to others would have refuted his claims, and to use it to derive the nature of the moral law. Because nothing else but reason is left to determine the content of the moral law, the only form this law can take is the universal principle of reason. Thus the supreme formal principle of Kant's ethics is: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.

"Kant still faced two major problems. First, he had to explain how we can be moved by reason alone to act in accordance with this supreme moral law; and, second, he had to show that this principle is able to provide practical guidance in our choices. If we were to couple Hume's theory that reason is always the slave of the passions with Kant's denial of moral worth to all actions motivated by desires, the outcome would be that no actions can have moral worth. To avoid such moral skepticism, Kant maintained that reason alone can lead to action. Unfortunately he was unable to say much in defense of this claim. Of course, the mere fact that we otherwise face so unpalatable a conclusion is in itself a powerful incentive to believe that somehow a categorical imperative must be possible, but this :s not convincing to anyone not already wedded to Kant's view of moral worth. At one point Kant appeared to be taking a different line. He wrote that the moral law inevitably produces in us a feeling of reverence or awe. If he meant to say that this feeling then becomes the motivation for obedience, however, he was conceding Hume's point that reason alone is powerless to bring about action. It would also be difficult to accept that anything, even the moral law, can necessarily produce a certain kind of feeling in all rational beings regardless of their psychological constitution. Thus this approach does not succeed in clarifying Kant's position or rendering it plausible, Kant gave closer attention to the problem of how his supreme formal principle of morality can provide guidance in concrete situations. One of his examples is as follows. Suppose that I plan to get some money by promising to pay it back, although 1 have no intention of keeping my promise. The maxim of such an action might be "Make false promises when it suits you to do so." Could such a maxim be a universal law? Of course not. If promises were so easily broken, no one would rely on them, and the practice of promising would cease. For this reason, I know that the moral law does not allow me to carry out my plan .Not all situations are so easily decided. Another of Kant's examples deals with aiding those in distress. I see someone in distress, whom I could easily help, but I prefer not to do so. Can I will as a universal law the maxim that a person should refuse assistance to those in distress? Unlike the case of promising, there is no strict inconsistency in this maxim being a universal law. Kant, however, says that I cannot will it to be such because I may someday be in distress myself, and I would then want assistance from others. This type of example is less convincing than the previous one. If I value self-sufficiency so highly that I would rather remain in distress than escape from it through the intervention of another, Kant's principle no longer tells me that I have a duty to assist those in distress. In effect, Kant's supreme principle of practical reason can only tell us what to do in those special cases in which turning the maxim of our action into a universal law yields a contradiction. Outside this limited range, the moral law that was to apply to all rational beings regardless of their wants and desires cannot guide us except by appealing to our desires. Kant does offer alternative formulations of the categorical imperative, and one of these has been seen as providing more substantial guidance than the formulation so far considered. This formulation is: "So act that you treat humanity in your own person and in the person of everyone else always at the same time as an end and never merely as means." The connection between this formulation and the first one is not entirely clear, but the idea seems to be that when I choose for myself I treat

myself as an end. If, therefore, in accordance with the principle of universal law, I must choose so that all could choose similarly, I must respect everyone else as an end. Even if this is valid, the application of the principle raises further questions. What is it to treat someone merely as a means? Using a person as a slave is an obvious example; Kant, like Bentham, was making a stand against this kind of inequality while it still flourished as an institution in some parts of the world. But to condemn slavery we have only to give equal weight to the interests of the slaves. Does Kant's principle take us any further than Utilitarianism? Modern Kantians hold that it does because they interpret it as denying the legitimacy of sacrificing the rights of one human being in order to others. One thing that can be said confidently is that Kant was firmly opposed to the Utilitarian principle of judging every action by its consequences. His ethics is a deontology. In other words, the rightness of an action depends on whether it accords with a rule irrespective of its consequences. In one essay Kant went so far as to say that it would be wrong to tell a lie even to a would-be murderer who came to your door seeking to kill an innocent person hidden in your house. This kind of situation illustrates how difficult it is to main a strict deontologist when principles may clash. Apparently Kant believed that his principle of universal law required that one never tell lies, but it could also be argued that his principle of treating everyone as an end would necessitate doing everything possible to save the life of an innocent person. Another possibility would be to formulate the maxim of the action with sufficient precision to define the circumstances under which it would be permissible to tell lies-e.g., we could all agree to a universal law that permitted lies to people intending to commit murder. Kant did not explore such solutions.

Philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel

The Enlightenment, inspired by the example of natural science, had accepted certain bounds to the possibility of knowledge; that is, it had recognized certain limits to reason's ability to penetrate ultimate reality because that would require methods that surpass the boundaries of scientific method. In this particular modesty, the philosophies of Hume and Kant were much alike. But the early 19th century marked a resurgence of the metaphysical spirit at its most ambitious and extravagant extreme. German Idealism reinstated the speculative pretensions of Leibniz and Spinoza at their height. This turn was partly a consequence of the Romantic influence but, more importantly, of a new alliance of philosophy not with science but with religion. It was not accidental that all of the great German Idealists were university professors whose fathers were Protestant pastors or who had themselves studied theology: Fichte at Jena and Leipzig (1780-84); Schelling and Hegel at the Tubingen seminary (1788-95). And it is probably this circumstance that gave to German Idealism its intensely serious, its quasi-religious, and its dedicated character.

The consequence of this religious alignment was that philosophical interest shifted from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (in which he had attempted to account for natural science and denied the possibility of certainty in metaphysics) to his Critique of Practical Reason (in which he had explored the nature of the moral self) and his Critique of Judgment (in which he had treated of the purposiveness of the universe as a whole). For absolute Idealism was based upon three premises:

- That the chief datum of philosophy is the human self and its self-consciousness;
- That the world as a whole is spiritual through and through, that it is, in fact, something like a cosmic Self;
- That, in both the self and the world, it is not primarily the intellectual element that counts but, rather, the volitional and the moral.

Thus, to understand the self, self-consciousness, and the spiritual universe became for Idealistic metaphysics the task of philosophy.

From the point of view of doctrine, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel had much in common. Fichte (1762-1814), professor of philosophy at the newly founded University of Berlin (1809-14) and a great symbol of German patriotism through the Napoleonic Wars, combined in a workable unity the subjectivism of Descartes, the cosmic monism of Spinoza, and the moral intensity of Kant. He saw human self-consciousness as the primary metaphysical fact through the analysis of which the philosopher finds his way to the cosmic totality that is "the Absolute." And, just as the moral will is the chief characteristic of the self, so also is it the activating principle of the world. Thus Fichte provided a new definition of philosophizing that made it central in dignity in the intellectual world. The sole task of philosophy is "the clarification of consciousness." And the highest degree of self-consciousness is achieved by the philosopher because he alone recognizes "Mind," or "Spirit." as the central principle of reality.

This line of thought was carried further by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Fichte's successor at Berlin and perhaps the single most comprehensive and influential thinker of the 19th century. Kant's problem had been the critical examination of reason's role in human experience. For Hegel, too, the function of philosophy is to discover the place of reason in nature, in experience, and in reality; to understand the laws according to which reason operates in the world. But whereas Kant had found reason to be the form that mind imposes upon the world, Hegel found it to be constitutive of the world itself-not something that mind imposes but that it discovers. As Fichte had projected consciousness from mind into reality, so Hegel projected reason; and the resultant Hegelian dictates - that "the rational is the real" and that "the truth is the whole" - although they express an organic and a totalitarian theory of truth and reality, tend to blur the usual distinctions that previous philosophers had made between logic and metaphysics, between subject and object, and between thought and existence. For the basic tenet of idealism, that reality is spiritual generates just such a vague inclusiveness.

To the Fichtean foundations, however, Hegel added one crucial corollary: that the Absolute, or Whole, which is a concrete universal entity, is not static but undergoes a crucial development in time. Hegel called this evolution "the dialectical process." By stressing it, Hegel accomplished two things: (1) he indicated that reason itself is not

eternal but "historical," and (2) he thereby gave new meaning and relevance to the changing conditions of human society in history - which added to the philosophical task a cultural dimension that it had not possessed before.

The philosopher's vocation, in Hegel's view, was to approach the Absolute through consciousness, to recognize it as Spirit expressing and developing itself ("realizing itself" was his own phrase) in all of the manifold facets of human life. For struggle is the essence of spiritual existence, and self-enlargement is its goal. For these reasons the various branches of intellect and culture become stages in the unfolding of the World-Spirit:

• The psychological characteristics of man (habit, appetite, judgment) representing "Subjective Spirit";

• His laws, social arrangements, and political institutions (the family, civil society, the state) expressing "Objective Spirit";

• His art, religion, and philosophy embodying "Absolute Spirit."

What began, therefore, in Hegel as a metaphysics of the Absolute ended by becoming a total philosophy of human culture.

Schelling, German philosopher whose metamorphoses encompass the entire history of German idealism. He turned to constructing a systematic philosophy of nature. His philosophy attempts to derive consciousness from objects. Beginning with "pure objectivity", Schelling purports to show how nature undergoes a process of unconscious self-development, culminating in the conditions for its own self-representation. The method of the philosophy of nature is fundamentally a priori: it begins with the concept of the unity of nature and accounts for its diversity by interpreting nature as a system of opposed forces or "polarities", which manifest themselves in ever more complex levels of organization.

Ludwig Feuerbach

b. July 28, 1804, Landshut, Bavaria [now in Germany] d. Sept. 13, 1872, Rechenberg, Ger.German philosopher and moralist remembered for his influence on Karl Marx and for his humanistic theologizing. The fourth son of the eminent jurist Paul von Feuerbach, Ludwig Feuerbach abandoned theological studies to become a student of philosophy under G.W.F. Hegel for two years at Berlin. In 1828 he went to Erlangen to study natural science, and two years later his first book, Gedanken uber Tod und Unsterblichkeit ("Thoughts on Death and Immortality"), was published anonymously. In this work Feuerbach attacked the concept of personal immortality and proposed a type of immortality by which human qualities are reabsorbed into nature. His Abalard und Heloise (1834) and Pierre Bayle (1838) were followed by Uber Philosophic und Christentum (1839; "On Philosophy and Christianity"), in which he claimed "that Christianity has in fact long vanished not only from the reason but from the life of mankind, that it is nothing more than a fixed idea." Continuing this view in his most important work, Das Wesen des Christentums (1841; The Essence of Christianity), Feuerbach posited the notion that man is to himself his own object of thought and religion nothing more than a consciousness of the infinite. The result of this view is the notion that God is merely the outward projection of man's inward nature. In the first part of his book, which strongly influenced Marx, Feuerbach analyzed the "true or anthropological essence of religion." Discussing God's aspects "as a being of the understanding," "as a moral being or law," "as love," and others, he argued that they correspond to different needs in human nature. In the second section he analyzed the "false or theological essence of religion," contending that the view that God has an existence independent of human existence leads to a belief in revelation and sacraments, which are items of an undesirable religious materialism.

Although Feuerbach denied that he was an atheist, he nevertheless contended that the God of Christianity is an illusion. As he expanded his discussion to other disciplines, including philosophy, he came to see Hegel's principles as quasi-religious and embraced instead a form of materialism that Marx subsequently criticized in his Thesen uber Feuerbach (written 1845). Attacking religious orthodoxy during the politically turbulent years of 1848-49, Feuerbach was seen as a hero by many of the revolutionaries. His influence was greatest on such anti-Christian publicists as David Friedrich Strauss, author of the skeptical Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet (1835-36; The Life of Jesus Critically Examined), and Bruno Bauer, who like Feuerbach, had abandoned Hegelianism for naturalism. Some of Feuerbach's views were later endorsed by extremists in the struggle between church and state in Germany and by those who, like Marx, led the revolt of labour against capitalism. Among his other works are Theogonie (1857) and Gottheit, Freiheit, und Unsterblichkeit (1866; "God, Freedom, and Immortality").

Feuerbach sought to demystify both faith and reason in favor of the concrete and situated existence of embodied human consciousness. One should rewrite "The individual is a function of the Absolute" as "The Absolute is a function of the individual". Since religion itself proves to be merely a "dream of the human mind", metaphysics, theology, and religion can be reduced to "anthropology", the study of concrete embodied human consciousness and its cultural products.

MARX AND MARXISM

History as a process of dialectical change: The suggestion that there is something essentially mistaken in the endeavour to comprehend the course of history "naturalistically" and within an explanatory framework deriving from scientific paradigms was powerfully reinforced by conceptions stemming from the development of German Idealism in the 19th century. Hegel's "philosophy of the spirit" made its appearance upon the intellectual scene contemporaneously with Saint-Simonian and Comtean Positivism, rivaling the latter in scope and influence and

bringing with it its own highly distinctive theory of historical evolution and change. Hegel's stress upon the "organic" nature of social wholes and the incommensurability of different historical epochs owed evident debts to Herderian ideas, but he set these within an overall view that pictured the movement of history m dynamic terms. Regularities and recurrences of the son that typically manifest themselves in the realm of nature are foreign, Hegel maintained, to the sphere of mind or spirit which was characterized instead as involving a continual drive toward self-transcendence and the removal of limitations upon thought and action. Man was not to be conceived according to the mechanistic models of 18th-century Materialism; essentially he was free, but the freedom that constituted his nature could only achieve fulfillment through a process of struggle and of overcoming obstacles that were themselves the expression of his own activity; it was in this sense that Hegel claimed that spirit was "at war with itself' - "it has to overcome itself as its most formidable obstacle" (Lectures on the Philosophy of History). In concrete terms, this meant that historical advance did not proceed through a series of smooth transitions. Once the potentialities of a particular society had been realized in the creation of a certain mode of life, its historical role was over; its members became aware of its inadequacies, and the laws and institutions they had previously accepted unquestioningly v/ere now experienced as fetters, inhibiting further development and no longer reflecting their deepest aspirations. Thus, each phase of the historical process could be said to contain the seeds of its own destruction and to "negate" itself, the consequence was the emergence of a fresh society, representing another stage in a progression whose final outcome was the formation of a rationally ordered community with which each citizen could consciously identify himself and in which there would therefore no longer exist any sense of alienation or constraint. Somewhat curiously, the type of community Hegel envisaged as exemplifying this satisfactory state of affairs bore a striking resemblance to the Prussian monarchy of his own time.

The notion that history conforms to a "dialectical" pattern, according to which contradictions generated at one level are overcome or transcended at the next, was incorporated - though in a radically new form - in the theory of social change propounded by Karl Marx. Like Hegel, Marx adopted a "directional" view of history; but, whereas Hegel had tended to exhibit it as representing the unfolding in time of an inner spiritual principle, Marx looked elsewhere for the ultimate determinants of its course and character. Man, according to Marx, was a creative being, situated in a material world that stood before him as an objective reality and provided the field for his activities; this primitive truth, which had been obscured by Hegel's mystifying abstractions, afforded the key to a proper understanding of history as a process finally governed by the changing methods whereby men sought to derive from the natural environment the means of their subsistence and the satisfaction of their evolving wants and needs. The productive relations, in which men stood to one another, resulting in such phenomena as the division of labour and the appearance of economically determined classes, were the factors fundamental to historical movement. What he termed the superstructure of society-which covered such things as political institutions and systems of law, ethics, and religion-was in the last analysis dependent upon the shape taken by the "material production" and the "material intercourse" of human beings in their struggle to master nature: "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." Hence, the inner dynamic of history was held to lie in conflicts arising from changes in the means of production and occurring when modes of social organization and control, adapted to the development of the productive forces at one stage, became impediments to it at another; they were to be resolved, furthermore, not by abstract thought but by concrete action. Thus, the Hegelian conception of spirit as involved in a relentless struggle with itself and with what it had created underwent a revolutionary transformation, explosive in its implications.

Marx's interpretation of the historical process, with its stress upon necessity and the operation of ineluctable laws, has often been portrayed by its proponents as being scientific in character. It has, however, more than one aspect, and it would be an error to identify its underlying methodology with that associated with Comtean Positivism. Generally speaking, the basic categories within which it was framed derived from a theory of human nature that had more in common with the postulates of German romantic; thought than with those of British and French Empiricism: to this extent, the logical structure Marx sought to impose upon the data of history belonged to a tradition that stressed the differences rather than the resemblances between the human and the natural world.

Marx understood alienation as state of radical disharmony (1) among individuals, (2) between them and their own activity, or labor, and between individuals and their system of production. In his masterwork “Capital”, Marx employed Hegel’s method of dialectic to generate an internal critique of the theory and practice of capitalism, showing that, under assumptions (notably that human labor is the source of economic value) found in such earlier theorists as Adam Smith, this system must undergo increasingly severe crises, resulting in the eventual seizure of control of the increasingly centralized means of production from relatively small class of capitalist proprietors by the previously impoverished non-owners (the proletariat) in the interest of a thenceforth classless society.

Control questions.

1. What is the message of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”?
2. Is our mind an active or passive organ in conceiving reality?
3. What are the basic notions of Hegel’s Logic?
4. Is there alienation in modern world?

POSITIVISM

The social Positivism of Comte and Mill

Comte, Auguste, French philosopher and sociologist, the founder of positivism. In conformity with empiricism, Comte held that knowledge of the world arises from observation.

Comte's Positivism was posited on the assertion of a so-called law of the three phases (or stages) of intellectual development. There is a parallel, as Comte saw it, between the evolutions of thought patterns in the entire history of man, on the one hand, and in the history of an individual's development from infancy to adulthood, on the other. In the first, or so-called theological, stage, natural phenomena are explained as the results of supernatural or divine powers. It matters not whether the religion is polytheistic or monotheistic; in either case, miraculous powers or wills are believed to produce the observed events. This stage was criticized by Comte as anthropomorphic; i.e., as resting on all-too-human analogies. Generally, animistic explanations-made in terms of the volitions of soul like beings operating behind the appearances - are rejected as primitive projections of unverifiable entities.

The second phase, called metaphysical, is in some cases merely a depersonalized theology: the observable processes of nature are assumed to arise from impersonal powers, occult qualities, vital forces, or entelechies (internal perfecting principles). In other instances, the realm of observable facts is considered as an imperfect copy or imitation of eternal ideas, as in Plato's metaphysics of pure Forms. Again, Comte charged that no genuine explanations result; questions concerning ultimate reality, first causes, or absolute beginnings are thus declared to be absolutely unanswerable. The metaphysical quest can lead only ю the conclusion expressed by the German biologist and physiologist, Emil du Bois-Reymond: "Ignoramus et ignorabimus" ("We are and shall be ignorant"); it is a deception through verbal devices and the fruitless rendering of concepts as real things.

The sort of fruitfulness that it lacks can be achieved only in the third phase, the scientific, or 'positive," phase - hence the title of Comte's magnum opus: Cours de philosophic positive (1830-42; The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, 1853) - because it claims to be concerned only with positive facts. The task of the sciences and of knowledge in general, is to study the facts and regularities of nature and society and to formulate the regularities as (descriptive) laws; explanations of phenomena can consist in no more than the subsuming of special cases under general laws. Mankind reached full maturity of thought only after abandoning the pseudoexplanations of the theological and metaphysical phases and substituting an unrestricted adherence to scientific method.

In his three stages Comte combined what he considered to be an account of the historical order of development with a logical analysis of the leveled structure of the sciences. By arranging the six basic and pure sciences one upon the other in a pyramid, Comte prepared the way for Logical Positivism to "reduce" each level to the one below it. He placed at the fundamental level the science that does not presuppose any other sciences-viz., mathematics-and then ordered the levels above it in such a way that each science depends upon, and makes use of, the sciences below it on the scale: thus arithmetic and the theory of numbers are declared to be presuppositions for geometry and mechanics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology (including physiology), and sociology. Each higher level science, in turn, adds to the knowledge content of the science or sciences on the levels below, thus enriching this content by successive specialization. Psychology is conspicuously missing in Comte's system of the sciences, Anticipating some ideas of 20th-century Behaviourism and physicalism, Comte assumed that psychology should become a branch of biology (especially of brain neurophysiology), on the one hand, and of sociology, on the other. As the "father" of sociology, Comte maintained that the social sciences should proceed from observations to general laws, very much as (in his view) physics and chemistry do. He was skeptical of introspection in psychology, being convinced that, in attending to one's own mental states, these states would b^ irretrievably altered and distorted. In thus insisting on the necessity of objective observation, he was close to the basic principle of the methodology of 20th-century Behaviourism.

Among Comte's disciples or sympathizers were Cesare Lombroso, an Italian psychiatrist and criminologist, and Paul-Emile Littre, J.-E, Renan, arid Louis Weber.

Despite some basic disagreements with Comte, the 19th-century English philosopher John Stuart Mill, also a logician and economist must be regarded as one of the outstanding Positivists of his century. In his System of Logic (1843), he developed a thoroughly Empiricist theory of knowledge and of scientific reasoning, going even so far as to regard logic and mathematics as empirical (though very general) sciences. The broadly synthetic philosopher Herbert Spencer, author of a doctrine of the "unknowable" and of a general evolutionary philosophy, was, next to Mill, an outstanding exponent of a Positivistic orientation.

The critical Positivism of Mach and Avenarius. The influences of Hume and of Comte were also manifest in important developments in German Positivism, just prior to World War 1. The outstanding representatives of this school were a philosophical critic of the physics of Newton, an Austrian, Ernst Mach, who was also an original thinker as a physicist and excelled as a historian of mechanics, thermodynamics, and optics, and Richard Avenarius, founder of a philosophy known as Empiriocriticism.

Mach, in the introductory chapter of his book Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen (1886; Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations, 1897), reviving the Humean antimetaphysics, contended that all factual knowledge consists of a conceptual organization and elaboration of what is given in the elements; i.e., in the data of immediate experience. Very much in keeping with the spirit of Comte, he repudiated the transcendental Idealism of Kant. For

Mach, the most objectionable feature in Kant's philosophy was the doctrine of the Dinge an sich - i.e., of the "things-in-themselves" - the ultimate entities underlying phenomena, which Kant had declared to be absolutely unknowable though they must nevertheless be conceived as partial causes of man's perceptions. Hermann von Helmholtz. a wide-ranging scientist and philosopher and one of the great minds of the 19th century, by contrast, held that the theoretical entities of-physics are, precisely, the things-in-themselves-a view which, though generally Empiricist, was thus clearly opposed to the Positivist doctrine. Theories and theoretical concepts, according to the Positivist understanding, were merely instruments of prediction. From one set of observable data, theories formed a bridge over which the investigator could pass to another set of observable data. Positivists generally maintained that theories might come and go, whereas the facts of observation and their empirical regularities constituted a firm ground from which scientific reasoning could start and to which it must always return in order to test its validity. In consequence, most Positivists were reluctant to call theories true or false but preferred to consider them merely as more or less useful.

The task of the sciences, as it earlier had been expressed by the German physicist Gustav Kirchhoff. was the pursuit of a compendious and parsimonious description of observable phenomena, Concern with first causes or final reasons was to be excluded from the scientific endeavour as fruitless, o: hopeless (if not meaningless). Even the notion of explanation became suspect and was at best taken (as already in Comte) to be no more than an ordering and connecting of observable facts and events by empirically ascertainable laws.

Mach and, along with him, Wilhelm Oslwald, the originator of physical chemistry', were the most prominent opponents of the atomic theory in physics and chemistry. Ostwald even attempted to derive the basic chemical laws of constant and multiple proportions without the help of the atomic hypothesis. To the Positivist the atom, since it could not be seen, was to be considered at best a "convenient fiction" and at worst an illegitimate ad hoc hypothesis. Hans Vaihinger, a subjectivist who called himself an "idealistic Positivist," pursued the idea of useful fictions to the limit, and was convinced that the concept of the atom, along with the mathematical concepts of the infinite and the infinitesimal, and those of causation, free will, the economic man, and the like, were altogether fictitious, some of them even containing internal contradictions.

The anti-atomistic strand in the thought of the Positivists was an extreme manifestation of their phobia regarding anything unobservable. With the undeniably great success of the advancing microtheories in physics and chemistry, however, the Positivist ideology was severely criticized, not only by some contemporary philosophers but also by outstanding scientists. The Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann and the German Max Planck, for example, both top-ranking theoretical physicists, were in the forefront of the attack against Mach and Ostwald. Boltzmann and Planck, outspoken Realists, were deeply convinced of the reality of unobservable microparticles, or microevents, and were clearly impressed with the ever-growing and converging evidence for the existence of atoms, molecules, quanta, and subatomic particles. Nevertheless, the basic Positivist attitude was tenaciously held by many scientists, and striking parallels to it appeared in American Pragmatism and instrumentalism; in parts of the work of the Pragmatists Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, there is a philosophy of pure experience essentially similar to that of Mach.

Though Richard Avenarius has not become widely known, he too anticipated a good deal of what the American Pragmatists propounded. His Positivism, like that of Mach, comprised a biologically oriented theory of knowledge. From the needs of organisms in their adaptation to the exigencies of their environment develop the conceptual tools needed for prediction of future conditions. In Avenarius' view, the raw material of the construction of the concepts of common sense and of the sciences, however, was "the given"; i.e.,; the data of immediate sensory experience. Just as Mill in the 19th century considered ordinary physical objects as "permanent possibilities of sensation," so Mach and Avenarius construed the concepts pertaining to what men commonscnsically regard as the objects of the real world as "complexes of sensations." Thus, it was maintained that a stone, for example, is no more than a collection of such sensory qualities as hardness, colour, and mass. The traditional assumption that there must be an underlying substance that has these properties was repudiated. To the question "What would be left over if all of the perceptible qualities were stripped (in thought) away from an observable object?" these Positivists answered: "Precisely nothing." Thus the concept of substance was declared not only superfluous but meaningless as well.

In similar fashion, the concept of causation was explicated not as a real operating principle but as regularity of succession or as functional dependency among observable or measurable variables. Because these dependencies are not logically necessary, they are contingent and ascertained by observation, and especially by experimentation and inductive generalization.

The Newtonian doctrine according to which space and time are absolute or substantive realities had been incisively criticized by the 17th-century Rationalist Gottfried Leibniz and was subjected by Mach to even more searching scrutiny. While Leibniz had already paved the way for the conception of space and time as exclusively a matter of relations between events, Mach went still further in attacking the arguments of Newton in favour of a dynamic and absolute space and time. In particular, the inertial and centrifugal forces that arise in connection with accelerated or curvilinear motions had been interpreted by Newton as effects of such motions with respect to a privileged reference medium imagined as an absolute Cartesian mesh system graphed upon a real space. In a typically Positivistic manner, however, Mach found the idea quite incredible. How, he asked, could an absolutely empty space have such powerful effects? Mach conjectured that any privileged reference system must be generated not by an imperceptible grid but by material reality-specifically, by the total mass of the universe (galaxies and fixed

stars), an idea that later served as an important stalling point for Einstein's general theory of relativity and gravitation.

The Positivist theory of knowledge, as proposed by Mach and Avenarius, impressed many scholars, most notable among whom was probably the leading British logician and philosopher Bertrand Russell in one of the earlier phases of his thought. In a work entitled Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), Russell analyzed the concept of physical objects as comprising classes of (perceptual) aspects or perspectives, an idea that later stimulated the work of Rudolf Carnap, an outstanding philosophical semanticist and Analyst, entitled Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928; The Logical Structure of the World, 1967). Mach remained the most influential thinker among Positivists tor a long time, though some of his disciples, like Josef Petzoldt, are now largely forgotten. But The Grammar of Science (1892), written by Karl Pearson, a scientist, statistician, and philosopher of science, still receives some attention; and in France it was Abel Rey, also a philosopher of science, who, along the lines of Mach, severely criticized the traditional mechanistic view of nature. In the United States, John Bernard Stallo, a German-born American philosopher of science (also an educator, jurist, and statesman), developed a Positivistic outlook, especially in the philosophy of physics, in his book The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1882), in which he anticipated to a degree some of the general ideas later formulated in the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics.

Logical Positivism: Carnap and Schlick Wittgenstein's Tractatus was both a landmark in the history of contemporary Analytic philosophy and perhaps its most aberrant example. It not only contained the most highly sophisticated metaphysics but also was an important influence on the most antimetaphysical of the positions taken by Analytic philosophers, viz., that of Logical Positivism, which was mainly developed by a group of philosophers, scientists, and logicians who were centred in Vienna and came to be known as the Vienna Circle. Among these, Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick have perhaps had the most influence on Anglo-American philosophy, although it was an English philosopher, A J. Ayer-whose Language, Truth and Logic (1936) is still the most widely read work of the movement in America and England-who introduced the ideas of Logical Positivism to English philosophy. Its main tenets have struck sympathetic chords in the Analytic philosophers and arc still important today, even if in repudiation.

Above all else, Logical Positivism was antimetaphysical; nothing can be learned about the world, it held, except through the methods of the empirical sciences. The Positivists sought a method for showing both (1) when a theory that seemed to be about the world was really metaphysical arid (2) that such a theory was, in fact, meaningless, and this they found in the principle of verification. In its positive form, the principle said that the meaning of any statement that is really about the world is given by the methods employed for verifying its truth or falsity - the only allowable methods being, ultimately, those of observation and experiment. In its negative form, the principle said that no statement could both be a statement about the world and have no method of verification attached to it: Its negative form was the weapon used against metaphysics and for the vindication of science as the only possible source of knowledge about the world. The principle would, thus, class as meaningless many philosophical and religious theories that purport to say something about die world but provide no way of testing the truth of the statements; for example, in religion it would render suspect the statement that God exists, which, being metaphysical, would be, strictly speaking, meaningless.

The principle of verification run almost immediately into difficulties, most of which were first raised by the Positivists themselves. The attempt to work out these difficulties belongs to a more detailed study of the movement. It is sufficient co note here that these problems were sufficient to make most subsequent Analytic philosophers wary of appealing directly to the principle. It has, however, influenced philosophical work in more subtle ways.

With the principle of verification in hand, the Positivists thought that they could show a great many theories to be nonsense. There were several areas of discourse, however, which failed the test of the principle but which were simply impossible to rule out as concealed nonsense. Foremost among these disciplines were mathematics and ethics. Mathematics (and logic) could hardly be written off as nonsense. Yet their theorems are not verifiable by observation and experiment; they are known, in fact, by pure a priori reasoning alone. The answer seemed to be provided in Wittgenstein's tractatus, which held that the propositions of mathematics and logic are, in Kantian terms, analytic; i.e., true - like the statement "All bachelors are unmarried" - in virtue of the conventions that lie behind the use of the symbols involved.

About ethics or, more precisely, about any statements involving value judgments, the Positivist view was different, yet still of lasting importance. In this view, value judgments are not, like mathematical truths, necessary adjuncts to science. But they cannot be put off as nonsense; nor, obviously, are they true by definition or linguistic convention. The usual view of the Positivists, called emotivism, is that what look like statements of fact (e.g., that one should not tell lies) are really expressions of one's feelings toward a certain action; thus, value judgments are not really true or false. The Positivist's position was that neither mathematical nor ethical statements could be dismissed, as were metaphysical propositions. Both had then to be exempted from the principle of verification, and this was done by arguing that their statements are not really about the world: mathematical truths are conventions, and ethical statements are merely expressions of feelings. The divorce of ethics from science, once again, reflects an old Empiricist theme, to be seen, for example, in David Hume's dictum that from matters of fact one cannot derive a conclusion about what ought to be nor vice versa.

Ludvig Wittgenstein

b. April 26, 1889, Viennad. April 29, 1951, Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, Eng. Austrian-born English philosopher, who was one of the most influential figures in British philosophy during the second quarter of the 20th century and who produced two original and influential systems of philosophical thought-his logical theories and later his philosophy of language.

Early life through World War I.

Wittgenstein, the son of a leading Austrian steelmaker, was the youngest of eight children, all of whom were generously endowed with artistic and intellectual talent. Both parents were musically gifted, and their home was a centre of musical life. Educated at home until the age of 14, Wittgenstein then studied for three years in an Austrian school, where the emphasis was on mathematical and natural sciences, after which he studied mechanical engineering for two years in Berlin. In 1908 he engaged in aeronautical research in England, experimenting with kites at an upper atmosphere station. His interest soon turned toward developing an engine that would propel an airplane. Working in an engineering laboratory of the University of Manchester, where he was registered as a research student, he conceived the idea of placing a reaction jet at the tip of each blade of a propeller. He designed an experimental engine, supervised its construction, and tested it successfully. Problems relating to the design of a propeller aroused his interest in mathematics, and this soon produced a desire to understand the foundations of mathematics. Bertrand Russell's book The Principles of Mathematics (1903) had a decisive influence on him. Abandoning his engineering studies at Manchester in 1911, he went to Cambridge to study with Russell. He progressedjrapidly in mathematical logic; according to Russell, he "soon knew all that I had to teach." Russell remarked that getting to know Wittgenstein was "one of the most exciting intellectual adventures" of his life. Wittgenstein, he said, had "fire and penetration and intellectual purity to a quite extraordinary degree."

Wittgenstein remained at Cambridge through most of 1913, working with unrelenting intensity at problems in and about logic and engaging in prolonged discussions with Russell. He then went to Skjolden, Nor., where he lived in seclusion, working hard at logic. Upon the outbreak of 'world War I, Wittgenstein enlisted in the Austrian army, serving first on a river vessel and later in an artillery workshop. In 1916 he served in a howitzer regiment on the Russian front as an artillery observer, winning several decorations for bravery. He was then sent to be trained as an artillery officer, was commissioned, and continued to serve on the eastern front until 1918, when he was transferred to a mountain artillery regiment on the Italian front.

Period of the "Tractatus." Throughout the war, Wittgenstein worked on problems of logic and philosophy, writing his thoughts in notebooks that he carried in his rucksack. When he became a prisoner of the Italians at the end of the war, he had a completed manuscript, which he sent to Russell in England. After his release, Wittgenstein tried in vain to find a publisher for his book. Its eventual publication, due to Russell's influence, occurred in 1921 under the title Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logieo-Philosophicus, 1922). The Tractatus is universally accepted as novel, profound, and influential. The book is a series of remarks, carefully ordered and numbered in a decimal notation. Although only 75 pages, it sweeps over a vast range of topics: the nature of language: the limits of what can be said; logic, ethics, and philosophy; causality and induction; the self and the will; death and the mystical; good and evil. The central question of the Tractatus is: How is language possible? How can a man, by uttering a sequence of words, say something? And how can another person understand him? Wittgenstein was struck by the fact that a man can understand sentences that he has never previously encountered. The solution that burst upon him was that a sentence that says something (a proposition) must be "a picture of reality." "A proposition shows its sense," he wrote: it shows a situation in the world. His picture theory seemed to explain the "connection between the signs on paper and at situation outside in the world." Not realizing that propositions are pictures comes from failing to consider them in their "completely analyzed" form, in which they are arrangements of simple signs that are correlated with simple elements of reality so that "the picture touches reality,"

One of the most striking features of the Tractatus is its conception of the limits of language. Not only must a propositional picture contain exactly as many elements as does the situation that it represents but, furthermore, all pictures and all possible situations in the world must share the same logical form, which is at once "the form of representation" and "the form of reality " But this form 'that is common to language and reality cannot itself be represented. "Propositions can represent the whole of reality," he wrote, "but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it-logical form." "What can be said can only be said by means of a proposition, and so nothing that is necessary for the understanding of all propositions can be said."

There are other things that cannot be represented ("said"): the necessary existence of simple elements of reality; the existence of a thinking, willing self; and the existence of absolute value. These things are also unthinkable, since the limits of language are the limits of thought. Thus Wittgenstein's remark, "Unsayable things do indeed exist," is itself something that cannot be said or thought; it may give insight, but it is actually nonsensical and eventually must be "thrown away." The final sentence of the book ("Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent") is no truism. It is a highly metaphysical remark that attempts to convey the unsayable, unthinkable doctrine that there is a realm about which one can say nothing.

Upon returning to civilian life in 1919, Wittgenstein gave away the large fortune inherited from his father. He once said that he had done this to avoid having friends for the sake of his money, but it is also true that he disliked ease and luxury. His mode of life came to be characterized by extreme simplicity and frugality.

Feeling that the Tractatus had exhausted his contributions to philosophy, Wittgenstein sought some other vocation. He became an elementary school teacher and beginning in 1920 taught in various tiny villages in Lower Austria. During this period he was severely unhappy and frequently thought of suicide. He was helped, however, by his relationship with his young pupils. Painful frictions eventually developed between Wittgenstein and some of the other teachers and villagers, and in 1925 he abandoned his career as a school teacher. For a few months he served as a gardener's assistant in a monastery near Vienna. When he was invited to undertake the building of a mansion in Vienna for one of his sisters, he accepted the task. This project, which occupied his time for two years, was carried through with typical concentration and originality.

Wittgenstein's musical gifts were considerable. He played the clarinet when a young man, and throughout his life he had the rare ability to whistle difficult classical music, sometimes whistling long passages from memory. Wittgenstein's musical sophistication as well as the peculiar authority of his intelligence and personality is reflected in an incident that occurred when a well-known string quartet was rehearsing in a home where Wittgenstein was one of a small group of listeners. Extremely reserved at first, he offered a few modest remarks about the interpretation of the music; but eventually, according to the account of a witness, "he was carried away by passion and intervened in the rehearsal." The musicians reacted with polite disdain, but at a later rehearsal, the account continues, "Wittgenstein, now completely accepted by the four musicians, did most of the talking, and his objections and advice were heard as deferentially as if Gustav Mahler himself had interrupted their rehearsal."

For a decade after World War I, Wittgenstein did not engage in philosophical studies. He did, however, occasionally meet with other philosophers: the brilliant young philosopher Frank Ramsey and a few members of the so-called Vienna Circle, which gave birth to Logical Positivism.

Period of the "Philosophical Investigations". Suddenly Wittgenstein felt that once again he could do creative work in philosophy. He returned to Cambridge early in 1929, where he was made a fellow of Trinity College. Through his lectures and the wide circulation of notes taken by his students, he gradually came to exert a powerful influence on philosophical thought throughout the English-speaking world. Those who attended his discussions were impressed by the force of his intellect, his passionate seriousness, and the novelty of his ideas and methods. Through these lectures, which were extemporaneous, often taking the form of responses to his own questions, he was creating a new philosophical outlook.

From his return to Cambridge in 1929 until his death 23 years later, Wittgenstein wrote prodigiously. A large number of his notebooks, manuscripts, and typescripts have been preserved. The crown of this work was the Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953; Philosophical Investigations), which, in accordance with his wishes, was published only after his death. Subsequently, a number of related writings have been edited and published.

The thinking that began afresh in 1929 gradually arrived at a very different outlook from that of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein came to reject such former conceptions as that a proposition has one and only one complete analysis; that every proposition has a definite sense; that reality and language are each composed of simple elements; that there is an essence of language, of propositions, of thought; that there is an a priori order of the world. With the rejection of the assumption that all representations must share a common logical form, the conception of the unsayable disappeared.

In die Tractatus Wittgenstein had believed that the endless variety of kinds of uses of language is misleading-hidden beneath this diversity there must be a unifying essence to which a philosopher tries to penetrate. In the Investigations he held that this belief is an illusion. There is no unity hidden in the diversity. The perplexities that the philosopher feels about the nature of memory, of thinking, of understanding a word, or of following a rule and his insistence on asking "What is knowledge?" "What is an intention?" "What is an assertion?" are eased, or quieted, by descriptions, or reminders, of what lies open to view, namely the ranges of differing cases in which one applies these words as he uses language, or works with it, in the daily traffic of speech and communication. These descriptions break the hold of the preconceptions that falsify philosophical thinking; they destroy the obsessive belief that there must be an essence of knowledge, of intention, of assertion.

Wittgenstein employed the example of games and tried to get his reader to rid himself of the assumption that there is a common nature of games. Some but not all games are amusing or involve competition or winning and losing; there is only a network of "overlapping and criss-crossing" similarities between games, not some common feature running through all games. Wittgenstein used the term "family resemblance"; he held that just as the word "game" is applied to a range of cases that have only a family resemblance, so it is with the words that loom so large in philosophy: "knowledge," "proposition," "memory," "intention," "thought," "rule," and "belief." Something is called a belief, for example, perhaps because it has similarities with some of the things that were previously called beliefs. The application of a term is extended from previous cases to new cases "as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.

An outstanding feature of Wittgenstein's second philosophical position is his concern to show how concepts are linked to actions and reactions, to the expression of the concepts in human life. "What we are supplying," he wrote, "are really remarks on the natural history of human beings." The perplexity that a man feels about the meaning of a form of words may be relieved if he asks himself, "On what occasion, for what purpose, do we say this? What kinds of actions accompany these words? (Think of a greeting.) In what scenes will they be used; and what for?" Wittgenstein's aim was to display the function and significance of concepts as due not to an intangible realm of mind but to the human forms of life in which they are embedded.

Whereas the Tractatus is regarded with universal admiration, the reception of the investigations has been mixed. Some students of philosophy are perplexed by the enigmatic style and the seeming lack of organization. Some think it is inferior to the Tractatus in both precision and seriousness, but for others it has radically transformed and enriched philosophy.

In 1939 Wittgenstein was appointed to the chair in philosophy at Cambridge University previously held by that master of philosophical analysis G.E. Moore. During World War II he left Cambridge to serve as a porter in Guy's Hospital in London and later worked as a laboratory assistant in the Royal Victoria Infirmary. As in his previous war service, he continued to think and write on philosophical problems. In the autumn of 1944 he returned to Cambridge to resume his lectures and discussions. He grew more and more restive, however, as a professor of philosophy, and at the end of 1947 he resigned his chair. He wanted to devote his time and strength to completing the Investigations, and also he felt a need for "thinking alone, without having to talk to anybody." He stayed in a cottage on the west coast of Ireland until his health would no longer permit it. Thereafter he lived most of the time with various friends in the United States and England. He was frequently ill, and in the autumn of 1949 he was found to have cancer-a discovery that did not disturb him since he had "no wish to live on." He continued to do intensive work, however, until his death two years later.

Karl Popper

It was in coming to this juncture in his critique of Positivism that Karl Popper, an Austro-English philosopher of science, in his Logik der Forschung (1935; The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1959), insisted that the meaning criterion should be abandoned and replaced by a criterion of demarcation between empirical (scientific) and transempirical (nonscientific, metaphysical) questions and answers - a criterion that, according to Popper, is to be testability, or, in his own version, falsifiability; i.e., refutability. Popper was impressed by how easy it is to supposedly verify all sorts of assertions-those of psychoanalytic theories seemed to him to be abhorrent examples. But the decisive feature, as Popper saw it. Should be whether it is in principle conceivable that evidence could be cited that would refute (or disconfirm) a given law, hypothesis, or theory. Theories are (often) bold conjectures. It is true that scientists should be encouraged in their construction of theories-no matter how far they deviate from the tradition; it is also true, however, that all such conjectures should be subjected to the most severe and searching criticism and experimental scrutiny of their truth claims. The growth of knowledge thus proceeds through the elimination of error; i.e., through the refutation of hypotheses that are either logically inconsistent or entail empirically refuted consequences.

Despite valuable suggestions in Popper's philosophy of science, the Logical Positivists and Empiricists continued to reformulate their criteria of factual meaningfulness. The Positivist Hans Reichenbach, who emigrated from Germany to California, proposed, in his Experience and Prediction (1938), a probabilistic conception. If hypotheses, generalizations, and theories can be made more or less probable by whatever evidence is available, he argued, and then they are factually meaningful. In another version of meaningfulness, first adumbrated by Schlick (under the influence of Wittgenstein's thought), the philosopher's attention is focussed on concepts rather than on propositions. If the concepts in terms of which theories are formulated can be related, through chains of definitions, to concepts that are definable ostensibly - i.e., by pointing to or exhibiting items or aspects of direct experience - then those theories are factually meaningful; This is the version also advocated by Richard von Mises, an Austro-American mathematician and methodologist, in his Positivism (1951) and, later, more technically elaborated by Carnap, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1 (1956).

PRAGMATISM

School of philosophy, dominant in the United States during the first quarter of the 20th century, based on the principle that the usefulness, workability, and practicality of ideas, policies, and proposals are the criteria of their merit. It stresses the priority of action over doctrine, of experience over fixed principles, and it holds that ideas borrow their meanings from their consequences and their truths from their verification. Thus, ideas are essentially instruments and plans of action.

Achieving results, "getting things done" in business and public affairs is often said to be "pragmatic." There is a harsher and more brutal connotation of the term in which any exercise of power in the successful pursuit of practical and specific objectives is called "pragmatic." The character of American business and politics is often so described. In these cases "pragmatic" carries the stamp of justification: a policy is justified pragmatically if it is successful. The familiar and the academic conceptions have in common an opposition to invoking the authority of precedents or of abstract and ultimate principles. Thus in law, judicial decisions that have turned on the weighing of consequences and probable general welfare rather than on being deduced from precedents have been called pragmatic.

The word pragmatism goes back to the Greek ("action," "affair"). The Greek historian Polybius (died 118 BC) called his writings "pragmatic," meaning thereby that they were intended to be instructive and useful to his readers. In his introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hegel commented on this "pragmatical" approach as the second kind of reflective history, and tor this genre he cited Johannes von Muller's History of the World (Eng. trans. 1840). As the psychologist and leading Pragmatist William James remarked, "the term is derived from the same Greek word meaning action, from which the words practice' and practical' come." Charles Peirce, another pioneering

Pragmatist, who may have been the first to use the word to designate a specific philosophic doctrine, had Kant's German term rather than the Greek word in mind: Pragmatisch refers to experimental, empirical, and purposive thought "based on and applying to experience." In the philosophy of education the notion that children learn by doing, that critical standards of procedure and understanding emerge from the application of concepts to directly experienced subject matters, has been called "pragmatic." In semiotics, the general theory of language, that part which studies the relation of the user to the words or other signs being used, is called pragmatics (as distinct from semantics and syntax).

Thus, according to pragmatism, knowledge is instrumental- a tool for organizing experience satisfactorily. Concepts are habits of belief or rules of action. Values, which arise in historically specific cultural situations, are intelligently appropriated only to the extent that they satisfactorily resolve problems and are judged worth retaining. Truth is belief that is confirmed in the course of experience and is therefore fallible, subject to further revision.

Control questions.

1. Give the example of the action of verification-principle.
2. How do you understand the phrase: “Whereof one can not speak, thereof one must be silent”?
3. What is the criterion of truth in pragmatism?

WESTERN IRRATIQNALISM

A 19th- and early 20th-century philosophical trend that claimed to enrich man's apprehension of life by expanding it beyond the rational to its fuller dimensions. Rooted either in metaphysics or in an awareness of the uniqueness of human experience, irrationalism stressed the dimensions of instinct, feeling, and will as over and against reason. The term is used chiefly by continental European philosophers, who regard irrationalism as one of several strong currents flowing into the 20th century.

There were irrationalists before the 19th century. In ancient Greek culture-which is usually assessed as rationalistic - a Dionysian (i.e., instinctive) strain can be discerned in the works of the poet Pindar, in the dramatists, and even in such philosophers as Pythagoras and Empedocles and in Plato. In early modern philosophy - even during the ascendancy of Cartesian rationalism-Blaise Pascal turned from reason to an Augustinian faith, convinced that "the heart has its reasons" unknown to reason as such.

The main tide of irrationalism, like that of literary romanticism-itself a form of irrationalism - followed the Age of Reason and was a reaction to it. Irrationalism found much in the life of the spirit and in human history that could not be dealt with by the rational methods of science. Under the influence of Charles Darwin and later Sigmund Freud, irrationalism began to explore the biological and subconscious roots of experience. Pragmatism, existentialism, and vitalism (or "life philosophy"; all arose as expressions of this expanded view of human life and thought.

For Arthur Schopenhauer, a typical l9th-century irrationalist, voluntarism expressed the essence of reality - a blind, purposeless will permeating all existence. If mind, then, is an emergent from mute biological process, it is natural to conclude, as the pragmatists did, that it evolved as an instrument for practical adjustment - not as an organ for the rational plumbing of metaphysics. Charles Sanders Peirce and William James thus argued that ideas are to be assessed not in terms of logic but in terms of their practical results when put to the test of action.

Irrationalism is also expressed in the historicism and relativism of Wilhelm Dilthey, who saw all knowledge as conditioned by one's private historical perspective and who thus urged the importance of the Geisteswissenschaften (the humanities). Johann Georg Hamann, spurning speculation, sought truth in feeling, faith, and experience, making personal convictions its ultimate criterion. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi exalted the certitude and clarity of faith to the detriment of intellectual knowledge and sensation.

Friedrich Schelling and Henri Bergson, who were preoccupied with the uniqueness of human experience, turned to intuitionism, which "sees things invisible to science." Reason itself was not repudiated; it had simply lost its commanding role inasmuch as personal insights are impervious to testing. In its aspect as a vitalism, Sergson's philosophy-as well as that of Friedrich Nietzsche-was [nationalistic in holding that instinctive, or Dionysian, drive lies at the heart of existence. Nietzsche viewed moral codes as myths, lies, and frauds created to mask forces operating beneath the surface to influence thought and behaviour. For him, God is dead and man is free to formulate new values. Ludwig Kiages extended life philosophy in Germany by urging that the irrational springs of human life are "natural" and should be followed in a deliberate effort to root out the adventitious reason; and Oswald Spengler extended it to history, which he viewed intuitively as an irrational process of organic growth and decay. `

In existentialism, Soren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus all despaired of making sense out of an incoherent world; and each chose his own alternative to reason-the leap of faith, radical freedom, and heroic revolt, respectively.

In general, irrationalism implies either (in ontology) that the world is devoid of rational structure, meaning, and purpose; or (in epistemology) that reason is inherently defective and incapable of knowing the universe without distortion; or (in ethics) that recourse to objective standards is futile; or (in anthropology) that in human nature itself the dominant dimensions are irrational.

Schopenhauer, Arthur

Active maturity.

The winter (1813-14) he spent in Weimar, in intimate association with Goethe, with whom he discussed various philosophical topics. In that same winter the Orientalist Friedrich Majer, a disciple of Johann Gottfried Herder, introduced him to the teachings of Indian antiquity - the philosophy of Vedanta and the mysticism of the Vedas (Hindu scriptures). Later, Schopenhauer considered that the Upanisads (philosophic Vedas), together with Plato and Kant, constituted the foundation on which he erected his own philosophical system.

In May 1814 he left his beloved Weimar after a quarrel with his mother over her frivolous way of life, of which he disapproved. He then lived in 'Dresden until 1818, associating occasionally with a group of writers for the Dresdener Abcndzeitung ("Dresden Evening Newspaper"). Schopenhauer finished his trea tise Uber das Sehn und die Farben (1816; "On Vision and Colours"), supporting Goethe against Isaac Newton.

His next three years were dedicated exclusively to the preparation and composition of his main work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819; The World as Will and Idea). The fundamental idea of this work - which is condensed into a short formula in the title itself - is developed in four books composed of two comprehensive series of reflections that include successively the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of nature, aesthetics, and ethics.

The first book begins with Kant. The world is my representation, says Schopenhauer. It is only comprehensible with the aid of the constructs of man's intellect-space, time, and causality. But these constructs show the world only as appearance, as a multiplicity of things next to and following one another - not as the thing in itself, which Kant considered to be unknowable. The second book advances to a consideration of the essences of the concepts presented. Of all the things in the world, only one is presented to a person in two ways: he knows himself externally as body or as appearance, and he knows himself internally as part of the primary essence of all things, as will. The will is the thing in itself; it is unitary, unfathomable, and unchangeable, beyond space and time, without causes and purposes. In the world of appearances, it is reflected in an ascending series of realizations. From the blind impulses in the forces of inorganic nature, through organic nature (plants and animals) to the rationally guided actions of men, an enormous chain of restless desires, agitations, and drives stretch forth'-a continual struggle of the higher forms against the lower, an eternally aimless and insatiable striving, inseparably united with misery and misfortune. At the end, however, stands death, the great reproof that the will-to-live receives, posing the question to each single person: Have you had enough?

Whereas the first two books present the will in an affirmative mode, the last two, dealing with aesthetics and ethics, surpass them by pointing to the negation of the will as a possible liberation. Evoking as their leading figures the genius and the saint, who illustrate this negation; these books present the "pessimistic" world view that values nonbeing more highly than being. The arts summon man to a will-less way of viewing things, in which the play of the passions ceases. To the succession of levels achieved by the realizations of the will corresponds a gradation of levels in the arts, from the lowest - the art of building (architecture) - through the art of poetry to the highest of arts-music. But the arts liberate a person only momentarily from the service of the will. A genuine liberation results only from breaking through the bounds of individuality imposed by the ego. Whoever feels acts of compassion, selflessness, and human kindness and feels the suffering of other beings as his own is on the way to the abnegation of the will to life, achieved by the saints of all peoples and times in asceticism. Schopenhauer's anthropology and sociology do not, in the mariner of Hegel, commence with the state or with the community; they focus upon man - patient, suffering man who toils by himself - and show him certain possibilities of standing his ground and of living together with others.

The book marked the summit of Schopenhauer's thought. In the many years thereafter, no further development of his philosophy occurred, no inner struggles or changes, no critical reorganization of basic thoughts. From then onward, his work consisted merely of more detailed exposition, clarification, and affirmation.

In March 1820, after a lengthy first tour of Italy and a triumphant dispute with Hegel, he qualified to lecture at the University of Berlin. Though he remained a member of the university for 24 semesters, only his first lecture was actually held; for he had scheduled (and continued to schedule) his lectures at the same hour when Hegel lectured to a large and ever-growing audience. Clearly, he could not successfully challenge a persistently advancing philosophy. Even his book received scant attention. For a second lime Schopenhauer went on a year-long trip to Italy, and this was followed by a year of illness in Munich. In May 1825 he made one last attempt in Berlin, but in vain. He now occupied himself with secondary works, primarily translations.

Kierkegaard, Soren

Kierkegaard, Soren Aabye (1813-55), Danish writer whose “literature”, as he called it, includes philosophy, psychology, theology and devotional literature, fiction, and literary criticism.

He returned from Berlin with an enormous manuscript in his trunk, Enten-Eller: et-livs fragment (1843; Either/Or: A Fragment of Life). Nearly all Kierkegaard's books were published pseudonymously, with fictitious names suited to the particular work, a peculiarity intended to persuade the reader that the ideas he proposed were not to be taken as the pronouncements of an authority but presented as various modes of life for the reader's judgment and, especially, choice. This is, in fact, the meaning of the title Either/Or, which offers the alternatives of an aesthetic or an ethical (or ethico-religious) view of life. Kierkegaard's belief in the necessity - for each individual-of

making a fully conscious, responsible choice among the alternatives that life offers has become fundamental in all existential writing and thought.

Kierkegaard's unhappy experience with Regine obviously plays a great role in Either/Or, and, indeed, the final part of the first volume recalls his own love story in many details recorded in his diary. The book can be seen as a secret communication to Regine, intended to explain and justify his attitude to her. Such secret communications run through all his works, and Kierkegaard returns again and again to the question of his responsibility for what he did. Either/Or is a work of high artistic value; in addition, it provides an important illustration of the current "literary trend when Romanticism was developing some of its later preoccupations-social realism and individual psychology - and was becoming more pessimistic and morbid in its outlook. These elements also occur in Kierkegaard's subsequent books, which appeared in rapid succession.

Among them should be mentioned Frygt og baeven (1843; Fear and Trembling) and Gjentagelsen (1843; Repetition), both of which deal with faith and with the idea of sacrifice. The starting point of Fear and Trembling is the story of Abraham and Isaac. Once more Kierkegaard examines the implications of his break with Regine, a sacrifice, like that of Abraham, performed in obedience to a higher duty, and, like Abraham's readiness to slay his son, an act that contravenes the laws of ethics. The problem is whether situations can be imagined in which ethics can be suspended by a higher authority-i.e., by God, when God himself must be considered the essence of everything ethical. This problem-which Kierkegaard calls "the teleological suspension of the ethical"-led him to the conclusion that faith is essentially paradoxical. Repetition is associated with Fear and Trembling since it provides a psychological demonstration of these ideas.

In 1844 Philosophiske smuler (Philosophical Fragments) and Begrebet angest (The Concept of Dread) appeared. The former is an attempt to present Christianity as it should be if it is to have any meaning. It aims particularly at presenting Christianity as a form of existence that presupposes free will, without which everything becomes meaningless. This was an attack on the prevailing Hegelian philosophy, which employed grandiose historical perspectives in which the individual was sucked up as tracelessly as a grain of dust. In fact, by this time Kierkegaard was preparing for a showdown with Hegelian philosophy, but, before he did so, he felt the need to extend his ideas concerning the philosophy of freedom into the sphere of psychology. The result was The Concept of Dread. Extraordinarily penetrating, it is perhaps the first work of depth psychology in existence.

In this work Kierkegaard makes a clear distinction between what he calls angst, or dread-a feeling that has no definite object-and the fear and terror that derive from an objective threat (e.g., a wild animal, a gunman). How intimately Kierkegaard's ideas were intertwined with his life can be seen from an extract from his diary;

But if I had explained things to her [Regine], I would have had to initiate her into terrible things, my relationship with my father, his melancholy, the eternal night that broods over me, my despair, lusts, and excesses, which perhaps in God's eyes were not so heinous; for it was dread which caused me to go astray.

In the last part of the sentence we have the starting point and key to The Concept of Dread. Kierkegaard perceived that freedom cannot be proved philosophically because any proof would imply a logical necessity, which is the opposite of freedom. The discussion of freedom does not belong to the sphere of logic but to that of psychology, which cannot discuss freedom itself but can describe the state of mind that makes freedom possible. This state of mind is dread. Through experiencing dread, one leaps from innocence to sin, and, if the challenge of Christianity is accepted, from guilt to faith. Dread is thus sin's prelude, not its sequel, as one would think at first.

In 1845 Kierkegaard had a new book ready, Stadier paa livets vci (Stages on Life's Way), a voluminous work and perhaps his most mature artistic achievement. In a way, it reiterates the idea of Either/Or, as the two titles indicate, but there is a vital difference-now the religious stage, or sphere, is distinguished not merely from the aesthetic but also from the ethical. This development was, in fact, a logical consequence of the ideas embodied in all his former works, which aimed at exposing the inadequacy of human ethics as a way of life. Accordingly, while in Either/Or there were only two spheres, the aesthetic and the ethical, in Stages on Life's Way there are three. In the third and last section of the book, "Guilty?/Not Guilty?," Kierkegaard dissects the story of his broken engagement from a new angle. On the aesthetic plane, a love tragedy signifies that two lovers cannot be united because an extraneous power prevents them; the story of Romeo and Juliet provides a classic example. On the ethical plane, the obstacle consists in their belonging to different spheres of existence, one interpreting love aesthetically, the other ethically. This obstacle can only be overcome by one elevating the other to his own sphere of existence, a thing that rarely happens. On the religious plane, however, the obstacle lies in the fact that one of the two is constitutionally different, for he conceives his destiny to be one of suffering, and only the acceptance of suffering will enable him to achieve detachment from the here and now and so prepare him for eternity. The aesthetic hero has his opposition outside himself; the religious finds it within. The aesthetic hero becomes great by conquering; the religious hero by suffering. But suffering in the service of "the idea" is precisely the realization of the idea in the religious sphere of existence. This was the argument that Kierkegaard had not himself conceived when he wrote Either/Or and for whose sake he had to write the book over again.

It is an argument that evinces an increasingly sombre outlook on life and on humanity as a whole. A number of unpleasant experiences had contributed to his changed mood. Regine had married and thus crushed a romantic illusion about their remaining in a sort of divine marriage, raised above the terrestrial level, only waiting for God to make the impossible possible. This, in fact, was the idea underlying both Fear and Trembling and Repetition. Now it had all come to nothing, and the disillusionment emerges clearly in the first part of Stages on Life's Way, called "In

Vino Veritas" or "The Banquet," which is modeled on Plato's Symposium and deals with the same subjects-love, eros, sex, woman - and reflects a biting sarcasm and scathing contempt for women in general.

Kierkegaard frequently uses the verb “to exist” in a special sense, to refer to human existence. Kierkegaard describes human existence as an unfinished process, in which “the individual” (a key concept in his thought) must take responsibility for achieving an identity as a self through free choices. In accord with his claim that existence cannot be reduced to intellectual thought, Kierkegaard devotes much attention to emotions and passions.

Nietzsche

Nietzsche's writings fall into three well-defined periods. The early works, The Birth of Tragedy and the four Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen (1873; Untimely Meditations), are dominated by a Romantic perspective influenced by Schopenhauer and Wagner. The middle period, from Human, All-Too-Human up to The Gay Science, reflects the tradition of French aphorists. It extols reason and science, experiments with literary genres, and expresses Nietzsche's emancipation from his earlier Romanticism and from Schopenhauer and Wagner. Nietzsche's mature philosophy emerged after The Gay Science.

In his mature writings Nietzsche was preoccupied by the origin and function of values in human life. If as he believed, life neither possesses nor lacks intrinsic value and yet is always being evaluated, then such evaluations can usefully be read as symptoms of the condition of the evaluator. He was especially interested, therefore, in a probing analysis and evaluation of the fundamental cultural values of Western philosophy, religion, and morality, which he characterized as expressions of the ascetic ideal.

The ascetic ideal is born when suffering becomes endowed with ultimate significance. According to Nietzsche the Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, made suffering tolerable by interpreting it as God's intention and as an occasion for atonement. Christianity, accordingly, owed its triumph to the flattering doctrine of personal immortality, that is, to the conceit that each individual's life and death have cosmic significance. Similarly, traditional philosophy expressed the ascetic ideal when it privileged soul over body, mind over senses, duty over desire, reality over appearance, and the timeless over the temporal. While Christianity promised salvation for the sinner who repents, philosophy held out hope for salvation, albeit secular, for its sages. Common to traditional religion and philosophy was the unstated but powerful motivating assumption that existence requires explanation, justification, or expiation. Both denigrated experience in favour of some other, "true" world. Both may be read as symptoms of a declining life, or life in distress.

Nietzsche's critique of traditional morality centred on the typology of "master" and "slave" morality. By examining the etymology of the German words gut ("good"), schlecht ("bad"), and bose ("evil"), Nietzsche maintained that the distinction between good and bad was originally descriptive, that is, a nonmoral reference to those who were privileged, the masters, as opposed to those who were base, the slaves. The good/evil contrast arose when slaves avenged themselves by converting attributes of mastery into vices. If the favoured, the "good," were powerful, it was said that the meek would inherit the earth. Pride became sin. Charity, humility, and obedience replaced competition, pride, and autonomy. Crucial to the triumph of slave morality was its claim to being the only true morality. This insistence on absoluteness is as essential to philosophical as to religious ethics. Although Nietzsche gave a historical genealogy of master and slave morality, he maintained that it was an ahistoricul typology of traits present in everyone.

"Nihilism" was the term Nietzsche used to describe the devaluation of the highest values posited by the ascetic ideal. He thought of the age in which he lived as one of passive nihilism, that is. as an age that was not yet aware that religious and philosophical absolutes had dissolved in the emergence of 19th-century Positivism. With the collapse of metaphysical and theological foundations and sanctions for traditional morality only a pervasive sense of purposelessness and meaninglessness would remain. And the triumph of meaninglessness is the triumph of nihilism: "God is dead." Nietzsche thought, however, that most men could not accept the eclipse of the ascetic ideal and the intrinsic meaninglessness of existence but would seek supplanting absolutes to invest life with meaning. He thought the emerging nationalism of his day represented one such ominous surrogate god, in which the nation-state would be invested with transcendent value and purpose. And just as absoluteness of doctrine had found expression in philosophy and religion, absoluteness would become attached to the nation-state with missionary fervour. The slaughter of rivals and the conquest of the earth would proceed under banners of universal brotherhood, democracy, and socialism. Nietzsche's prescience here was particularly poignant, and the use later made of him especially repellent. For example, two books were standard issue for the rucksacks of German soldiers during World War 1, Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Gospel According to St. Jolin. It is difficult to say which author was more compromised by this gesture.

Nietzsche often thought of his writings as struggles with nihilism, and apart from his critiques of religion, philosophy, and morality he developed original theses that have commanded attention, especially perspectivism, will to power, eternal recurrence, and the superman. Perspectivism is a concept which* holds that knowledge is always perspective, that there are no immaculate perceptions, and that knowledge from no point of view is as incoherent a notion as seeing from no particular vantage point.

Perspectivism also denies the possibility of an all-inclusive perspective, which could contain all others and, hence, make reality available as it is in itself. The concept of such an all-inclusive perspective is as incoherent as the concept of seeing an object from every possible vantage point simultaneously.

Nietzsche's perspectivism has sometimes been mistakenly identified with relativism and skepticism. Nonetheless, it raises the question of how one is to understand Nietzsche's own theses, for example, that the dominant values of the common heritage have been underwritten by an ascetic ideal, is this thesis true absolutely or only from a certain perspective? It may also be asked whether perspectivism can be asserted consistently without self-contradiction, since perspectivism must presumably be true in an absolute that is a nonperspectival sense. Concerns such as these have generated much fruitful Nietzsche commentary as well as useful work in the theory of knowledge.

Nietzsche often identified life itself with "will to power," that is, with an instinct for growth and durability. This concept provides yet another way of interpreting the ascetic ideal, since it is Nietzsche's contention "that all the supreme values of mankind lack this will-that values which are symptomatic of decline, nihilistic values, are lording it under the holiest names." Thus, traditional philosophy, religion, and morality have been so many masks a deficient will to power wears. The sustaining values of Western civilization have been sublimated products of decadence in that the ascetic ideal endorses existence as pain and suffering. Some commentators have attempted to extend Nietzsche's concept of the will to power from human life to the organic and inorganic realms, ascribing a metaphysics of will to power to him. Such interpretations, however, cannot be sustained by reference to his published works.

The doctrine of eternal recurrence, the basic, conception of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, asks the question "How well disposed would a person have to become to himself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than the infinite repetition, without alteration, of each and every moment?" Presumably most men would, or should, find such a thought shattering because they should always find it possible to prefer the eternal repetition of their lives in an edited version rather than to crave nothing more fervently than the eternal recurrence of each of its horrors. The person who could accept recurrence without self-deception or evasion would be a superhuman being (Ubermensch), a superman whose distance from the ordinary man is greater than the distance between man and ape, Nietzsche says. Commentators still disagree whether there are specific character traits that define the person who embraces eternal recurrence.

Bergson Henri

Bergson, Henri (1859-1941), French philosopher, the most influential of the first half of the twentieth century.

The publication of the Essai found Bergson returned to Paris, teaching at the Lycee Henri IV. In 1891 he married Louise Neuburger, a cousin of the French novelist Marcel Proust. Meanwhile, he had undertaken the study of the relation between mind and body. The prevailing doctrine was that of the so-called psychophysiological parallelism, which held that for every psychological fact there is a corresponding physiological fact that strictly determines' it. Though he was convinced that he had refuted the argument for determinism, his own work, in the doctoral dissertation, had not attempted to explain how mind and body are related. The findings of his research into this problem were published in 1896 under the title Ματι ρε μ μοιρε: εσσαι λα ρλατιου δυ χορπσ θ λэεσπριτ (Matter and Memory).

This is the most difficult and perhaps also the most perfect of his books. The approach that he took in it is typical of his method of doing philosophy. He did not proceed by general speculation and was not concerned with elaborating a great speculative system. He began in this, as in each of his books, with a particular problem, which he analyzed by first determining the empirical (observed) facts that are known about it according to the best and most up-to-date scientific opinion. Thus, for “Matter and Memory” he devoted five years to studying all of the literature available on memory and especially the psychological phenomenon of aphasia, or loss of the ability to use language. According to the theory of psychophysiological parallelism, a lesion in the brain should also affect the very basis of a psychological power. The occurrence of aphasia, Bergson argued, showed that this is not the case. The person so affected understands what others have to say, knows what he himself wants to say, suffers no paralysis of the speech organs, and yet is unable to speak. This fact shows, he argued, that it is not memory that is lost but, rather, the bodily mechanism that is needed to express it. From this observation Bergson concluded that memory and so mind or soul, is independent of body and makes use of it to carry out its own purposes.

The Essai had been widely reviewed in the professional journals, but Ματι ρε μ μοιρε attracted the attention of a wider audience and marked the first step along the way that led to Bergson's becoming one of the most popular and influential lecturers and writers of the day. In 1897 he returned as professor of philosophy to the χολε Νορμαλε ΣυπΓ ριευρε**,** which he had fust entered as a student at the age of 19. Then, in 1900, he was called to the College de France, the academic institution of highest prestige in all of France, where he enjoyed immense success as a lecturer, From then until the outbreak of World War I, there was a veritable vogue of Bergsonism. William James was an enthusiastic reader of his works, and the two men became warm friends. Expositions and commentaries on the Bergsonian philosophy were to be found everywhere. It was held by many that a new day in philosophy had dawned that brought with it light to many other activities such as literature, music, painting, politics, and religion…

Λэωολυτιου χρΓ ατριχε (1907; Creative Evolution), the greatest work of these years and Bergson's most famous book, reveals him most clearly as a philosopher of process at the same time that it shows the influence of biology upon his thought. In examining the idea of life, Bergson accepted evolution as a scientifically established fact. He criticized, however, the philosophical interpretations that had been given of it for failing to see the importance of duration and hence missing the very uniqueness of life. He proposed that the whole evolutionary

process should be seen as the endurance of an Γλαυ ωιταλ ("vital impulse") that is continually developing and generating new forms. Evolution, in short, is creative, not mechanistic.

In this developing process, he traced two main lines: one through instinct, leading to the life of insects; the other through the evolution of intelligence, resulting in man; both of which, however, are seen as the work of one vital impulse that is at work everywhere in the world. The final chapter of the book, entitled "The Cinematographical Mechanism of Thought and the Mechanistic illusion," presents a review of the whole history of philosophical thought with the aim of showing that it everywhere failed to appreciate the nature and importance of becoming, falsifying thereby the nature of reality by the imposition of static and discrete concepts.

Among Bergson's minor works are Λε Ριρε: εσσαι συρ λα σιγυιφιχαυχε δυ χομιθνε (1900: Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic) and Ιντροδνχτιου θ λα μεταπηψσιθυε (1903; An Introduction to Metaphysics). The latter provides perhaps the best introduction to his philosophy by offering the clearest account of his method. There are two profoundly different ways of knowing, he claimed. The one, which reaches its furthest development in science, is analytic, spatial i zing, and conceptualizing, tending to see things as solid and discontinuous. The other is an intuition that is global, immediate, reaching into the heart of a thing by sympathy. The first is useful for getting things done, for acting on the world, but it fails to reach the essential reality of things precisely because it leaves out duration and its perpetual flux, which is inexpressible and to be grasped only by intuition. Bergson's entire work may be considered as an extended exploration of the meaning and implications of his intuition of duration as constituting the innermost reality of everything.

EXISTENTIALISM

Existentialism, a philosophical and literary movement that came to prominence in Europe, particularly in France, between two World Wars and immediately after second World War, and that focused on the uniqueness of each human individual as distinguished from abstract universal human qualities.

According to Existentialism: (1) Existence is always particular and individual - always my existence, your existence, his existence. (2) Existence is primarily the problem of existence (i.e., of its mode of being), it is, therefore, also the investigation of the meaning of Being. (3) This investigation is continually faced with diverse possibilities, from among which the existent (i.e., man) must make a selection, to which he must then commit himself. (4) Because these possibilities are constituted by man's relationships with things and with other men, existence is always a being-in-the-world-i.e., in a concrete and historically determinate situation that limits or conditions choice. Man is therefore called Dasein ("there being") because he is defined by the fact that he exists, or is in the world and inhabits it.

With respect to the first point, that existence is particular, Existentialism is opposed to any doctrine that views man as the manifestation of an absolute or of an infinite substance. It is thus opposed to most forms of Idealism, such as those that stress Consciousness, Spirit, Reason, Idea, or Oversoul. Secondly, it is opposed to any doctrine that sees in man some given and complete reality that must be resolved into its elements in order to be known or contemplated. It is thus opposed to any form of objectivism or scientism since these stresses the crass reality of external fact. Thirdly, Existentialism is opposed to any form of necessitarianism; for existence is constituted by possibilities from among which man may choose and through which he can project himself. And, finally, with respect to the fourth point, Existentialism is opposed to any solipsism (holding that I alone exist) or any epistemological Idealism (holding that the objects of knowledge are mental), because existence, which is the relationship with other beings, always extends beyond itself, toward the being of these entities; it is, so to speak, transcendence.

Starting from these bases, Existentialism can take diverse and contrasting directions. It can insist on the transcendence of Being with respect to existence, and, by holding this transcendence to be the origin or foundation of existence, it can thus assume a theistic form. On the other hand, it can hold that human existence, posing itself as a problem, projects itself with absolute freedom, creating itself by itself, thus assuming to itself the function of God. As such, Existentialism presents itself as a radical atheism. Or it may insist on the finitude of human existence - i.e., on the limits inherent in its possibilities of projection and choice. As such, Existentialism presents itself as a humanism.

From 1940 on, with the diffusion of Existentialism through continental Europe, its directions have developed in terms of the diversity of the interests to which they are subject: the religious interest, the metaphysical (or nature of Being) interest, the moral and political interest. This diversity of interests is rooted, at least in part, in the diversity of sources on which Existentialism has drawn. One such source has been the subjectivism of the 4th-5th-century theologian St. Augustine, who exhorted man not to go outside himself in the quest for-truth, for it is within him that truth abides. "If you find that you are by nature mutable," he wrote, "transcend yourself." Another source has been the Dionysian Romanticism of Nietzsche, who exalted life in its most irrational and cruel features and made this exaltation the proper task of the "higher man," who exists beyond good and evil. Still another source has been the nihilism of Dostoyevsky, who, in his novels, presented man as continually defeated as a result of his choices and as continually placed by them before the insoluble enigma of himself. As a consequence of the diversity of these sources, Existentialist doctrines have focused on several aspects of existence

They have focused, first, on the problematic character of the human situation, through which man is continually confronted with diverse possibilities or alternatives, among which he may choose and on the basis of which he can project his life

Second, the doctrines have focused on the phenomena of this situation and especially on those that are negative or baffling, such as the concern or preoccupation that dominates man because of the dependence of all his possibilities upon his relationships with things and with other men; the dread of death or of the failure of his projects; the "shipwreck" upon insurmountable "limit situations" (death, the struggle and suffering inherent in every form of life, the situation in which everyone daily finds himself); the guilt inherent in the limitation of choices and in the responsibilities that derive from making them; the boredom from the repetition of situations; the absurdity of man's dangling between the infinity of his aspirations and the finitude of his possibilities.

Third, the doctrines have focused on the intersubjectivity that is inherent in existence and is understood either as a personal relationship between two individuals, I and thou, such that the thou may be another man or God, or as an impersonal relationship between the anonymous mass and the individual self deprived of any authentic communication with others.

Fourth, Existentialism focuses on ontology, on some doctrine of the general meaning of Being, which can be approached in any of a number of ways: through the analysis of the temporal structure of existence; through the etymologies of the most common words-on the supposition that in ordinary language Being itself is disclosed, at least partly (and thus is also hidden); through the rational clarification of existence by which it is possible to catch a glimpse, through ciphers or symbols, of the Being of the world, of the soul, and of God; through existential psychoanalysis that makes conscious the fundamental "project" in which existence consists; or, finally, through the analysis of the fundamental modality to which all the aspects of existence conform - i.e., through the analysis of possibility.

There is, in the fifth place, the therapeutic value of existential analysis that permits, on the one hand, the liberating of human existence from the beguilements or debasements to which it is subject in daily life and, on the other, the directing of human existence toward its authenticity; i.e., toward a relationship that is well-grounded on itself, and with other men, with the world, and with God.

The various forms of Existentialism may also be distinguished on the basis of language, which is an indication of the cultural traditions to which they belong and which often explains the differences in terminology among the various authors. The principal representatives of German Existentialism are Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers; those of French personalistic Existentialism are Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre; that of French Phenomenology is Maurice Merleau-Ponty; that of Spanish Existentialism is Jose Ortega y Gasset; that of Russian Idealistic Existentialism is Nikolay Berdyayev (who, however, lived half of his adult life in France); and that of Italian Existentialism is Nicola Abbagnano. The linguistic differences, however, are not decisive for a determination of philosophical affinities. For example, Marcel and Sartre are farther apart than Heidegger and Sartre; and there is greater affinity between Abbagnano and Merlenu-Ponty than between Merleau-Ponty and Marcel.

PSYCHOANALYSIS

A highly influential method of treating mental disorders, shaped by psychoanalytic theory, which emphasizes unconscious mental processes and is sometimes described as "depth psychology."

The psychoanalytic movement originated in the clinical observations and formulations of the Austrian psychiatrist Sigmund Freud, who coined the term. During the 1890s, Freud was associated with another Viennese, Josef Breuer, in studies of neurotic patients under hypnosis. Freud and Breuer observed that, when the sources of patients' ideas and impulses were brought into consciousness during the hypnotic state, the patients showed improvement.

Observing that most of his patients talked freely without being under hypnosis, Freud evolved the technique of free association of ideas The patient was encouraged to say anything that' came to mind, without regard to its assumed relevancy or propriety. Noting that patients sometimes had difficulty in making free associations, Freud concluded that certain painful experiences were repressed, or held back from conscious awareness. Freud noted that in the majority of the patients seen during his early practice the events most frequently repressed were concerned with disturbing sexual experiences. Thus he hypothesized that anxiety was a consequence of the repressed energy (libido)' attached to sexuality; the repressed energy found expression in various symptoms that served as psychological defense mechanisms. Freud and his followers later extended the concept of anxiety to include feelings of fear, guilt, and shame consequent to fantasies of aggression and hostility and to fear of loneliness caused by separation from a person on whom the sufferer is dependent.

Freud's free-association technique provided him with a tool for studying the meanings of dreams, slips of the tongue, forgetfulness, and other mistakes and errors in everyday life. From these investigations he was led to a new conception of the structure of personality: the id, ego, and superego. The id is the unconscious reservoir of drives and impulses derived from the genetic background and concerned with the preservation and propagation of life. The ego, according to Freud, operates in conscious and preconscious levels of awareness. It is the portion of the personality concerned with the tasks of reality: perception, cognition, and executive actions. In the superego lie the individual's environmentally derived ideals and values and the mores of his family and society; the superego serves as a censor on the ego functions.

In the Freudian framework, conflicts among the three structures of the personality are repressed and lead to the arousal of anxiety. The person is protected from experiencing anxiety directly by the development of defense mechanisms, which are learned through family and cultural influences. These mechanisms become pathological when they inhibit pursuit of the satisfactions of living in a society. The existences of these patterns of adaptation or mechanisms of defense are quantitatively but not qualitatively different in the psychotic and neurotic states.

Freud held that the patient's emotional attachment to the analyst represented a transference of the patient's relationship to parents or important parental figures. Freud held that those strong feelings, unconsciously projected to the analyst, influenced the patient's capacity to make free associations. By objectively treating these responses and the resistances they evoked and by bringing the patient to analyze the origin of those feelings, Freud concluded that the analysis of the transference and the patient's resistance to its analysis were the keystones of psychoanalytic therapy.

Early schisms over such issues as the basic role that Freud ascribed to biological instinctual processes caused onetime associates Carl Jung, Otto Rank, and Alfred Adler to establish their own psychological theories. Most later controversies, however, were over details of Freudian theory or technique and did not lead to a complete departure from the parent system. Other influential theorists have included Erik Erikson, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan. At one time psychiatrists held a monopoly on psychoanalytic practice, but soon nonmedical therapists also were admitted.

Later developments included work on the technique and theory of psychoanalysis of children. Freud's tripartite division of the mind into id, ego, and superego became progressively more elaborate, and problems of anxiety and female sexuality received increasing attention. Psychoanalysis also found many extraclinical applications in other areas of social thought, particularly anthropology and sociology, and in literature and the arts.

Freud used the results of his investigations to speculate about the origins of morality, religion, and political authority. He tended to find their historical and psychological roots in early stages of the development of the individual. Morality in particular he traced to the internalization of parental prohibitions and demands, producing a conscience or superego. Such identification plays an important role in character formation in general. The instinctual renunciation demanded by morality and often achieved by repression Freud regarded as essential to the order society needs to conduct its business. Civilization gets the energy for the achievements of art and science by sublimation of the instinctual drives. But the costs of society and civilization to the individual in frustration, unhappiness, and neurosis can be too high.

Control questions.

1. Explain the meaning of Nietzsche’s phrase: ”God is dead”.
2. Give definition of “existence”.
3. What is the role of libido in human life?

RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY

Russian philosophy, the philosophy produced by Russian thinkers from the mideighteenth century to the present.

In Russian history, member of a 19th-century intellectual movement that wanted Russia's future development to be based on values and institutions derived from the country's early history. Developing in the 1830s from study circles concerned with German philosophy, the Slavophiles were influenced greatly by Friedrich Schelling. The movement was centred in Moscow and attracted wealthy, well-educated, well-traveled members of the old aristocracy. Among its leaders were Aleksey S. Khomyakov, the brothers Konstantin S. and Ivan S. Aksakov, the brothers Ivan V. and Pyotr V. Kireyevsky, and Yury F. Samarin. Their individual interests covered a broad range of topics, including philosophy, history, theology, philology, and folklore; but they all concluded that Russia should not use Western Europe as a model for its development and modernization but should follow a course determined by its own character and history.

They considered western Europe, which had adopted the Roman Catholic and Protestant religions, as morally bankrupt and regarded Western* political and economic institutions (e.g., constitutional government and capitalism) as outgrowths of a deficient society. The Russian people, by contrast, adhered to the Russian Orthodox faith; thus, according to the Slavophiles, through their common faith and church, the Russian people were united in a "Christian community," which defined natural, harmonious, human relationships.

The Slavophiles considered the Russian peasant commune an uncorrupted representation of the "Christian community." They also believed that the autocratic form of government was well suited to a people spiritually bound together. Viewing Russia as potentially able to develop according to the "Christian community" model, the Slavophiles also thought that once such a society was established, Russia's duty would be to revitalize the West by reintroducing spiritual values there ю replace rationalism, materialism, and individualism.

But the Slavophiles also realized that their contemporary society did not represent their ideal. They believed that Peter I the Great (reigned 1682-1725), by introducing reforms imitating the West, had corrupted Russia, driven a wedge between the nobility and the peasantry, and upset the natural social relationships. They despised the state bureaucracy organized under Peter and his church reforms that had undermined spiritual authority.

In order to perfect Russian society and to restore the autocracy and the church in their ideal forms, the Slavophiles urged extensive reforms, including the emancipation of serfs, curtailment of the bureaucracy, the granting of civil liberties (i.e., freedom of speech, press, and conscience), and the establishment of an institution representing the whole people (similar to the veche OR the zemsky sobor of pre-Petrine Russia).

Although they enthusiastically approved some facets of Russian society and held views resembling the government's official doctrine of narodnost ("nationality"), which emphasized the superior character of the Russian people, Nicholas I objected to their criticism of his regime (which, of course, was based on Peter's reforms). His government censored their journals and generally tried to suppress the movement. The Slavophiles were also opposed intellectually by the Westernizers, a group that developed simultaneously with them but insisted that Russia imitate the Western pattern of modernization and introduce constitutional government into the tsarist autocracy.

The Slavophiles were most active during the 1840s and '50s. After the Crimean War (1853-56), the death of its foremost leaders (1856 and 1860), and the promulgation of the reforms of Alexander II (1860s), the movement declined. Its principles were adapted and simplified by extreme nationalists, Pan-Slavists, and revolutionary Populists (Narodniki). In addition to their influence on those movements, the Slavophiles individually made significant contributions to their various fields of study, particularly theology (with Khomyakov's theory of sobornost, a spiritual unity and religious community based on a free commitment to Orthodoxy), Russian history, and folklore.

The content of Russian philosophy may be characterized in general terms as tending toward utopianism, maximalism, moralism, and soteriology. To take the last point first: Hegel philosophy was received in Russia not only as an allembracing system but also as a vehicle of secular salvation. In the 1860s Darwinism was similarly received, as was Marxism in the 1890s. Utopianism appears at the historical and sociopolitical level in two characteristic doctrines: free theocracy, in which the spiritual authority of the Roman pope was to be united with the secular authority of the Russian tsar; and ecumenical project of reuniting the Eastern and Western churches in a single universal church that would also incorporate the “Protestant principle” of free philosophical and theological inquiry. Maximalism appears at the individual and religious level in claim that God, for whom alone “all things are possible”, can cause what has happened not to have happened and, in particular, can restore irrecoverable human loss, such as that associated with disease, deformity, madness, and death.

Solovyov

He was the son of the historian Sergey M Solovyov. After a basic education in languages, history, and philosophy at his Orthodox home, he took his doctorate at Moscow University in 1874 with the dissertation "The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists." After travels in the West, he wrote a second thesis, a critique of abstract principles, and accepted a teaching post at the University of St. Petersburg, where he delivered His celebrated lectures on Godmanhood (1880). This appointment was later rescinded because of Solovyov's clemency appeal for the March 1881 assassins of Tsar Alexander II, He also encountered official opposition to his writings and to his activity in promoting the union of Eastern Orthodoxy with the Roman Catholic church.

Solovyov criticized Western empiricist and idealist philosophy for attributing absolute significance to partial insights and abstract principles. Drawing on the writings of Benedict de Spinoza and G.W.F. Hegel, he regarded life as a dialectical process, involving the interaction of knowledge and reality through conflicting tensions. Assuming the ultimate unity of Absolute Being, termed God in the Judeo-Christian tradition, Solovyov proposed that the world's multiplicity, which had originated in a single creative source, was undergoing a process of reintegration with that source. Solovyov asserted, by his concept of Godmanhood, that the unique intermediary between the world and God could only be man, who alone is the vital part of nature capable of knowing and expressing the divine idea of "absolute unitotality" in the chaotic multiplicity of real experience. Consequently, the perfect revelation of God is Christ's incarnation in human nature.

For Solovyov, ethics became a dialectical problem of basing the morality of human acts and decisions on the extent of their contribution to' the world's integration with ultimate divine unity, a theory expressed in his The Meaning of Love (1894).

At the end of his life Solovyov offered (in Three Conversations on War, Progress, and the End of History, 1900) a contrasting apocalyptic vision of historical and cosmic disaster, including the appearance, in the twenty-first century, of the Antichrist (the son of Devil).

Control questions.

1. What was the essence of dispute between Slavophiles and Westernizers?
2. What is utopia?
3. How did Solovyev portray the relationship of Church and State?

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Discipline that seeks to unify the several empirical investigations of human nature in an effort to understand individuals as both creatures of their environment and creators of their own values. The word anthropology was first used in the philosophical faculties of German universities at the end of the 16th century to refer to the systematic

study of man as a physical and moral being. Philosophical anthropology is thus, literally, the systematic study of man conducted within philosophy or by the reflective methods characteristic of philosophy; it might in particular be thought of as being concerned with questions of the status of man in the universe, of the purpose or meaning of human life, and, indeed, with the issues of whether there is any such meaning and of whether man can be made an object of systematic study. What actually falls under the term philosophical anthropology, however, varies with conceptions of the nature and scope of philosophy. The fact that such disciplines as physics chemistry and biology - which are now classified as natural sciences - wore until the 19th century all branches of natural philosophy serves as a reminder that conceptions of philosophy have changed.

Twentieth-century readings of philosophical anthropology are much narrower than those of previous centuries. Four possible meanings are now accepted: (1) the account of man that is contained in any comprehensive philosophy; (2) a particular philosophical orientation known as humanism (see humanism), in which the study of man provides the foundation for all else-a position that has been prominent since the Renaissance; (3) a distinctive, 20th-century form of humanism that on occasion has claimed the label of "philosophical anthropology" for itself and that has taken the human condition, the personal being-in-the-world, as its starting point; and (4) any study of man that is regarded as unscientific. Philosophical anthropology has been used in the last sense by 20th-century antihumanists for whom it has become a term of abuse; antihumanists' have insisted that if anthropology is to be possible at all it is possible only on the condition that it rejects the concept of the individual human subject. Humanism, in their eyes, yields only a prescientific, and hence a philosophical (or ideological), nonscientific anthropology.

By tracing the development of the philosophy of man, it will thus be possible to deal, in turn, with the four meanings of philosophical anthropology. First, however, it is necessary to discuss the concept of human nature, which is central to any anthropology and to philosophical debates about the sense in which and the extent to which man can be made an object of systematic, scientific study. Thus broadly conceived, philosophical anthropology is a kind of inquiry as old as philosophy itself, occupying philosophers from Socrates to Sartre; and it embraces philosophical psychology, the philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and existentialism. Such inquiry presupposes no immutable “essence of man”, but only the meaningfulness of distinguishing between what is “human” and what is not, and the possibility that philosophy as well as other disciplines may contribute to our self-comprehension.

Scheler

b. Aug. 22, 1874, Munich, Ger. d. May 19, 1928, Frankfurt am Main

German social and ethical philosopher, remembered for his phenomenological approach, after the philosophical method of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. In 1901 Scheler became a lecturer at the University of Jena; by that time he had already been influenced by Husserl. Scheler later met several of Husserl's disciples during his years (1907-10) as a professor at Munich. Retiring to Berlin in 1910, he wrote his major works before 1917, when he joined the German Foreign Office as a diplomat in Geneva and at The Hague. In 1919 he became professor of philosophy and sociology at Cologne. By 1920 he had become a pacifist and a convert to Roman Catholicism, but about 1924 he turned toward a more pantheistic view of man and the world.

As a phenomenologist, Scheler sought to discover the essence of mental attitudes and their relation to their objects. He differed from Husserl in his readiness to assign an independently real status to the objects. Scheler's work falls into two periods. During the first, his work contained a number of Christian orientations, as in the main work of this period, Der Formalisms in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (1913-16; Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values), which is in part a severe critique of Kant. Scheler shows that what one "ought to do" presupposes a feeling of the value of what ought to be done and divides all values into five ranks, which are given a priori and which are anchored in each person's ordo amoris, an "order, or logic, of the heart" that is not congruent with the logic of reason. In holding this view, Scheler followed the 17th-century French philosopher Blaise Pascal. According to this logic, moral acts and deeds are individual and originate in an individual's prerational preferring (or rejecting) of values. Moral experience lies in the "call of the hour," in which the a priori rankings among values become individually transparent, no matter how much the ordo amoris may be distorted by feelings of resentment, hate, or other passions. The only vehicle for attaining a higher moral status is the "exemplarity" of a person, which pulls the individual toward his exemplary self-value.

While the first period centred on the incontrovertible value of the individual person, in his second period Scheler set out to determine the "meta-anthropological" status of humanity. In Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (1928; "Man's Place in the Universe") and in manuscripts edited after his death, he offers a grandiose view of Being: man, God, and world are one self-becoming cosmic process in absolute time. This process has two poles: spirit (Geist) and life-urge (Drang). By itself, spirit is powerless, unless its ideas can "functionalize" with life-factors (material conditions) allowing their realization, a concept similar to those of American pragmatism, in which Scheler took a lifelong interest. Divine spirit also needs human life and history to become real. Reality lies in the "resistance" between these two poles. Resistance qua reality is central not only in his phenomenology but also in his Versuche zu eincr Soziologie des Wissens (1924; "Sociology of Knowledge").

The core of Scheler’s phenomenological method is his conception of the objectivity of essences. For Scheler, values are such objective essences. There are four such values, the hierarchical organization of which could be both immediately intuited and established by various public criteria like duration and independence: pleasure, vitality,

spirit, and religion. Corresponding to these values are various personalities who are not creators of value but their discoverers, historical disclosers, and exemplars: the “artist of consumption”, the hero, the genius, and the saint. A similar hierarchy of values applies to forms of society, the highest of which is the church, or a community of solidarity and love. Scheler criticizes the leveling tendencies of liberalism for violating this hierarchy, leading to forms of resentment, individualism, and nationalism, all of which represent the false ordering of values.

Ontology

The theory or study of being as such; i.e., of the basic characteristics of all reality. Though the term was first coined in the 17th century, ontology is synonymous with metaphysics or "first philosophy" as defined by Aristotle in the 4th century BC. Because metaphysics came to include other studies (e.g., philosophical cosmology and psychology), ontology has become the preferred term for the study of being. It was brought into prominence in the 18th century by Christian Wolff a German rationalist, for whom it was a deductive discipline leading to necessary truths about the essences of beings. His great successor Immanuel Kant, however, presented influential refutations of ontology as a deductive system and of the ontological argument for God's necessary existence (as supreme and perfect being). With the 20th-century renovation of metaphysics, ontology or ontological thought has again become important, notably among phenomenologists and existentialists, among them Martin Heidegger.

Perhaps the most familiar question in ontology is whether there are only material entities- materialism- or only mental entities, i.e., minds and their states- idealism- or both- dualism. Here “entity” has its broadest sense: anything real. More specific questions of ontology concern the existence and nature of certain individuals- also called particulars, or certain properties (e.g., are there properties that nothing exemplifies?) or relations (e.g., is there a relation of causation that is a necessary connection rather than a mere regular conjunction between events?). The nature of space and time is another important example of such a more specific topic. Are space and time peculiar individuals that “contain” ordinary individuals, or are they just systems of relations between individual things, such as being (spatially) higher or (temporally) prior.

Matter

Material substance that constitutes the observable universe and, together with energy, forms the basis of all objective phenomena.

The basic building blocks of matter are atoms. All matter shares certain fundamental properties. Every physical entity has gravitation, the property by which it attracts every other entity. Another inherent and permanent property of matter is inertia, which causes a body to resist any change in its condition of rest or its motion. The mass of a body is a measure of its inertia, though it is commonly taken as a measure of the amount of material contained in the body.

Matter in bulk may have several states, the most familiar of which are the gaseous, liquid, and solid states. Less clearly definable but also referred to as states of matter are plasma, clusters, and amorphous conditions such as the glassy state. Each such state exhibits properties that distinguish it from the others. Moreover, these general states can be subdivided into groups according to particular types of .properties. Solids, for example, may be divided into metallic, ionic, covalent, or molecular based on the kinds of bonds that hold together the constituent atoms.

According to Albert Einstein's special theory of relativity, matter (as mass) and energy are equivalent. Accordingly, matter can be converted into energy and energy into matter. The transformation of matter into energy, for instance, results during nuclear fission, which involves the splitting of a nucleus of uranium or another heavy: element into two fragments of almost equal mass.

Space-time

All our thoughts and concepts are called up by sense-experiences and have a meaning only in reference to these sense-experiences. On the other hand, however, they are products of the spontaneous activity of our minds; they are thus in no wise logical consequences of the contents of these sense-experiences. If, therefore, we wish to grasp the essence of a complex of abstract notions we must for the one part investigate the mutual relationships between the concepts and the assertions made about them; for the other, we must investigate how they are related to the experiences.

So far as the way is concerned in which concepts are connected with one another and with the experiences there is no difference of principle, between the concept-systems of science and those of daily life. The concept-systems of science have grown out of those of daily life and have been modified and completed according to the objects and purposes of the science in question.

The more universal a concept is the more frequently it enters into our thinking; and the more indirect its relation to sense-experience, the more difficult it is for us to comprehend its meaning; this is particularly the case with pre-scientific concepts that we have been accustomed ю use since childhood. Consider the concepts referred to in the words "where," "when," "why," "being," to the elucidation of which innumerable volumes of philosophy has been devoted. We fare no better in our speculations than a fish which should strive to become clear as to what is water.

Space-time is a four-dimensional continuum combining the three dimensions of space with time in order to represent motion geometrically. Each point is the location of the event, all of which together represent “the world” through time; path in the continuum (worldlines) represent the dynamical histories of moving particles, so that straight worldliness correspond to uniform motions; three-dimensional sections of constant time value represent all of space at a given time.

Space

In the present article we are concerned with the meaning of "where," that is, of space. It appears that there is no quality contained in our individual primitive sense-experiences that may be designated as spatial. Rather, what is spatial appears to be a sort of order of the material objects of experience. The concept "material object" must therefore be available if concepts concerning space are to be possible. It is the logically primary concept. This is easily seen if we analyse the spatial concepts for example, "next to," "touch," and so forth, that is, if we strive to become aware of their equivalents in experience. The concept "object" is a means of taking into account the persistence in time or the continuity, respectively, of certain groups of experience-complexes. The existence of objects is thus of a conceptual nature, and the meaning of the concepts of objects depends wholly on their being connected (intuitively) with groups of elementary sense-experiences. This connection is the basis of the illusion which makes primitive experience appear to inform us directly about the relation of material bodies (which exist, after all, only in so far as they are thought).

In the sense thus indicated we have (the indirect) experience of the contact of two bodies. We need do no more than call attention to this, as we gain nothing for our present purpose by singling out the individual experiences to which this assertion alludes. Many bodies can be brought into permanent contact with one another in manifold ways. We speak in this sense of the position-relationships of bodies (Lagenbeziehungen). The general laws of such position-relationships are essentially the concern of geometry. This holds, at least, if we do not wish to restrict ourselves to regarding the propositions that occur in this branch of knowledge merely as relationships between empty words that have been set up according to certain principles.

Pre-scientific Thought. - Now, what is the meaning of the concept "space" which we also encounter in pre-scientific thought? The concept of space in pre-scientific thought is characterised by the sentence: "we can think away things but not the space which they occupy." It is as if, without having had experience of any sort, we had a concept, nay even a presentation, of space and as if we ordered our sense-experiences with the help of this concept, present a priori. On the other hand, space appears as a physical reality, as a thing which exists independently of our thought, like material objects. Under the influence of this view of space the fundamental concepts of geometry; the point, the straight line, the plane, were even regarded as having a self-evident character. The fundamental principles that deal with these configurations were regarded as being necessarily valid and as having at the same time an objective content. No scruples were felt about ascribing an objective meaning to such statements as "three empirically given bodies (practically infinitely small) lie on one straight line," without demanding a physical definition for such an assertion. This blind faith in evidence and in the immediately real meaning of the concepts and propositions of geometry became uncertain only after non-Euclidean geometry had been introduced.

Reference to the Earth. - If we start from the view that all spatial concepts are related to contact-experiences of solid bodies, it is easy to understand how the concept "space" originated, namely, how a thing independent of bodies and yet embodying their position-possibilities (Lagerungsmoglichkeiten) was posited. If we have a system of bodies in contact and at rest relatively to one another, some can be replaced by others. This property of allowing substitution is interpreted as "available space." Space denotes the property in virtue of which rigid bodies can occupy different positions. The view that space is something with a unity of its own is perhaps due to the circumstance that in pre-scientific thought all positions of bodies were referred to one body (reference body), namely the forth. In scientific thought the earth is represented by the co-ordinate system. The assertion that it would be possible to place an unlimited number of bodies next to one another denotes that space is infinite. In pre-scientific thought the concepts "space" and "time" and "body of reference" are scarcely differentiated at all. A place or point in space is always taken to mean a material point on a body of reference. Thus, space- an extended manifold of several dimensions, where the number of dimensions corresponds to the number of variable magnitudes needed to specify a location in the manifold; in particular, the three-dimensional manifold in which physical objects are situated and with respect to which their mutual positions and distances are defined.

Time

The physical time-concept answers to the time-concept of the extra-scientific mind. Now, the latter has its root in the time-order of the experiences of the individual, and this order we must accept as something primarily given.

I experience the moment "now," or, expressed more accurately, the present sense-experience (Sinnen-Erlebnis) combined with the recollection of (earlier) sense-experiences. That is why the sense-experiences seem to form a series, namely the time-series indicated by "earlier" and "later." The experience-series is thought of as a one-dimensional continuum. Experience-series can repeat themselves and can then be recognised. They can also be repeated inexactly, wherein some events are replaced by others without the character of the repetition becoming lost

for us. In this way we form the time-concept as a one-dimensional frame which can be filled in by experiences in various ways. The same series of experiences answer to the same subjective time-intervals.

The transition from this "subjective" time (Ich-Zeit) to the time-concept of pre-scientific thought is connected with the formation of the idea that there is a real external world independent of the subject. In this sense the (objective) event is made to correspond with the subjective experience, in the same sense there is attributed to the "subjective" time of the experience a "time" of the corresponding "objective" event. In contrast with experiences external events and their order in time claim validity for all subjects.

This process of objectification would encounter no difficulties were the time-order of the experiences corresponding to a series of external events the same for all individuals In the case of the immediate visual perceptions of our daily lives, this correspondence is exact. That is why the idea that there is an objective time-order became established to an extraordinary extent. In working out the idea of an objective world of external events in greater detail, it was found necessary to make events and experiences depend on each other in a more complicated way. This was at first done by means of rules and modes of thought instinctively gained, in which the conception of space plays a particularly' prominent pan. This process of refinement leads ultimately to natural science.

The measurement of time is effected by means of clocks. A clock is a thing which automatically passes in succession through a (practically) equal series of events (period). The number of periods (clock-time) elapsed serves as a measure of time. The meaning of this definition is at once clear if the event occurs in the immediate vicinity of the clock in space; for all observers then observe the same clock-time simultaneously with the event (by means of the eye) independently of their position. Until the theory of relativity was propounded it was assumed that the conception of simultaneity had an absolute objective meaning also for events separated in space.

This assumption was demolished by the discovery of the law of propagation of light. For if the velocity of light in empty space is to be a quantity that is independent of the choice (or, respectively, of the state of motion) of the inertial system to which it is referred, no absolute meaning can be assigned to the conception of the simultaneity of events that occur at points separated by a distance in space. Rather, a special time must be allocated to every inertial system. If no co-ordinate system (inertial system) is used as a basis of reference there is no sense in asserting that events at different points in space occur simultaneously. It is in consequence of this that space and time are welded together into a uniform four-dimensional continuum.

Anthropogenesis

Evolution of modern human beings from nonhuman and extinct hominid forms. The main stages of hominid evolution are represented by the australopithecines, Homo habilis, Homo erectus and Homo sapiens.

Human beings, extant and extinct, comprise the zoological family Hominidae; and the single living human species, Homo sapiens, is one of some 200 species of the order Primates, in turn one of 20 orders constituting the vertebrate class Mammalia. Among the past and present diversity of primates, hominids have long been recognized as having the closest resemblances, and hence affinities, to the African great apes (pongids); thus, in 1863 the British biologist T.H. Huxley noted in The Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature that "whatever system of organs be studied ... the structural differences which separate Man from the Gorilla and the Chimpanzee arc not so great as those which separate the Gorilla from the lower apes [monkeys]." Various methods for the comparative evaluation of genetic character states have both repeatedly confirmed and measured in some detail the very close proximity of the extant African apes and modern Homo sapiens. All such findings are congruent with a common origin of apes and Hominidae, within the African continent, which took place some five to six million years ago.

Three major areas are generally recognized within the subject of human evolution: primatology, which has as its major focus the biological and behavioral aspects of nonhuman primates; human paleontology, which is concerned with the recovery, description, and evaluation of the fossil evidence for hominid evolution; and paleoanthropology, which encompasses interrelated investigations into the biological and behavioral evolution of Hominidae. In addition, five major areas of research can be identified in human evolutionary studies: the origins of Hominidae, adaptation and diversification of the genus Australopithecus, the origins of the genus Homo, the emergence of Homo erectus and subsequent hominid occupation of Eurasia, and the origins and dispersals of premadern and modem Homo sapiens.

Investigations of hominid origins are variously concerned with diverse comparative studies of extant higher primates and humans, as well as the search for ancestors in the fossil record. Pongids and hominids show a diversity of contrasting adaptations that evidently reflect their evolutionary divergences and which thus require explanation. Moreover, although markedly different from the Asian pongid (orangutan), the African pongids (gorilla 'and chimpanzee) differ from one another both structurally and behaviorally. The roots of Hominidae have been traced to at least four million years ago, and possibly to some five million years ago. The rarity and fragmentary condition of the few eldest known specimens, however, do not reveal critical aspects of hominid adaptation, such as modifications in trunk and lower-limb structure. Hence, the details of hominid origins remain unknown and the subject of lively debate and substantial speculation. The ancestral stock of extant African apes and of hominids also remains unknown, in large part a reflection of the paucity of fossil-bearing localities in the five- to 10-million-year time span. In the absence of a fossil record, structural and other adaptations have been projected back as an ancestral condition from living descendant species; but this is a very risky procedure that dismisses morphological transformation and adaptation and assumes stasis without complementary confirmation.

The oldest definitely known hominids are attributed to the extinct genus Australopithecus. The genus speciated substantially, producing distinct and, in some cases, possibly convergent lineages. At least four species (afarensis, africanus, robustus, boisei) are commonly accepted, and two more (aethiopicus, crassidens) are recognized by some workers on morphological grounds. All species of the genus originated in the Pliocene epoch (5.3 to 1.6 million years ago), and the genus apparently became extinct in the Early Pleistocene (about 1.6 million to 900,000 years ago); its distribution is unknown outside the African continent. The oldest and most primitive species is A. afarensis, and most workers believe it to be ancestral to succedent species. Although they exhibited some fundamental hominid adaptations (bipedalism, reduction of anterior dentition, exploitation of nonforested habitats), most or all australopithecine species remained primitive in terms of growth and maturation, brain size and proportions, dietary adjustments, and complexity of cultural behaviour. Homo coexisted with the later, so-called "robust," australopithecines - robustus (and possibly crassidens) in southern Africa and boisei in East Africa-although the adaptations enabling such coexistence are scarcely understood, and it is generally thought that an australopithecine species was ancestral to Homo.

The recognition and suitable definition of the genus Homo and its initial representatives has been a persistently troublesome problem. There have been no formal diagnoses, and the few characterizations offered suffer from both lack of definitive character states and inclusiveness. The problem has been exacerbated as the hominid fossil record has expanded, particularly in respect to specimens dated to the end of the Pliocene epoch that lack distinctively Australopithecus-like characteristics. The first such specimens, found in the early 1960s in the Olduvai Gorge of Tanzania, were designated Homo habilis. Further remains of both comparable and greater age were subsequently recovered from northern Kenya and southwestern Ethiopia. Although a single initial Homo species (H. habilis) was originally proposed, this perspective has been criticized by some workers as simplistic because of the substantial variability of the fossil finds; accordingly, it is entirely possible mat two contemporaneous and even sympatric species may have existed in the Late Pliocene. Coincident with the appearance and subsequent presence of such hominid(s) are various traces of associated culturally patterned behaviours. These include evidence of natural but transported and accumulated stone, flaked-stone artifacts, and occasional associated mammal (and other) skeletal parts, all of which indicate the exploitation and utilization of animal resources: the repeated utilization and occupation of particular locales; and the expanded employment of natural resources in conjunction with technological capabilities and requirements. Such biological and behavioral adaptations are believed by many workers to reflect major transformations and reorganizations in hominid phylogeny, perhaps consequent upon the initial appearance of genus Homo.

The fossil record in sub-Saharan Africa affords evidence of the appearance of another, more derived (i.e., more evolved) species of Homo - Homo erectus-at the beginning of the Pleistocene epoch. At several localities in East and southern Africa, the species occurs sympatrically with the "robust" australopithecines. Less ancient occurrences are also known from northwestern Africa. The initial occupation of Eurasia by hominids appears to postdate such an antiquity, and it is generally inferred that the first Eurasian hominids were dispersals from an African source, perhaps between 1.5 and one million years ago. Homo erectus was first and, for a long time, best known from fossil finds in Southeast and East Asia. The fossil occurrences there range in age from approximately 1.6 million to 250,000 years. Although initial hominid occupation in Europe was probably at least as early, no human skeletal remains are known from the most ancient times, and those that have been found-dated to between 500,000 and 300,000 years ago-do not represent H. erectus but rather a form of H. sapiens that has been labeled "archaic." The initial and subsequent penetration of hominids from the lower to middle latitudes occurred as the amplitude and intensity of glacial-interglacial climatic cycles was increasing. The extent to which there were attendant, and perhaps correlative, changes in human biology and in behaviour have remained the subjects of substantial research and much controversy.

Traditionally, the tendency among students of hominid evolution was to attribute premodern human fossil finds to one or more extinct species, and sometimes even distinct genera, but as efforts increasingly have been directed a^ seeking congruence between developments in evolutionary biology and in the state of the hominid fossil record, substantial revisions in the classification of Hominidae have emerged. A variety of premodern human finds of both late Middle Pleistocene and early Late Pleistocene ages came to be subsumed within the species H. sapiens and were only further distinguished below the species level. This varied and increasingly large sample of post-erectus hominids came to be regarded as archaic H. sapiens, as distinguished from anatomically modern humans. This is largely a consequence of the mosaic of morphological features represented in the substantial variations among such materials, which exhibit primitive versus advanced, or derived, features.

If early African H. erectus constituted the source of subsequent hominids, then it would appear that evolution proceeded quite differently in major geographic areas. For example, H. erectus is characteristic of the Asian Middle Pleistocene, where it is also long persistent and distinguished by its own group of singular, derived features. In Africa derivatives of early H. erectus are known, as are some transitional examples linking H. erectus to archaic H. sapiens. Skeletal parts of the earliest hominid occupants of western Eurasia are not known. The first examples from this area occur well into the Middle Pleistocene, and there is a range of variation in the specimens from strongly and partially erectus-like to incipiently Neanderthal-like, passing ultimately into the well-known and widely distributed Neanderthal peoples. The Neanderthals were for many years treated as a distinct species (Homo neanderthalensis), but they were subsequently subsumed as an archaic subspecies of H. sapiens. An increasingly substantial body of evidence has been accumulated, however, which suggests that a return to the older position is probably warranted. In

Western Europe, at least, there is increasing evidence of the contemporaneity of the last Neanderthal peoples with those early modem populations that have come to be known as Cro-Magnons. For these reasons, and in order to recognize and express differing degrees of derivation, further taxonomic evaluation and distinction of these archaic H. sapiens specimens is required, which will doubtless include the recognition of additional subspecies of both the H. erectus and H. neanderthalensis groups in western Eurasia and also corresponding taxonomic reassessment of various African Middle Pleistocene samples. In East Asia the existence and morphology of archaic H. sapiens has been well established, but the extent to which this form was a contemporaneous or a succedent replacement for the late H. erectus populations has not been firmly resolved.

The roots of anatomically modern humans have long been a puzzle to students of human evolution and hence the source of much speculation and debate. Nonetheless, several developments have caused renewed interest in the problem from different perspectives. First, there has been the recognition of substantially greater relative and absolute ages for the archaeological industries of the African Middle Stone Age (about 200,000 to 40,000 years ago) and, correspondingly, some associated modern like human skeletal parts. A series of such sub-Saharan occurrences has been identified within earlier and later segments of this time span. Second, there has been the recognition and broad acceptance of early modem human (often called "Cro-Magnoid") populations in western Asia that were distinct from, and considerably older than (i.e., 90,000-100,000 years ago), the known Neanderthals from mat area and also much older than the European Cro-Magnon peoples who were widespread in Europe by some 30,000-35,000 years ago. Third, there has been the increasing availability of comparative genetic data on degrees of affinities of modern human populations. The biochemical systems of Asian and European populations appear to be more similar to each other than those of either group are to African populations; thus, Asians and Europeans may have shared a common ancestry some 40,000 years ago and a common ancestry with African populations almost three times as long ago. Moreover, investigations of human mitochondrial DNA reveal two facts: that the variation among modern human populations is small compared, for example, with that between apes and monkeys, which points to the recency of human origin; and that there is a distinction between African and other human mitochondrial DNA types, suggesting the substantial antiquity of the African peoples and the relative recency of other human populations.

Consciousness

A psychological condition defined by the English philosopher John Locke as "the perception of what passes in a man's own mind." Early views.

In the early 19th century the concept was variously considered. Some philosophers regarded it as a kind of substance, or "mental stuff," quite different from the material substance of the physical world. Others thought of it as an attribute characterized by sensation and voluntary movement, which separated animals and men from lower forms of life and also described the difference between the normal waking state of animals and men and their condition when asleep, in a coma, or under anesthesia (the latter condition was described as unconsciousness). Other descriptions included an analysis of consciousness as a form of relationship or act of the mind toward objects in nature, and a view that consciousness was a continuous field or stream of essentially mental "sense data," roughly similar to the "ideas" of earlier empirical philosophers.

The method employed by most early writers in observing consciousness was introspection - looking within one's own mind to discover the laws of its operation. The limitations of the method became apparent when it was found that because of differing preconceptions, trained observers in the laboratory often could not agree on fundamental observations.

Thomas Nagel claims that conscious states are subjective: to fully understand them, one must understand what it is like to be in them, but one can do that only by taking up the experiential point of view of a subject in them. Nagel has suggested that consciousness may be explainable only by appeal to as yet undiscovered basic non-mental, non-physical properties- " proto-mental properties". The nature of consciousness thus remains a matter of dispute.

Cognition

The process involved in knowing, or the act of knowing, which in its completeness includes perception and judgment. Cognition includes every mental process that can be described as an experience of knowing as distinguished from an experience of feeling or of willing. It includes, in short, all processes of consciousness by which knowledge is built up, including perceiving, recognizing, conceiving, and reasoning. The essence of cognition is judgment, in which a certain object is distinguished from other objects and is characterized by some concept or concepts.

The nature of cognition and the relationship between the knowing mind and external reality have been exhaustively discussed by philosophers since antiquity. Cognition and its development have been subjected to many viewpoints and interpretations. The psychologist is concerned with the cognitive process as it affects learning and behaviour.

There are two broad approaches to contemporary cognitive theory. The information-processing approach attempts to understand human thought and reasoning processes by comparing the mind to a sophisticated computer system that is designed to acquire, process, store, and use information according to various programs.

The second approach is based on the work of Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980), who viewed cognitive adaptation in terms of two basic processes: assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation is the process whereby an individual interprets reality in terms of his own internal model of the world based on previous experience; whereas, accommodation is the process of changing that model by developing the mechanisms to adjust to reality. Piaget believed that representational thought does not originate in a social language but rather in unique symbols that serve as a foundation for a later, acquired language.

The American psychologist Jerome S. Bruner (b. 1915) broadened Piaget's concept by suggesting that the cognitive process is effected by the three modes we use to represent our world: the enactive mode involves representation through action; the iconic mode uses visual and mental images; and the symbolic mode uses language.

Rationalism

The philosophical view that regards 'reason as the chief source and test of knowledge. Holding that reality itself has an inherently logical structure, the Rationalist asserts that a class of truths exists that the intellect can grasp directly. There are, according to the Rationalists, certain rational principles-especially in logic and mathematics, and even in ethics and metaphysics-that are so fundamental that to deny them is to fall into contradiction. The Rationalist's confidence in reason and proof tends, therefore, to detract from his respect for other ways of knowing. Rationalism has long been the rival of Empiricism, the doctrine that all knowledge comes from, and must be tested by, sense experience. As against this doctrine, Rationalism holds reason to be a faculty that can lay hold of truths beyond the reach of sense perception, both in certainty and generality. In stressing the existence of a "natural light," Rationalism has also been the rival of systems claiming esoteric knowledge, whether from mystical experience, revelation, or intuition, and has been opposed to various irrationalisms that lend to stress the biological, the emotional or volitional, the unconscious, or the existential at the expense of the rational.

In recent philosophical writing, the term “rationalism” is most closely associated with the positions of a group of seventeenth-century philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and sometimes Malebranche. They all share the view that we have a non-empirical and rational access to the truth about the way the world is, and all privilege reason over knowledge derived from senses. These philosophers are also attracted to mathematics as a model for knowledge in general.

Irrationalism

A 19th- and early 20th-century philosophical trend that claimed to enrich man's apprehension of life by expanding it beyond the rational to its fuller dimensions. Rooted either in metaphysics or in an awareness of the uniqueness of human experience, irrationalism stressed the dimensions of instinct, feeling, and will as over and against reason. The term is used chiefly by continental European philosophers, who regard irrationalism as one of several strong currents flowing into the 20th century.

There were irrationalists before the 19th century. In ancient Greek culture-which is usually assessed as rationalistic - a Dionysian (i.e., instinctive) strain can be discerned in the works of the poet Pindar, in the dramatists, and even in such philosophers as Pythagoras and Empedocles and in Plato, in early modern philosophy - even during the ascendancy of Cartesian rationalism-Blaise Pascal turned from reason to an Augustinian faith, convinced that "the heart has its reasons" unknown to reason as such.

The main tide of irrationalism, like that of literary romanticism - itself a form of irrationalism - followed the Age of Reason and was a reaction to it. Irrationalism found much in the life of the spirit and in human history that could not be dealt with by the rational methods of science. Under the influence of Charles Darwin and later Sigmund Freud, irrationalism began to explore the biological and subconscious roots of experience. Pragmatism, existentialism and vitalism (or "life philosophy”) arose as expressions of this expanded view of human life and thought.

For Arthur Schopenhauer, a typical 19th-century irrationalist, voluntarism expressed the essence of reality - a blind, purposeless will permeating all existence. If mind, then, is an emergent from mute biological process, it is natural to conclude, as the pragmatists did, that it evolved as an instrument for practical adjustment-not as an organ for the rational plumbing of metaphysics. Charles Sanders Peirce and William James thus argued that ideas are to be assessed not in terms of logic but in terms of their practical results when put to the test of action.

Irrationalism is also expressed in the historicism and relativism of Wilhelm Dilthey, who saw all knowledge as conditioned by one's private historical perspective and who thus urged the importance of the Geisteswissenschaften (the humanities). Johann Georg Hamann, spurning speculation, sought truth in feeling, faith, and experience, making personal convictions its ultimate criterion. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi exalted the certitude and clarity of faith to the detriment of intellectual knowledge and sensation.

Friedrich Schelling and Henri Bergson, who were preoccupied with the uniqueness of human experience, turned to intuitionism, which "sees things invisible to science." Reason itself was not repudiated; it had simply lost its commanding role inasmuch as personal insights are impervious to testing. In its aspect as a vitalism, Bergson's philosophy-as well as that of Friedrich Nietzsche-was irrationalistic in holding that instinctive, or Dionysian, drive lies at the heart of existence. Nietzsche viewed moral codes as myths, lies, and frauds created to mask forces operating beneath the surface to influence thought and behaviour. For him, God is dead and man is free to formulate

new values. Ludwig Klages extended life philosophy in Germany by urging that the irrational springs of human life are "natural" and should be followed in a deliberate effort to root out the adventitious reason; and Oswald Spengler extended it to history, which he viewed intuitively as an irrational process of organic growth and decay.

In existentialism, Soren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus all despaired of making sense out of an incoherent world; and each chose his own alternative to reason - the leap of faith, radical freedom, and heroic revolt, respectively.

In general, irrationalism implies either (in ontology) that the world is devoid of rational structure, meaning, and purpose; or (in epistemology) that reason is inherently defective and incapable of knowing the universe without distortion; or (in ethics) that recourse to objective standards is futile; or (in anthropology) that in human nature itself the dominant dimensions are irrational.

Agnosticism

(From Greek agnostos, "unknowable"), strictly speaking, the doctrine that humans cannot know of the existence of anything beyond .the phenomena of their experience. The term has come to be equated in popular parlance with skepticism about religious questions in general and in particular with the rejection of traditional Christian beliefs under the impact of modern scientific thought.

The word agnosticism was first publicly coined in 1869 at a meeting of the Metaphysical Society in London by T.H. Huxley, a British biologist and champion of the Darwinian theory of evolution. He coined it as a suitable label for his own position. "It came into my head as suggestively antithetical to the Gnostic' of Church history who professed to know so much about the very things of which I was ignorant." Agnosticism is an attitude of those who claim that metaphysical ideas can be neither proved nor disproved. Huxley wrote, “I neither affirm nor deny the immortality of man. I see no reason for believing it, but on the hand, I have no means of disproving it.”

Agnosticism is a form of skepticism applied to metaphysics, especially theism. The position is sometimes attributed to Kant, who held that we cannot have knowledge of God or immortality but must content with faith.

Axiology

(From Greek axios, "worthy"; logos, "science"), also called Theory of Value, the philosophical study of goodness, or value, in the widest sense of these terms. Its significance lies (1) in the considerable expansion that it has given to the meaning of the term value and (2) in the unification that it has provided for the study of a variety of questions-economic, moral, aesthetic, and even logical - that had often been considered in relative isolation.

The term "value" originally meant the worth of something, chiefly in the economic sense of exchange value, as in the work of the 18th-century political economist Adam Smith. A broad extension of the meaning of value to wider areas of philosophical interest occurred during the 19th century under the influence of a variety of thinkers and schools: the Neo-Kantians Rudolf Hermann Lotze and Albrecht Ritschl; Friedrich Nietzsche, author of a theory of the transvaluation of all values; Alexius Meinong and Christian von Ehrenfels; and Eduard von Hartmann, philosopher of the unconscious, whose Grundriss der Axiologie (1909; "Outline of Axiology") first used the term in a title. Hugo Munsterberg, often regarded as the founder of applied psychology, and Wilbur Marshall Urban, whose Valuation, Its Nature and Laws (1909) was the first treatise on this topic in English, introduced the movement to the United States. Ralph Barton Perry's book General Theory of Value (1926) has been called the magnum opus of the new approach. A value, he theorized, is "any object of any interest." Later, he explored eight "realms" of value: morality, religion, art, science, economics, politics, law, and custom.

A distinction is commonly made between instrumental and intrinsic value - between what is good as a means and what is good as an end. John Dewey, in Human Nature and Conduct (1922) and Theory of Valuation (1939), presented a pragmatic interpretation and tried to break down this distinction between means and ends, though the latter effort was more likely a way of emphasizing the point that many actual things in human life - such as health, knowledge, and virtue-are good in both senses. Other philosophers, such as C.I. Lewis, Georg Henrik von Wright, and W.K. Frankena, have multiplied the distinctions-differentiating, for example, between instrumental value (being good for some purpose) and technical value (being good at doing something) or between contributory value (being good as part of a whole) and final value (being good as a whole).

Many different answers are given to the question "What is intrinsically good?" Hedonists say it is pleasure; Pragmatists, satisfaction, growth, or adjustment; Kantians, a good will; Humanists, harmonious self-realization; Christians, the love of God. Pluralists, such as G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, Max Scheler, and Ralph Barton Perry, argue that there are any numbers of intrinsically good things. Moore, a founding father of Analytic philosophy, developed a theory of organic wholes, holding that the value of an aggregate of things depends upon how they are combined.

Because "fact" symbolizes objectivity and "value" suggests subjectivity, the relationship of value to fact is of fundamental importance in developing any theory of the objectivity of value and of value judgments. Whereas such descriptive sciences as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and comparative religion all attempt to give a factual description of what is actually valued, as well as causal explanations of similarities and differences between the valuations, it remains the philosopher's task to ask about their objective validity. The philosopher asks whether something is of value because it is desired, as subjectivists such as Perry hold, or whether it is desired because it has value, as objectivists such as Moore and Nicolai Hartmann claim. In both approaches, value judgments are assumed to have a cognitive status, and the approaches differ only on whether a value exists as a property of something

independently of human interest in it or desire for it. Noncognitivists, on the other hand, deny the cognitive status of value judgments, holding that their main function is cither emotive, as the positivist A.J. Ayer maintains, ,or prescriptive, as the analyst R.M. Hare holds. Existentialists, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, emphasizing freedom, decision, and choice of one's values, also appear to reject any logical or ontological connection between value and fact.

Society

The term structure has been used with reference to human societies since the 19th century, Before that time, it had been already applied to other fields, particularly construction and biology. Its biological connotations are evident in the work of several social theorists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, such as Herbert Spencer in England. He and others conceived of society as an organism, the parts of which are interdependent and thereby form a structure that is similar to the anatomy of a living body.

The metaphor of construction is clear in the work of Karl Marx, where he speaks of "the economic structure [Structure] of society, the real basis on which is erected a legal and political superstructure [Uberbau] and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond." This phrase expresses the Marxian view that the basic structure of society is economic, or material, and determines, at least to a large extent, the rest of social life, which is defined as spiritual or ideological.

Although social scientists since Spencer and Marx have disagreed on the concept of social structure, their definitions have certain elements in common. In the most general way, social structure may be defined as those features of a social entity (a society or group within a society) that have a certain permanence over time, are interrelated, and determine or condition to a large extent both the functioning of the entity as a whole and the activities of its individual members.

As may be inferred from this definition, several ideas are implicit in the notion of social structure. The concept expresses the idea that human beings form social relations that are not arbitrary and coincidental, but exhibit some regularity and persistence. The concept also refers to the observation that social life is not amorphous but is differentiated into groups, positions, and institutions that are interdependent, or functionally interrelated. These differentiated and interrelated characteristics of human groupings, although constituted by the social activities of individuals, are not a direct corollary of the wishes and intentions of these individuals; instead, individual choices are shaped and circumscribed by the social environment. The notion of social structure implies, in other words, that human beings are not completely free and autonomous in choosing their activities, but rather they are constrained by the social world they live in and the social relations they form with one another.

The social structure is sometimes simply defined as patterned social relations - those regular and repetitive aspects of the interactions between the members of a given social entity. Even on this descriptive level, the concept is highly abstract: it selects only certain elements from ongoing social activities. The larger the social entity considered, the more abstract the concept tends to be. What is considered as the social structure of a small group is generally much nearer to the daily activities of its individual members than that which is regarded as the social structure of a larger society. In the latter case the problem of selection is acute: what to include or not include as components of the social structure. The solution to the problem varies with the different theoretical views according to which characteristics of the society are regarded as particularly important.

Apart from these different theoretical views, some preliminary remarks on general aspects of the social structure of any society may be made. Most generally, social life is structured along the dimensions of time and space. Specific social activities take place at specific times, and time is divided into periods that are connected with the rhythms of social life - the routines of the day, the month, and the year. Specific social activities are also organized at specific places; particular places, for instance, are designated for such activities as working, worshiping, eating, or sleeping. Territorial boundaries delineate these places. These boundaries are defined by rules of property, which in any society structure the use and possession of scarce goods.

In any society, moreover, there is a more or less regular division of labour. Yet another universal structural characteristic of human societies is the regulation of violence. The use of violence is everywhere a potentially disruptive force; at the same time, it is a means of coercion and coordination of activities. Human beings have formed political units, such as nations, within which the use of violence is strictly regulated and which, at the same time, are organized for the use of violence against outside groups. In any society, furthermore, there are arrangements within the structure for sexual reproduction and the care and education of the young. These arrangements partly take the form of kinship and marriage relations. Finally, systems of symbolic communication, particularly language, everywhere structure the interactions between the members of a society.

Within the broad framework of these and other general features of human society, there is an enormous variety of social forms between and even within societies. Several theories have been developed to account for both the similarities and the varieties. In these theories certain aspects of social life are regarded as basic and, therefore, central components of the social structure.

Some social scientists use the concept of social structure as a device for creating an order for the various aspects of social life. Thus, the U.S. anthropologist George P. Murdock, in his Social Structure (1949), a comparative study of kinship systems, used the concept as a taxonomic scheme for classifying, comparing, and correlating aspects of kinship systems of different societies. In other studies, the concept is of greater theoretical

importance; it is regarded as an explanatory concept, a key to the understanding of human social life. Some of the more prominent of these theories are reviewed here.

State

Political organization of society, or the body politic, or, more narrowly, the institutions of government. The state is a form of human association distinguished from other social groups by its purpose, the establishment of order and security; its methods, the laws and their enforcement; its territory, the area of jurisdiction or geographic boundaries; and finally by its sovereignty. The state consists, most broadly, of the agreement of the individuals on the means whereby disputes are settled in the form of laws. In such countries as the United States, Australia, Nigeria, Mexico, and Brazil, the term state (or a cognate) also refers to political units, not sovereign themselves, but subject to the authority of the larger state, or federal union.

The history of the Western state begins in ancient Greece. Plato and Aristotle wrote of the polis, or city-state, as an ideal form of association, in which the whole community's religious, cultural, political, and economic needs could be satisfied. This city-state, characterized primarily by its self-sufficiency, was seen by Aristotle as the means of developing morality in the human character. The Greek idea corresponds more accurately to the modern concept of the nation-i.e., a population of a fixed area that shares a common language, culture, and history - whereas the Roman res publica, or commonwealth, is more similar to the modern concept of the state. The res publica was a legal system whose jurisdiction extended to all Roman citizens, securing their rights and determining their responsibilities. With the fragmentation of the Roman system, the question of authority and the need for order and security led to a long period of struggle between the warring feudal lords of Europe.

It was not until the 16th century that the modern concept of the state emerged, in the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli (Italy) and Jean Bodin (France), as the centralizing force whereby stability might be regained. In The Prince, Machiavelli gave prime importance to the durability of government, sweeping aside all moral considerations and focusing instead on the strength - the vitality, courage, and independence - of the ruler, for Bodin, his contemporary, power was not sufficient in itself to create a sovereign; rule must comply with morality to be durable, and it must have continuity-i.e., a means of establishing succession. Boding theory was the forerunner of the 17th-century doctrine of the "divine right of kings," whereby monarchy became the predominate form of government in Europe. It created a climate for the ideas of the 17th-century reformers like John Locke in England and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in France, who began to reexamine the origins and purposes of the state.

Rather than the right of a monarch to rule, Rousseau proposed that the state owed its authority to the general will of the governed. For him, the nation itself is sovereign, and the law is none other than the will of the people as a whole. Influenced by Plato, Rousseau recognized the state as the environment for the moral development of humanity. Man, though corrupted by his civilization, remained basically good and therefore capable of assuming the moral position of aiming at the general welfare. Because the result of aiming at individual purposes is disagreement, a healthy (noncorrupting) state can exist only when the common good is recognized as the goal.

Rousseau's ideas reflect an attitude far more positive in respect of human nature than either Locke or Thomas Hobbes, his 16th-century English predecessor. The "natural condition" of man, said Hobbes, is self-seeking and competitive. Man subjects himself to the rule of the state as the only means of -self-preservation whereby he can escape the brutish cycle of mutual destruction that is otherwise the result of his contact with others.

For Locke, the human condition is not so gloomy, but the state again springs from the need for protection-in this case, of inherent rights. Locke said that the state is the social contract by which individuals agree not to infringe on each other's "natural rights" to life, liberty, and property, in exchange for which each man secures his own "sphere of liberty."

The 19th-century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel saw the sphere of liberty as the whole state, with freedom not so much an individual's right, but rather, a result of human reason. Freedom was not the capacity to do as one liked but was the alignment with a universal will toward well-being. When men acted as moral agents, conflict ceased, and their aims coincided. Subordinating himself to the state, the individual was able to realize a synthesis between the values of family and the needs of economic life. To Hegel, the state was the culmination of moral action, where freedom of choice had led to the unity of the rational will, and all parts of society were nourished within the health of the whole. However, Hegel remained enchanted with the power of national aspiration. He did not share the vision of Immanuel Kant, his predecessor, who proposed the establishment of a league of nations to end conflict altogether and to establish a "perpetual peace."

For the English utilitarians of the 19th century, the state was an artificial means of producing a unity of interest and a device for maintaining stability. This benign but mechanistic view proposed by Jeremy Bentham and others set a precedent for the early communist thinkers like Karl Marx for whom the state had become an "apparatus of oppression" determined by a ruling class whose object was always to maintain itself in economic supremacy. He and his collaborator, Friedrich Engels. wrote in The Communist Manifesto that, in order to realize complete freedom and contentment, the people must replace the government first by, a "dictatorship of the proletariat," which would be followed by the "withering away of the state," and then by a classless society based not on the enforcement of laws but on the organization of the means of production and the fair distribution of goods and property.

In the 20th century, concepts of state ranged from anarchism, in which the state was deemed unnecessary and even harmful in that it operated by some form of coercion, to the welfare state, in which the government was held to be responsible for the survival of its members, guaranteeing subsistence to those lacking it.

In the wake of the destruction produced by the nationalistically inspired world wars, theories of internationalism like those of Hans Kelsen and Oscar Ichazo appeared. Kelsen put forward the idea of the state as simply a centralized legal order, no more sovereign than the individual, in that it could not be defined only by its own existence and experience. It must be seen in the context of its interaction with the rest of the world. Ichazo proposed a new kind of state in which the universal qualities of all individuals provided a basis for unification, with the whole society functioning as a single organism.

Personality

A characteristic way of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Personality embraces moods, attitudes, and opinions and is most clearly expressed in interactions with other people. It includes behavioral characteristics, both inherent and acquired, that distinguish one person from another and that can be observed in people's relations to the environment and to the social group.

The term personality has been defined in many ways, but as a psychological concept two main meanings have evolved. The first pertains to the consistent differences that exist between people: in this sense, the study of personality focuses on classifying and explaining relatively stable human psychological characteristics. The second meaning emphasizes those qualities that make all people alike and that distinguish psychological man from other species; it directs the personality theorist to search for those regularities among all people that define the nature of man as well as the factors that influence the course of lives. This duality may help explain the two directions that personality studies have taken: on the one hand, the study of ever more specific qualities in people, and, on the other, the search for the organized totality of psychological functions that emphasizes the interplay between organic and psychological events within people and those social and biological events that surround them. The dual definition of personality is interwoven in most of the topics discussed below. It should be emphasized, however, that no definition of personality has found universal acceptance within the field.

The study of personality can be said to have its origins in the fundamental idea that people are distinguished by their characteristic individual patterns of behaviour - the distinctive ways in which they walk, talk, furnish their living quarters, or express their urges. Whatever the behaviour, personologists - as those who systematically study personality are called-examine how people differ in the ways they express themselves and attempt to determine the causes of these differences. Although other fields of psychology examine many of the same functions and processes, such as attention, thinking, or motivation, the personologist places emphasis on how these different processes fit together and become integrated so as to give each person a distinctive identity, or personality.

The systematic psychological study of personality has emerged from a number of different sources, including psychiatric case studies that focused on lives in distress, from philosophy, which explores the nature of man, and from physiology, anthropology, and social psychology. The systematic study of personality as a recognizable and separate discipline within psychology may be said to have begun in the 1930s with the publication in the United States of two textbooks. Psychology of Personality (1937) by Ross Stagner and Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (1937) by Gordon W. Allport followed by Henry A. Murray's Explorations in Personality (1938), which contained a set of experimental and clinical studies, and by Gardner Murphy's integrative and comprehensive text. Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure (1947). Yet personology can trace its ancestry to the ancient Greeks, who proposed a kind of biochemical theory of personality.

One can say that personality is a social characteristic of man. Only in society human becomes personality.

Control questions.

1. What questions are the concern of “Philosophical Anthropology”?
2. What philosophers made important contributions into “Philosophical Anthropology”?
3. Why the study of consciousness is so difficult?
4. Try to give your own definition of personality?

Glossary

Alienation: according to Marx, man alienates himself to be dependent on or exploited by his environment, even though it may in some respects be his own product.

Analytic: (as applied to statements or propositions) true by virtue of meaning alone and without reference to empirical content.

Behaviourism: the thesis that “mental” states are neither “internal” nor “private”; whatever there is to know about the “mind” can be fully understood and explained in terms of publically observable overt physical behaviour.

Categorical imperative: for Kant, an unconditional moral principle that lays down that duty or obligation must be the only criterion for assessing human actions.

Deduction: a process of reasoning involving logically necessary inferences from a general premiss or set of premises to a conclusion.

Deontology: a subdivision of ethics concerned with moral obligation or duty.

Determinism: the view that whatever we think or do is not only caused but is also the inevitable consequence of antecedent circumstances or causes beyond our control.

Dialectics: for Plato a process of argument by means of which truth is alleged to be elicited; for Hegel a process of reasoning and a historical process which involves the progressive "negation" of the statement or event (the thesis) by another (the antithesis), both being subsequently subsumed into a "higher" synthesis.

Dialectical materialism: theory of Marx and Engels that "mind", man, society and nature are ultimately dependent on and explicable in terms of a material infrastructure and are subject to a dialectical process of change.

Dualism: the view that the world, including man, is constituted out of two different kind of substances.

Empiricism: the thesis that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience.

Epistemology: branch of philosophy concerned with the nature, scope and justification of knowledge.

Ethics: branch of philosophy concerned with questions about the value of human conduct, the nature of "goodness", the justification of moral rules and principles.

Idealism: the view that reality is mental and that external objects exist only in thought.

Induction: a reasoning process usually from empirically testable premisses to a general conclusion which may in some respects contain more information than was to be found in the premises together, or makes that information more explicit.

Karma: in Indian philosophy, the term refers to a causal "law" or "force" which determines a person's moral condition in present and future reincarnations according to the nature of his past deeds.

Materialism: theory that denies the existence of mind or mental states, or claims that "consciousness" can be fully accounted for in terms of material laws and processes.

Metaphysics: branch of philosophy concerned with the most general questions about "ultimate" reality and what kinds of things exist; and the nature of mind, matter, time causation and so on.

Moksa: in Indian thought the state of "enlightenment" in which one achieves "release" or freedom from the cycle of rebirth.

Monism: the view that the world, including man, is constituted of one kind of "stuff".

Noumenon: the thing-in-itself, the real nature of a thing essentially unperceivable and unknowable.

Phenomenon: that which perceived or experienced.

Sense-datum: what is immediately and directly given to us through the senses without reference to possible causes.

Substance: this term has been used in different ways by various philosophers since Greek times, but in general it refers to the “essence” of a thing- what makes it what it is, in which its qualities, attributes, or “accidents” inhere.

Teleology: the study of final causes, ends, or purposes, and of purposive of functional activities.

Universals: what general terms (for example “cat”, “whiteness”) are alleged to stand for.